Verification results for age-structured models of economic–epidemics dynamics

In this paper we propose a macro-dynamic age-structured set-up for the analysis of epidemics/economic dynamics in continuous time.The resulting optimal control problem is reformulated in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space framework where we perform the basic steps of dynamic programming approach.Our main result is a verification theorem which allows to guess the feedback form of optimal strategies. This will be a departure point to discuss the behavior of the models of the family we introduce and their policy implications.     

A note on the long rate in factor models of the term structure

In this paper, we consider factor models of the term structure based on a Brownian filtration. We show that the existence of a nondeterministic long rate in a factor model of the term structure implies, as a consequence of the Dybvig–Ingersoll–Ross theorem, that the model has an equivalent representation in which one of the state variables is nondecreasing. For two‐dimensional factor models, we prove moreover that if the long rate is nondeterministic, the yield curve flattens out, and the factor process is asymptotically nondeterministic, then the term structure is unbounded. Finally, we provide an explicit example of a three‐dimensional affine factor model with a nondeterministic yet finite long rate in which the volatility of the factor process does not vanish over time.     

Bayesian selection of technology assumptions for the transformation from supply-use to input–output tables

ABSTRACT

In the construction of input–output models from supply-use tables, technology assumptions disambiguate how an industry uses inputs in the production recipe of multiple outputs. This paper uses Bayes' theorem to select technology assumptions, taking into account empirical observations. The paper presents a formulation to explore hybrids between product and industry technology assumptions in product-by-product tables. We then present Markov chain Monte-Carlo techniques to implement the Bayesian method for selecting technology assumptions. We apply the method in a case study using Eurostat supply-use tables of 2004 and 2005, exhibiting a volume of secondary products of less than 13%, and 59 products and industries per country. The results show that the choice of technology is not important, given that there is no strong evidence in favour of any of them.     

Some issues in blockchain for accounting and the supply chain,with an application of distributed databases to virtual organizations

This paper reviews some recent blockchain‐based applications for information capture, distribution and preservation. As part of that review, this paper examines two key concerns with current blockchain designs for accounting and supply chain transactions: data independence and multiple semantic models for the same information distribution problem. Blockchain applications typically integrate database, application and presentation tiers all in the same ledger. This results in a general inability to query information in the ledger and other concerns. Further, since most applications appear to be private blockchain applications, there is a concern of agents needing to accommodate multiple blockchains depending on who their trading partners are and what they request. Finally, this paper uses a distributed database to design a ‘blockchain‐like’ system for virtual organizations.     

Preference aggregation and atoms in measures

This paper examines the aggregation of preferences with a finitely additive measure space of agents. We consider three types of non-dictatorship axioms: non-dictatorship, coalitional non-dictatorship, and atomic non-dictatorship. First, we show that the existence of an atom is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a social welfare function that satisfies weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and coalitional non-dictatorship. Second, we simultaneously impose non-dictatorship and coalitional non-dictatorship, and specify a necessary and sufficient condition for the finitely additive measure that guarantees the compatibility among the axioms. Third, we impose all non-dictatorship axioms and show that the corresponding measure is extremely restricted.     

An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem

We provide an up to 30% improvement in the Shapley–Folkman theorem error-bound, and briefly discuss its consequences for the course allocation problem.     

交易成本、禀赋效应与国有股权转让定价——兼论国有企业混合所有制改革的新思路

国有企业混合所有制改革是积极发展混合所有制经济的关键,完善的定价机制有助于推进国有企业混合所有制改革。国有股转让过程中存在大量的交易成本,扭曲了定价体系。基于科斯定理,可以发现,明晰产权是优化定价体系有效途径。但是,禀赋效应的存在,使得科斯定理无法完全解决国有股转让定价问题。对此,需要采取市场和非市场的政策组合,以此来完善国有股转让定价机制,推进国有企业混合所有制改革。     

关于风险投资内在机理的经济学分析

从经济学的角度对风险投资进行了内部和外部两个方面的具体分析。根据交易成本理论和信息不对称理论分析了风险投资的特点 ,揭示了风险投资迅速发展的内在机理 ;依据科斯定理和“囚徒困境”模型 ,阐明了政府积极参与的必要性     

The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing under Proportional Transaction Costs in Finite Discrete Time

We prove a version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which applies to Kabanov's modeling of foreign exchange markets under transaction costs. The financial market is described by a   d × d   matrix-valued stochastic process  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  specifying the mutual bid and ask prices between d assets. We introduce the notion of "robust no arbitrage," which is a version of the no-arbitrage concept, robust with respect to small changes of the bid-ask spreads of  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  . The main theorem states that the bid-ask process  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition iff it admits a strictly consistent pricing system. This result extends the theorems of Harrison-Pliska and Kabanov-Stricker pertaining to the case of finite Ω, as well as the theorem of Dalang, Morton, and Willinger and Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker, pertaining to the case of general Ω. An example of a  5 × 5  -dimensional process  (Π _t )² _{t =0}  shows that, in this theorem, the robust no-arbitrage condition cannot be replaced by the so-called strict no-arbitrage condition, thus answering negatively a question raised by Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker.     

Is it the economic policy,stupid? Economic policy,political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage

Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor's tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. Put simply, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage? The results suggest that a decrease in economic freedom increases the probability of an incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. Furthermore, a more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic incumbent governors, but a higher probability among Republicans; (2) increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; and (3) among Republican incumbents, increases of income taxation and of top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election. Finally, controlling for a variety of demographic, political and socioeconomic factors, we find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election, while increasing net population migration reduces it.