我国股价指数波动与宏观经济关系研究

本文以上证综合指数为研究对象,选取工业增加值、货币供应量、银行间同业拆借利率、居民消费价格指数等宏观经济变量作为解释变量,采用月度数据,对上证综合指数进行协整分析。分析证明上证综合指数与部分宏观经济变量之间存在协整关系,上证综合指数与货币供应量、同业拆借利率之间长期呈正相关关系,与居民消费价格指数负相关;并且上证综合指数与消费价格指数存在因果关系,与其他变量均不存在因果关系。这意味着我国股票市场虽然可以在一定程度上反映宏观经济的发展情况,但效率不高。     

商业银行现金持有量与宏观经济不确定性关系研究——基于面板数据的实证检验

本文研究了宏观经济不确定性对中国商业银行现金持有水平的影响。论文首先构建了一个GARCH模型得到代理变量来度量宏观经济不确定性,然后利用中国银行业2000～2009年的面板数据,实证检验了宏观经济不确定性对中国银行业现金持有水平的影响情况。实证结果表明:宏观经济不确定性对银行现金持有水平影响显著,当宏观经济不确定性增加、经济形势前景不明时,商业银行现金持有水平显著降低。     

Earnings persistence, accruals and managerial share ownership

We investigate the relationship between earnings persistence and a broad measure of total accruals (TACC). We propose and find that in Australia, TACC is less persistent than cash flows. We further propose that the persistence of accrual components is positively associated with the reliability of those components. However, we find that the least reliable accrual component has the greatest persistence and suggest possible reasons for this. We then investigate the relationship between earnings persistence and managerial share ownership, but find no evidence of a consistent, strong relationship. Rather, for the non-current operating accruals we find evidence consistent with incentive alignment for large firms with high operating cash flows, whereas for small firms we find evidence consistent with efficient contracting.     

Greenmail premia, board composition and management shareholdings

This paper investigates the association between premia paid in targeted share repurchases (greenmail) and the characteristics of the boards of directors. A nonlinear relationship is found between the premium paid and the proportion of shares held by the inside directors. The premium decreases as the proportion of unaffiliated outside directors increases.     

Innovation and growth: supply and demand factors in the recent US expansion

It is widely held that the social-economic context of the US,characterised by labour market flexibility and deregulationof product and capital markets, lies at the basis of the innovativecapacity displayed by the country's productive system in the1990s, thus accounting for the growth differential with Europe.Starting from a different interpretative model of innovationand growth, the paper focuses on both supply (institutionaland technological) and demand factors. It is argued that, whentheir interaction is taken into account, there is no strongevidence that more deregulated labour and product markets areamong the factors allowing for US growth. In accordance withthe view that there is no single road to innovation and growth,this leaves room for the exploration and implementation of policiesthat might reconcile innovation and growth with safeguards suchas those provided by Europe's social institutions.     

生产性过剩条件下中国宏观经济政策取向探讨

目前我国之所以出现生产性过剩，商品过剩为其直接原因，生产和消费关系失调为其根本原因。为此，国家宏观经济政策应由主要调控投资转向主要调控消费，以消费带动投资。     

The transition crisis in Bulgaria

In 1996-97, while making its way through a difficult processof economic and political transformations, Bulgaria was hitby a severe economic crisis. This paper seeks to reveal andanalyse the underlying factors and causes of this crisis. Itfocuses on empirical issues but also highlights some basic causalitiesand interrelations between economic variables during the crisisas well as the role of economic policy. The economic turmoilin Bulgaria is addressed from three different perspectives:(1) the historic roots of the crisis; (2) the actual evolutionof the fiscal, banking and currency crises, and (3) the politicaleconomy of the transition in Bulgaria.     

Managerial shareholdings, firm value, and acquired corporations

Prior research on the relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm value provides conflicting evidence. We take a different approach to its analysis and focus on managerial shareholdings in acquired firms. We argue that in a relatively unfettered market for corporate control, prior evidence of a nonlinear relationship between moral hazard costs and managerial shareholdings suggests that acquired corporations can be segmented according to managerial shareholdings, and that these segments will differ according to the source of wealth gains, managerial resistance, who acquires the company, and how target shareholders are paid. We find evidence consistent with these predictions.