管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。     

政府研发补贴促进企业创新了吗

政府补贴能否促进企业创新一直存在争议。与以往从资源视角探讨政府补贴与企业创新关系的研究不同，基于信号理论视角，以2012—2016年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本，通过剔除非研发补贴的噪音并控制样本自选择偏误，实证检验中国转型经济背景下，政府研发补贴对企业创新的微观政策效应，以及企业层面制度因素（产权性质）和区域层面制度因素（制度环境）对该效应的调节作用。研究发现，政府研发补贴释放的积极信号能够帮助企业获取外部创新资源，有效促进企业创新；相比于国有企业，政府研发补贴对非国有企业创新的激励效应更强；制度环境越好，政府研发补贴对企业创新的激励效应越强。研究理论丰富了科技创新政策有效性和信号理论相关研究。同时，研究发现，政府应继续加大对企业创新活动的补贴额度，不断深化所有制改革，为企业创新营造良好的外部制度环境；另外，企业还应充分发挥政府研发补贴信号的杠杆效应，拓宽外部创新资源获取渠道。     

提高出口退税能够“稳就业”和“稳外贸”吗?

近年来,全球贸易保护主义抬头加剧了各国之间的贸易摩擦。本文以中美贸易为例,探讨中国出口退税政策在稳就业、稳外贸以及应对贸易摩擦中的作用机制。首先基于1994-2020年季度数据发现:中国就业的波动较平稳;净出口则呈现高波动特征;中国就业和净出口呈现弱顺周期。这些周期特征与其他国家存在显著差异。其次构建了一个含有不完全金融市场和价格不完全传递的对称两国开放经济DSGE模型,数值模拟发现:在本国出口退税冲击和它国技术冲击下,模型能够较好地拟合中国就业和净出口的周期特征,其中财富效应和由贸易条件变化引起的支出转移效应是主要的内在传导机制。借助模型对中美贸易摩擦的反事实实验发现:中国单方面提高1%出口退税时,中国就业增长0.05%,净出口增长0.28%,呈现较强持续性,提高出口退税能够稳就业和稳外贸;当中国提高1%出口退税和美国提高1%进口关税时,中国就业增长0.03%,净出口增长0.16%,呈现较强持续性,勒纳中性不成立,此时出口退税在稳就业和稳外贸中的作用尽管有所削弱,但依然有效。     

The effects of credit default swaps on corporate investment

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how credit default swaps (CDS) affect the corporate investment of the referenced entities. We document a significant reduction in corporate investment after CDS trading, a result that is robust to alternative model specifications and a set of endogeneity tests. Our findings of the increased firm risk and cost of capital support the costly external capital channel. The cross-sectional variations in CDS effects demonstrate that both reduced monitoring and the empty creditor problem might be the underlying forces driving the costly external capital channel. Our additional analysis implies that CDS trading is associated with an enhancement in investment efficiency for firms that are prone to overinvestment.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

企业研发投入、资源特征与创新绩效关系研究

基于资源基础观，探讨了企业“资源池”中财务资源特征与技术资源特征如何与研发投入行为匹配以提升创新绩效，以创业板355家企业为样本开展泊松回归分析，研究发现：R&D投入与创新绩效存在倒U型关系；财务资源特征——资产流动性对R&D投入与创新绩效存在正向调节作用，起着“加速剂”作用；由于组织技术路径依赖，技术资源特征——技术积累程度对R&D投入与创新绩效存在负向调节作用，起着“缓冲剂”作用；资产流动性与技术积累程度提高会促进研发投入与创新绩效关系的阈值提高，促进更多研发投入有效转化。探讨了企业研发投入行为与资源特征的匹配，可为促进创新绩效提升提供理论支撑。     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

Do significant risk warnings in annual reports increase corporate bond credit spreads? Evidence from China

Based on listed companies issuing bonds on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2017, this study analyzes the relationship between significant risk warnings in Chinese companies’ annual reports and corporate bond credit spreads. The main findings are as follows. First, in the Chinese market, “substantial warnings of significant risks” can significantly improve corporate bond credit spreads, reflecting the risk-warning effect; second, state-owned property rights weaken this effect, which only pertains to listed companies with poor risk management and low information quality; third, significant risk warnings increase investors’ heterogeneous beliefs, also affecting credit spreads; and fourth, through textual analysis, it is found that the corporate bond credit spread is greater when the disclosed risk factors are more pessimistic and less similar to those of the previous year. The findings of this paper help to enrich the literature on credit spreads and risk disclosure.