首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   3篇
  计划管理   3篇
  2011年   1篇
  2007年   1篇
  2005年   1篇
排序方式: 共有3条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.  相似文献
2.
本文将失业理论的搜索模型与社会地位结合起来考察社会地位的动态影响。研究发现社会地位引入效用函数等价于代表性家庭时间偏好率的降低,利用对数效用函数,得到经济系统均衡状态存在的唯一性。在均衡状态下,更强的社会地位意识意味着更高的储蓄率和资本积累,以及提供更多的社会空闲职位、更高的工资、更高的就业率、更为宽松的劳动力市场和更低的利率。  相似文献
3.
We show that when the weak bidder’s bargaining power in the resale market is weakened, the auctioneer’s revenue from the first-price auction with resale is lower. Using the idea of Coase Theorem, we show that when the resale market is a sequential bargaining model with no commitment, the auctioneer’s revenue is substantially reduced, and the ranking is the opposite of Hafalir and Krishna (2009). We establish a version of the Coase Theorem in the context of the auctions with resale. When Coase Theorem holds, we show that the revenue of the auction with resale is lower than the revenue of the same auction without resale. We also provide the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for our model of auctions with resale.  相似文献
1
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号