Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

Chinese banking reforms in perspective: towards global alignment or national specificity?

The reforms of the banking sector in China conducted so far have been seeking to accomplish, simultaneously, two conflicting goals. On the one hand, the objective was to prepare Chinese banks for international competition and put them at the pace with the transformations observed in its overall economy. On the other, there is a social-driven agenda concerning employment and regional inequalities. Using principal component analysis, this article explores the impact of the ongoing reforms in the Chinese banking sector on the performance of individual banks. The results show that despite identical regulation, business practices can be dissimilar at the individual level. Taken collectively, the results also show the increasing influence of Western management standards in the Chinese banking sector.     

公共产权资源治理理论的演进与进展

1954年,戈登(Gordon)最先抓住了CPR问题的本质,并对其属性进行了模型化论证,成为该领域的开创性研究。哈丁"公地悲剧"的发表则激起了学界研究CPR问题的热潮。早期学界主张要么通过"利维坦",要么私有化来治理CPR。由于奥斯特罗姆等人的努力,社区自治作为事实上的一种替代性解决方案日益得到认可。拉赫曼(Rahman)等人的研究则表明在特定的宗教和文化背景下,公地不仅不会导致悲剧,而且具有私地所不能比拟的优势。希尔(Hill)对美国野牛的研究发现,即使是经济学家公认的公地悲剧也未必真的就是悲剧。     

公用事业民营化进程中的政府规制重构

民营化逐渐成为西方国家公用事业改革以及政府治理模式变革的基本潮流，并对后发展中国家的行政改革产生了巨大的示范作用。转型中国的公用事业民营化在约束条件、目的、绩效评估等方面与发达国家有所区别；对政府合理边界的确定是民营化改革成功的关键，要以破除行政性垄断为突破口、依法规制为核心、适当放松规制为原则、建立相对独立的规制机构为保障重构政府规制体系，促进公用事业的发展。     

The political economics of investment Utopia: public–private partnerships for urban infrastructure finance

This article explores the policy disconnect between the pursuit of private investment return and the public desire for enhanced social value from public–private partnership (P3) investments in urban infrastructure. Investors view infrastructure finance as an opportunity for relatively safe, high-return investing. But infrastructure-financing architecture to achieve high private returns frequently clashes with financing models that sustain long-term social benefits. The full implications of relational tensions in the structuring of P3s are analyzed. The principal policy conclusion is that, because of these tensions, the use of P3s for this purpose should be restricted.     

网络产业的市场结构重组、民营化与网络瓶颈

在传统体制下,电信、电力、铁路运输、管道燃气、自来水等网络产业基本上是由国有企业垄断经营的。因此,以促进竞争为导向的市场结构重组与民营化是这些网络产业改革的两大主题。但网络产业的改革必然凸现网络瓶颈,这要求政府制定与实施有效的接入管制政策。     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

HOLDINGS OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN COMPANIES IN FINLAND: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN THE LONGER TERM

Applying an approach of neo‐institutional research, this article examines the history of company holdings of the national government and local governments in Finland in the longer term. The article examines the genealogy of the institutional forms of these holdings, the diffusion, adoption and adaptation of these forms, and the political legitimacy of new forms and the political de‐legitimation of earlier forms. For theory, the results indicate that the individual tailoring of institutional forms offers flexibility but increases complexity. For practice, the results suggest that the company form may too easily marginalize alternative institutional forms such as co‐operatives, associations, and foundations.     

国企民营化与企业创新效率：促进还是抑制?

文章基于混合所有制改革的背景，从创新效率的视角考察了微观创新主体民营化前后创新行为的变化。研究发现，民营化抑制了企业的创新效率，企业的专利数量显著减少，这种影响在缺乏原国有大股东制衡、无系族的上市公司以及外部产权保护较弱的地区更加显著，而且相对于创业型企业，民营化企业的创新效率更低。进一步研究发现，民营化抑制企业创新效率的一个重要途径是关联交易显著增加、投资显著减少，民营化后非国有大股东更多地表现出掏空动机，减少了创新活动，降低了创新效率。文章的研究结论为理解民营化企业的效率提供了新视角，有助于我们正确认识和理解新兴转轨经济体的民营化行为，而且对于监管层如何推进混合所有制改革具有重要的政策启示。     

Is R&D spending influenced by disinvestment and local political corruption? The case of Indian central public sector enterprises

The current study examines the effect of disinvestment (dilution of state ownership) and local political corruption on R&D spending in enterprises owned by the central government of India. Based on certain characteristic features of innovation as a strategy available to state-owned enterprises, I build two sets of hypotheses formalising the channels of how these variables may affect the possibility and amount of R&D. Data is drawn from multiple sources to compile a dataset that covers all manufacturing central government-owned enterprises in India over a period of ten years from 2007 to 2016. The study employs an instrumental variable technique to reduce the endogeneity between disinvestment and R&D decisions. We find that, while disinvestment and local political corruption have strong negative effects on whether a firm invests in R&D or not, it has no effect on the amount of R&D. In fact, the amount is driven by a host of firm-specific factors such as size, profit and proficiency of the share of skilled labor, managerial strength and non-unionisation of labor. We also find that the effects are strongly driven by the size of firms, special status awarded to firms and the ideology of the state where the enterprise operates.