Tick size and market quality: Simulations based on agent‐based artificial stock markets

This paper investigates the way that minimum tick size affects market quality based on an agent‐based artificial stock market. Our results indicate that stepwise and combination systems can promote market quality in certain aspects, compared with a uniform system. A minimal combination system performed the best to improve market quality. This is the first study to analyse tick size systems that remain at the theory stage and compare four types of system under the same experimental environment. The results suggests that a minimal combination system could be considered a new direction for market policy reform to improve market quality.     

AI-chatbots on the services frontline addressing the challenges and opportunities of agency

AI-chatbots as frontline agents promise innovative opportunities for shaping service offerings that benefit customers and retailers. Examining current practice through the lens of agency, as defined by Social Cognitive Theory, we present a 3-level classification of AI-chatbot design (anthropomorphic role, appearance and interactivity) and examine how the combination of these three aspects of chatbot design impacts on the complementarities of agency. Recognizing current implementation challenges, we advance that the complementarities of agency at each level are the lynchpin mechanism that translates AI-chatbot design into service relevant outcomes. We develop a research agenda focused on the emotion interface, resolution of the proxy agency dilemma and development of collective agency to support the implementation of AI-chatbots as frontline service agents.     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

Application of collective knowledge diffusion in a social network environment

ABSTRACT

We present a group dynamics model that shows knowledge integration as a process occurring over time. As each individual in the group contact others, his own knowledge changes, and over time the collective knowledge is obtained. This allows modeling knowledge diffusion in a social network and while the models presented in this paper are not competitive in that area, they approach the problem from previously unconsidered direction. We test the behavior of the model in a multi-agent simulation and we test a simple advertisement campaign in a social network. We provide discussion of elements needed for making model more competitive.     

Uncertainty,Control, and Karl Polanyi’s Protective Response

Post-Keynesian institutionalist economists like Wallace Peterson and John Kenneth Galbraith recognized that the impact of uncertainty on economic wellbeing depends in part on the degree of control people have over the sources and consequences of it. Given the inability of government and other large institutions to reduce uncertainty or to provide citizens with the ability to manage it, mediating structures are considered as an alternative means of promoting economic security. The article concludes by describing and evaluating several of these alternatives.     

Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents

Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an inaccurate agent. The accurate agent who is biased will then more likely cause harm than does an inaccurate agent who favors the special interest. Therefore, the principal may gain more from controlling biases of an accurate agent than of an inaccurate one. Thus, high ability of public officials may be associated with little corruption.     

新制度经济学委托代理理论视野的拓展*

新制度经济学中的委托代理理论基于“经济人理性”假定，设计出了精密、精巧、精致的委托代理制度，有效化解了现代企业中委托人与代理人之间利益冲突并提升了企业运营效率。然而，现代企业实践已经证明，即使委托代理制度十分精密、精巧、精致，仍然没有彻底解决委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突和企业运营效率进一步提升问题。因此，必须拓展既有理论视野，从“经济人理性”假定拓展到“经济人+社会人+家庭人复合理性”假定，这样就能够实现委托代理理论视野的拓展。运用新制度经济学研究方法和双边对称信任数理模型表明：基于委托代理制度，进一步强化委托人与代理人之间双边对称信任度，可以进一步化解他们之间的利益冲突并且改善企业运营效率。基于这一结论，强化委托人与代理人之间双边对称信任度的具体路径是优化社会信任环境系统。     

Budget impact analysis of secukinumab versus adalimumab in the treatment of ankylosing spondylitis

Background: Biologic treatments have enhanced the treatment outcomes of patients with active ankylosing spondylitis (AS). Until recently, TNF-alpha-inhibitors have been the only biologics approved for the treatment of active AS. The objective of this study was to assess the potential financial impact of the first non-TNF-alpha biologic secukinumab (fully human IL-17A-inhibitor) vs adalimumab (TNF-alpha-inhibitor) in the treatment of AS in Finland.

Materials and methods: In this model-based budget impact analysis, patients were treated either with secukinumab (150?mg) or adalimumab (40?mg). The number of patients and market share of different biologics were based on national reimbursement registry data. Adalimumab was the most commonly used biologic treatment for AS, and in the base case analysis all adalimumab patients are assumed to switch to secukinumab. Response rates were based on a matching-adjusted indirect comparison between secukinumab and adalimumab. Patients not achieving response were switched to another biologic treatment.

Results: Treating AS patients with secukinumab instead of adalimumab leads to potential savings of 18.2 million euros within a 5-year time period. The total costs within the follow-up time were 59.5 million euros and 77.7 million euros with and without secukinumab, respectively. According to sensitivity analyses, a higher adoption rate of secukinumab corresponds to higher potential savings.

Conclusions: Secukinumab is a cost-saving treatment option compared with adalimumab in the treatment of AS in Finland. More patients could be treated with a biologic by allocating resources more efficiently.     

Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions

We prove an existence result for the principal–agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condition which takes into account the principal’s cost and the agents’ preferences. Our existence proof is simple and flexible enough to adapt to partial participation models as well as to the case of type-dependent budget constraints.     

贸易保护政策的动态不一致性——以我国出口退税政策为例

本文从企业与政府之间博弈的视角,揭示贸易保护政策的动态不一致性问题。理论分析表明,在理性预期与信息不对称的假设前提下,政府在与私人企业的博弈中,往往处于劣势地位,容易受企业行为的牵引,其结果将导致贸易保护政策的动态不一致性。本文以我国出口退税政策的实施作为上述论断的经验证据,结果表明,出口企业的策略性行为可能是导致我国出口退税政策频繁变动的内在原因之一。