Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?

This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non‐star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non‐star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non‐star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non‐star CEOs compared with star CEOs.     

党员干部腐败的文化原因探析

腐败作为一种社会现象已经上升为导致亡党亡国的重要问题。党员队伍不断地被侵蚀直至灭亡已经不再是危言耸听。然而,腐败作为社会现象,同样也是文化的集中反映。故文章通过从文化角度中的"一把手"封建文化、官本位文化、官系圈文化以及党员思想建设文化四个方面分析了党员干部腐败原因,以便更好地针对党员干部腐败问题采取措施,防患于未然。     

营改增背景下企业办税人员素质现状及提升路径

当前不断推进的营改增对企业税务管理工作提出了更高要求,对企业办税人员素质形成了新的考量。本文分析了营改增背景下税企双方对企业办税人员的素质要求,结合地方企业办税人员的素质现状,探究其影响因素。提出应严格企业办税人员准入制度,建立配套的职称晋升和有效的激励机制,为办税人员营造良好的职业发展空间,促进其综合素质的全面提升,为地方经济发展助力。     

防止公职人员利益冲突的路径选择——以人性为视角

公职人员的利益冲突问题是一个新的廉政建设研究领域。国（境）内外实践证明,利益冲突是腐败发生的重要根源,是导致政府行政行为非法性、政府信任危机的必然逻辑结果,其产生根源于人性趋利的本质特性。因此,防止公职人员利益冲突,须以人性趋利的本质特性为基点,以利益阻隔为路径,以制度的针对性、操作性与实效性为目标。基于此须设立防止利益冲突三道防线：建立良好的公职人员职业保障体系,让其不想;加大利益冲突的个人成本,让其不敢;创新权力约束与监督机制,让其不易。     

Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

In the aftermath of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new “independent” institutions were created to oversee financial auditing. Based on a modified version of Lukes’ multidimensional model of power, we first investigate how the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) has affected the dynamics of power among the main players enlisted in Canada’s regulation of public accounting. Our findings strengthen the view that a “form of allegiance” was, at the time of data collection, developing between CPAB and the largest Canadian accounting firms. Through a second analytical movement, we extend the boundaries of our argument, showing that patterns of resistance against the logic of arm’s length regulation operate in a variety of audit regulatory sites. Our conclusion points, in particular, to the spatial gap - and incidentally the limitations - of any attempt to control and supervise a globalized industry from a national or regional perspective.     

上市公司董事长与总经理的基本状况及年度报酬的相关性

董事长和总经理在现代公司治理结构中分别发挥不同的职能和作用。认识上市公司董事长与总经理的基本状况及其关系，是加强上市公司治理的一项重要基础工作。文章在对董事长和总经理相互关系理论分析的基础上，对我国1373家上市公司董事长和总经理的基本状况进行了全面的对比和分析，研究发现领取报酬的董事长与总经理年度报酬之间存在着高度相关和趋同的现象。     

CEO cash compensation determinants: an empirical examination of US airlines

This study empirically investigated the determinants of cash compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) for US airlines in the post-9.11 period. After an analysis of 53 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004, we found that the airline CEO cash compensation was positively correlated with the size and revenue efficiency of an airline firm whereas growth, debt use, profitability, and stock performance were irrelevant to the compensation. Larger airlines with better revenue-generating ability tended to offer high cash compensation to their CEOs. Our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance principle has yet to be fully implemented in the airlines industry. To minimize agency problems and enhance the firm value of US airlines, CEO compensation should be based not only on revenue efficiency but also on profitability and stock performance.     

美国陆军初级职业军事教育研究

美国陆军初级职业军事教育在借鉴中形成,在创新中不断发展,其主体结构相对稳定,又可根据战争经验、客观需求适时调整,整个体系科学、合理、灵活应变。     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.