R&D Investments and Tax Incentives: The Role of Intra-Firm Cross-Border Collaboration*

U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra-firm, cross-border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross-border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross-border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax-efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.     

Tax incentive,R&D investment and firm innovation: Evidence from China

We estimate the effect of R&D tax incentives on firm-level R&D expenditures (RDE) and patenting using a change in the eligibility criteria for a super deduction in China. In 2006, the Chinese government relaxed the “10 % eligibility criterion”, which stated that only firms with a 10 % or higher increase in prior-year RDE can claim an additional 50 % tax deduction. We use an event study approach to show that firms that became newly eligible to claim the super deduction (those just below the criterion) catches up on RDE and product innovation measured by the sales of new products. In the long run, we also observe a closing gap in the number of patents between the two groups of firms. Moreover, extending tax benefits to all firm helps to lower the tax burden, and we find no evidence of manipulation and relabeling.     

基于声誉效应的工程监理激励机制模型研究

为了提高工程监理工作积极性,基于Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,引入声誉效应,建立声誉效应和显性激励机制相结合的动态委托代理激励模型。分析声誉效应发挥激励机制作用条件,并与未考虑声誉效应的委托代理模型进行比较。结果表明:声誉效应在满足一定的条件下,引入声誉激励机制能够增加业主的期望收益,并且能提高监理的努力水平。最后,通过数值仿真模拟验证引入声誉效应的合理性。     

自治、博弈与激励:我国农村人居环境污染治理的制度安排

基于中央政府、地方政府及农民的互动视角,采用博弈分析方法,系统考察了我国农村人居环境污染的逻辑机制。研究发现:我国农村人居环境污染的根源在于规制失灵;农村人居环境公共资源的“公地悲剧”不是必然现象,可以在农民之间建立一种自实施的自治机制,避免导致“公地悲剧”;由于利益目标的差异,中央政府与地方政府之间的激励问题、地方政府与农户之间的博弈行为,导致了农村人居环境规制失灵。研究启示是,制度的建立健全是农村人居环境治理顺利推进的保障,更将有利于乡村振兴战略的实施以及我国农村的可持续发展。     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

科技政策对企业创新的作用机制研究——以广东省为例的实证分析

科技创新是立国之本、强国之路。政府在不同阶段制定相应的科技政策，以求持续激励企业参与创新活动、提高企业核心竞争力、促进产业结构转型升级。基于广东省2005-2017年上市公司数据，采用计数模型实证分析了地级市政府科技政策对企业创新的影响及作用机制。研究表明：科技政策力度越大，越能提高企业的创新水平；科技政策的激励作用主要通过研发强度这一中介变量产生；科技政策不仅能促进企业的策略性创新行为，同时也会导致企业的实质性创新行为；直接激励类型的政策对企业创新并无显著影响，而营造创新氛围的间接激励类型政策则对企业创新有着显著的正向影响；政策激励对非国有企业、非高科技企业的正向作用更加明显。     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

健全"跨界治理"机制共筑旅游合作基石

要保持区域旅游合作可持续发展,必须以合作的制度基础建设为抓手。本文根据“跨界治理”理论,借鉴欧共体等成功合作体的经验,阐述了健全合作体制、激励机制和法治建设的形式与方法,提出了我国区域旅游合作的基石就是建立健全“跨界治理体系”。     

经营者持股效应的理论分析

现代企业制度产生“两权分离”,形成委托——代理关系,产生代理问题,而经营者持股是解决代理问题的一种激励方案。本文认为,经营者持股可以满足代理人的多种需要,从而激励代理人产生有利于实现企业目标的行为;经营者持股是代理人参与企业剩余分配的有效方式,是建立激励契约的必然选择。