Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Can Management Turnover Restore the Financial Statement Credibility of Restating Firms? Further Evidence

This paper investigates the association between management turnover following financial restatements and the probability of subsequent restatements. We find that restating firms that replace management (CEO and/or CFO) are more likely to restate their financial statements again. We also find that subsequent restatements are mainly attributable to the new management. Overall, our results suggest that management turnover following restatements may not be an effective mechanism to remediate financial restatements, but the change to a new management results in a greater possibility of lower earnings quality (i.e., higher probability of subsequent financial restatements and accruals‐based earnings management). Our study supports prior literature's findings that the change in the top management leads to organizational instability and higher accounting information risk. Our findings have implications for internal decisionmaking with regard to top executive replacement.     

审计师行业专长、产品市场竞争与财务重述——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以2007~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为样本,对审计师行业专长与财务重述的关系,以及产品市场竞争程度对两者关系的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：审计师行业专长有助于降低财务重述发生的概率;产品市场竞争则削弱了审计师行业专长对财务重述行为的抑制作用。     

财务重述影响供应商向企业提供商业信用吗——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

以我国2007-2014年上市公司为样本,实证检验财务重述对供应商向企业提供商业信用融资规模的影响.研究结果表明:财务重述引起了供应商对目标企业会计信息质量的关注,导致企业商业信用融资规模减少,并且在非国有企业、市场地位低的企业以及金融生态环境较差的地区更为显著.进一步研究发现,上述结论因财务重述性质的异质性而存在差异.     

签字会计师个人经验与财务重述

文章用累计签发报告数、签发报告年数度量签字会计师一般个人经验,进而考察其对客户公司财务重述的影响,结果发现,在控制了公司及事务所层面因素后,随着签字会计师一般经验的提高,客户财务报告发生重述的可能性显著降低。进一步研究发现,签字会计师的客户特定经验(任期)也对财务重述具有抑制作用,并且在客户特定经验较少时,一般经验的作用更为明显;就一般经验而言,无论是行业经验还是非行业经验均有助于降低财务重述;签字会计师一般经验对财务重述的影响主要来自于复核合伙人。研究还发现,事务所规模、签字会计师性别会弱化一般经验的作用。这一研究提供了签字会计师个人经验与公司财务重述关系的经验证据,进一步拓展了审计师个人特质与审计质量之间关系的文献。     

会计信息质量检查、董事联结与财务重述

基于财务重述视角,考察会计信息质量检查制度的直接治理和间接治理效应。研究发现：会计信息质量检查显著降低被公告公司财务重述概率,也会降低与被公告公司存在内部董事联结关系(简称“内部董事联结”)公司的财务重述概率,但对与被公告公司存在外部董事联结关系(简称“外部董事联结”)公司的财务重述概率无显著影响。强化媒体报道和内部控制质量是缓解会计信息质量检查在外部董事联结中间接治理失效的有效措施;会计信息质量检查监管力度加大会进一步降低被公告公司以及内部董事联结公司财务重述概率。     

声誉激励、财务重述与审计费用

选取2001—2016年深沪两市主板上市公司为研究样本,实证检验财务重述对审计费用的影响。结果表明：财务重述与审计费用显著正相关,发生财务重述的公司审计费用显著高于没有财务重述的公司;发生财务重述的公司具有变更事务所和购买审计意见的动机倾向,行业竞争激烈加剧了事务所间的恶意竞争,事务所有可能蓄意降低审计费用招揽有财务重述的低端公司客户;由于声誉激励效应,声誉良好的大规模事务所对财务重述的公司所收取的审计费用显著升高,形成事务所竞争的“马太效应”。     

如何防范企业分支机构的财务舞弊行为

随着市场经济的发展，企业经济活动越来越复杂化，设立分支机构十分普遍，财务舞弊行为时有发生，如不加以防范，将危害到企业的整体利益。寻求防范对策，遏制此起彼伏的财务舞弊丑闻，无疑具有重大的理论与现实意义。