Shariah compliance and corporate cash holdings

This study investigates the influence of Shariah compliance status on cash holding levels and the speed of adjustment of non-financial listed firms in six Gulf Cooperation countries from 2005 to 2016. The results show that Shariah compliance status has a significant effect on firms’ cash holding decisions. Shariah-compliant firms have significantly higher cash holding levels than non-Shariah-compliant firms. Further, Shariah-compliant firms adjust more quickly towards their target cash holdings than their conventional counterparts. In our view, Shariah-compliant firms are subject to multiple restrictions that limit their external financing channels. Therefore, holding larger cash reserves is important as it helps gain from the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The findings of this study have important implications for regulators, investors and managers. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to compare the effect of Shariah compliance on firms’ cash holdings and the speed of adjustment towards the trade-off theory’s optimal cash holding target.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.     

It is not a flat world after all: Tax repatriation costs and cash value

US corporations have accumulated record‐high amounts of cash, and most of it is trapped in foreign accounts. This study tests the hypothesis that the marginal value of cash decreases in the presence of tax repatriation costs, as these costs are a strong indication that part of the cash is trapped abroad. Cash abroad is not readily available to the company because it is subject to an additional layer of tax before it can be used or distributed. Moreover, uncertainty surrounds the potential use of foreign cash, and research documents that firms holding high amounts of cash abroad are likely to invest in negative net present value activities. Finally, possible changes in tax regulation are an additional source of uncertainty. Consequently, foreign cash should be worth less than domestic cash. Using a large sample of US firms drawn from COMPUSTAT during the 1991–2012 period, the analysis suggests that shareholders value an extra dollar of cash at $1.086. However, this result changes dramatically when the change in cash is interacted with the tax cost of repatriating the earnings. That is, the marginal value of cash decreases significantly in the presence of tax repatriation costs, and shareholders discount cash when it is likely to be held abroad. This study contributes to the literature on cash holding by investigating whether tax repatriation costs affect the value of corporate cash. Moreover, the findings show that there are important economic consequences linked to the phenomenon of cash accumulation in foreign countries and therefore provide regulators with a sound foundation on which to take additional actions to require more disclosure of and transparency in the actual location of firms’ cash holdings.     

A theory of operational cash holding,endogenous financial constraints,and credit rationing

This paper develops a theory of operational cash holding. Liquidity shocks due to delayed payments must be financed using cash or short-term debt. Debt holders provide an irrevocable credit line given a firm's expected insolvency risk, and equity holders select optimum cash holding. The model demonstrates the trade-off between cash holding and investing in fixed assets. Introducing uncertain cash flows leads to precautionary cash holding if debt holders impose financial constraints. Precautionary cash holding, in turn, reduces insolvency risk enhancing access to short-term finance. The theory shows that credit rationing can occur in the absence of market frictions. Using U.S. data from 1998 to 2012, empirical findings suggest that the decline in credit lines has contributed to the increase in cash holding in line with theoretical predictions.     

金融控股公司的风险状况与监管模式效能分析

在金融控股公司日益显露其强大竞争力的同时,也不断暴露出它所面临的风险。无论其潜在的内部和外部风险,最终都将带来巨大的社会影响,而适合的监管模式则可以进行有效地控制风险,但是不同的监管模式效能差异也不同     

我国股份制商业银行治理结构对银行绩效影响的实证分析

文章运用EVA这一衡量公司治理绩效的新指标,对我国股份制商业银行治理结构作了回归分析。结果表明,第一大股东持股比例及国有性质与绩效正相关,董事会规模及高管人员薪酬与EVA回报率呈负相关关系,高管人员持股也对银行绩效产生正向影响,而股权集中度、董事会会议次数、监事会规模及会议次数、银行规模均未对银行绩效产生影响。     

金融控股集团的双重财务杠杆风险分析

国内商业银行近年资产扩张迅速且坏账率居高不下,普遍出现了资本充足率不足的情况,一些新兴的金融控股集团开始效仿国外的做法,采用风险较大的双重财务杠杆来为子银行补充资本金。本文以中信控股有限责任公司2003年底为中信实业银行融资补充60亿资本金为案例,介绍双重财务杠杆的使用手法和潜在的风险,以期为认识和防范双重财务杠杠风险提供借鉴。     

业绩考核制度如何影响央企现金持有?——基于《考核办法》第三次修订的准自然实验

本文基于2010—2017年我国A股上市公司数据,以十八大后推行的业绩考核办法优化修订为准自然实验,选用双重差分模型检验2013年新的《考核办法》实施对中央企业的现金持有的影响,研究发现:与不受该制度影响的民营企业相比,新的《考核办法》显著正向提升央企的现金持有水平,且这一结果均通过平行趋势、控制组调整、变量替换、PSM-DID和安慰剂检验等稳健性检验;通过机制分析发现,业绩考核制度通过发挥抑制央企因超额持现所诱发的过度投资而提升央企现金持有;进一步地,业绩考核还促使央企权衡增持的现金资源二次配置策略,缩减超额持现的股利支付且转而将其用于创新活动,进而提升中央企业现金持有价值。上述结果意味着,业绩考核制度既可以抑制过度投资的无效耗费行为促使央企增持现金,又将增持现金用于“多创新,少股利”的长期价值创造权衡配置,优化增持现金利用效率,提高企业创新能力,进而提升企业价值,这为十八大以来有关中央企业高质发展和国资监管体制建设而进行改革的政策预期效果提供经验证据,同时为进一步全面深化国资监管、积极深入推进业绩考核制度优化修订提供理论依据和经验证据。     

Who is more visionary in mergers: Commercial vs. investment banks

Early papers concerning bankers on board usually focus on the rationale of bank entry and such effects on company performance. Recently, Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) started to look at the different effects of the bankers with different expertise on the investment strategy and post-entry performance of the firms on which they have board seats. This study extends this line of research to further examine the relationship between the change of different types of financial professionals’ equity holdings of acquiring firms prior to merger completion dates and these acquirers’ post-merger performance. Using 381 U.S. listed acquirers during 2000–2005, we find that the changes of the ownership of commercial banks and insurance companies are positively related to the acquirers’ short-term performance. However, only the changes of the ownership of investment bankers are negatively related to the bidders’ long-term performance, implying that, due to conflict of interests, investment bankers probably aim at the increase of the short-run post-merger performance of the acquiring companies of which they have relatively larger equity holdings.     

浅析股权激励方案设计

股权激励作为一种对管理层激励的有效方式，在公司激励机制中发挥着重要的作用。但任何一个工具和方法都是一把双刃剑，股权激励会稀释产权，用得不好也会适得其反。因此，在设计股权激励方案中，要坚持“两个结合”和明确方案的目的；选择适合企业的股权激励设计方案时，应考虑企业的发展周期，同时注重股票的来源与定价问题、激励对象等关键点。