Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

西餐牛肉类初加工与食品安全控制分析

牛肉是西餐主要的食材之一。本文通过对牛肉的初加工技术进行分析,探究对西餐牛肉类进行食品安全控制的措施,以提高牛肉类产品的整体质量,使西餐牛肉类产品能够达到我国食品安全的标准。     

跨国并购执行阶段财务风险研究

改革开放以来,中国经济持续高速增长,国内市场逐步开放,国家对“一带一路”的推进也使越来越多的企业试图通过海外并购的方式扩大其国际市场份额,以此提高企业竞争力。但即便有国家政策的支持,想要完成海外并购依旧是困难重重,因此,系统分析所存在的财务风险并加以控制变成重中之重。论文对跨国并购现状进行概述,随后重点分析在执行阶段所存在的几点财务风险,并提出相应的防范建议。     

信息化环境下企业内部审计模式思考

随着信息技术的高速发展,大数据技术呈现出爆发增长并逐渐渗入各行各业。基于信息化的大背景,大数据技术已被越来越多的企事业单位广泛运用,为企业发展带来更多可能性。大数据审计作为一种新型内部审计手段,具备独特的优势,将其运用到企业内部审计中可以较大程度提高内部审计的效率。但是它也为内部审计带来了一定不确定性,进而增加其审计风险。论文就大数据审计在企业内部审计中的应用进行了相关分析,并提出了相应的应对措施。     

组织管理对空中交通管制员工作能效的影响分析

综合借鉴SHELL模型和Reason模型的概念,参考国际民航组织《安全管理手册》,分析民航运行体系中组织管理对空中交通管制员工作能效的作用路径,提出组织管理对管制员工作能效产生积极影响的方法和建议.     

服务业内部结构异质性演化与行业发展差距研究——基于全要素生产率视角下的分析

基于1990—2017年行业面板数据，采用超越对数生产函数对服务业各细分行业TFP增长率进行分解和测度，揭示我国服务业内部结构生产率演化进程及其异质性现象，并采用可导性对数方差分解法、VAR协整模型和误差修正模型（VECM）考察TFP及其构成部分对服务业行业发展差距的贡献度，评估其异质性作用于行业发展差距的长短期效应。研究发现，在服务业内部结构演化过程中，TFP、技术进步和技术效率改进呈逐步下降趋势，其中技术进步是推动TFP增长的核心，规模效率改进发展水平一直滞后，配置效率改进在服务业发展初期较为滞后，但水平逐步提升；生产性和生活性服务业行业间TFP及构成部分异质性在演化过程中呈下降趋势，且生活性服务业行业间异质性程度要小于生产性服务业，行业间异质性变化幅度最大的是规模效率改进，技术效率改进异质性波动程度最小；TFP异质性是造成行业间发展差距扩大的主要原因，其中技术效率改进是主导因素，且该效应的发挥只有在长期具有显著性。     

论移动应用平台的运维运营及技术管控工作

电力企业在移动信息化技术方面也迈出了步伐,开展电力业务现场作业、物资与基建的现场作业、故障抢修等班组作业应用,本文主要讨论移动应用平台的运维和技术管控工作,为移动应用平台的建设和发展提供一种工作思路。     

What has New Zealand gained from The FTA with China?: Two counterfactual analyses†

We investigate the effects of the 2008 New Zealand (NZ)–China free trade agreement (FTA) on exports from NZ to China, and real GDP per capita in NZ using the synthetic control method to estimate the counterfactuals. NZ exports to China were more than 200% higher in 2014 than what they would have had the FTA never been signed. NZ's food and live animals exports to China were more than 180% higher in 2014 than the counterfactual. Our counterfactuals indicate a small but negative effect of the FTA on NZ's real GDP per capita between 2009 and 2012.     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响*——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来，“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响，政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响，重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一，不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应，税费返还则产生互补效应。第二，持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应，也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三，审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应，也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策，以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用，提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

Crony capitalism,the party-state,and the political boundaries of corruption

We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.