Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

The panic buying behavior under public health emergencies will lead to many adverse consequences, such as material waste, price fluctuation and uneven distribution of epidemic prevention materials, which will pose a threat to the social stability and economic development. In this paper, we construct a tripartite game model to explore the strategic choices of the public, merchants and the government in order to effectively respond to the panic buying behavior in the epidemic. The results demonstrate that: (1) Eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the panic buying events. The worst scenario can be improved by adjusting some relevant parameters. (2) The probability of the public choosing the strategy of “not involving in panic buying” depends on the potential benefits and losses of snapping up, rather than the extent of price rising. (3) The probability of merchants choosing the strategy of “not bid up price” depends on the intangible benefits. (4) The probability of the government choosing the strategy of “active supervision” depends on the supervision costs and government credibility, rather than the amount of fines. In addition, strategic suggestions to mitigate panic buying behavior are put forward from the perspective of each stakeholder.     

Obesity of politicians and corruption in Ukraine in 2000–2020– Reply

We collected 469 frontal face images of Ukrainian cabinet ministers who were in office in 2000–2020. For each image, the minister's body mass index was estimated using a computer vision algorithm. The time series of median estimated body mass index of cabinet ministers co-moves over time with two existing measures of corruption – World Bank worldwide governance indicator Control of Corruption, and the discrepancy between the quantity of luxury wristwatches exported from Switzerland to Ukraine (reported by Swiss statistics) and the corresponding quantity imported by Ukraine from Switzerland (reported by Ukrainian statistics).     

从利益共同体到命运共同体:地方政府隐性债务的合作治理

在地方政府性债务的治理中,隐性债务因其增长迅速、规模不清和风险不确定,成为未来债务治理的重点和难点。隐性债务挟裹主体众多,关联利益甚广,因此,基于共同体视角,明确治理主体,有利于化解风险。在隐性债务生产阶段,因利而合的共同体大肆攫取利益导致隐性债务激增;在债务风险凸显阶段,利益共同体的本能选择不是"安危与共",而是"大难临头各自保"。但债务风险的"飞去来器效应"和群体性焦虑,将促使利益共同体走向命运共同体。命运共同体既是利益共同体,更是治理共同体。在隐性债务治理阶段,共同体应形成"共生"意识、采取"共治"行动、构筑"共担"保障,实现有效共治。     

Does local government competition aggravate haze pollution? A new perspective of factor market distortion

Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.     

优化营商环境,推动发展高质量经济

促进中国经济高质量发展的必由之路是优化营商环境,提升区域竞争力。目前我国面临着国际内外的复杂局势,经济未来的发展趋势不容乐观,为此我们要深入落实新的发展理念,建立新的发展思路,构建新的发展格局。优化营商环境应实现建立服务型政府,实现企业经营环节的全覆盖,降低制度性交易成本、建立完善的商业系统生态链、打造具有中国特色的营商环境。     

政府投资工程总承包项目设计优化认定与收益归属研究

工程总承包模式以设计与施工的高度融合,日益在建筑业受到青睐。但由于政府投资项目中存在有关结余资金上缴国库等规定,容易导致政府投资工程总承包项目下设计优化产生的成果是进行分成或作为结余资金上缴界定不清。鉴于此,本文通过政策文件,并结合政府投资项目特点,分析政府投资工程总承包项目设计优化的情形认定以及在不同结算依据和合同计价方式下设计优化收益归属的界定,为有效激励总承包单位积极进行设计优化奠定基础。     

Deep learning for modeling the collection rate for third-party buyers

This study evaluates a wide range of machine learning techniques such as deep learning, boosting, and support vector regression to predict the collection rate of more than 65,000 defaulted consumer credits from the telecommunications sector that were bought by a German third-party company. Weighted performance measures were defined based on the value of exposure at default for comparing collection rate models. The approach proposed in this paper is useful for a third-party company in managing the risk of a portfolio of defaulted credit that it purchases. The main finding is that one of the machine learning models we investigate, the deep learning model, performs significantly better out-of-sample than all other methods that can be used by an acquirer of defaulted credits based on weighted-performance measures. By using unweighted performance measures, deep learning and boosting perform similarly. Moreover, we find that using a training set with a larger proportion of the dataset does not improve prediction accuracy significantly when deep learning is used. The general conclusion is that deep learning is a potentially performance-enhancing tool for credit risk management.     

地方财政政策逆周期调节：财政分权还是债务增发*

财政政策工具实际操作偏离最初设计将会降低政策工具的调控效果，导致宏观经济波动加剧。针对地方政府财政政策的逆周期性调控目标，本文关注财政分权深化和政府债务增发的逆周期性效应。研究发现：地方政府财政政策总体呈现顺周期特征。财政分权程度的提高放大了地方财政政策的顺周期性。地方政府债务增发使地方财政政策呈现逆周期特征。地方政府财政政策及其收入面、支出面均呈现顺周期性，由“顺”转“逆”的债务平衡点分别为0137，0113，0209。当前绝大部分地区的债务规模都在债务平衡点之下。驱动地方政府债务逆周期调控的内在因素是官员晋升激励。晋升激励的程度越高，地方债务逆周期调控的力度就越大。但外部市场融资环境的波动削弱了地方政府债务逆周期调控的力度。本文的政策主张是，不宜过度财政分权，应该扩大地方债发行规模，促使地方财政政策逆周期调节。     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响*——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来，“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响，政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响，重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一，不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应，税费返还则产生互补效应。第二，持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应，也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三，审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应，也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策，以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用，提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.