Political forecast cycles

A moral hazard model is used to show why overly optimistic revenue forecasts prior to elections can be optimal: Opportunistic governments can increase spending and appear more competent; ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles – as also found for US states in the empirical literature. Additionally, we obtain three theoretical results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.     

The Benefit of Frequent Corporate Philanthropy

Applying behavioural economic theory, we argue that the frequency of philanthropic activity is important in determining corporate philanthropy's economic outcome. Using Chinese data from 2003 to 2016, we find that firms with more frequent philanthropic activities obtain more government subsidies than firms that only engage in one-off charitable donations. Firms with better corporate governance, such as higher management ownership and more independent directors, are more likely to adopt a strategy of frequent donation. Furthermore, firms are more likely to be frequent donors when management or local government officers have a long tenure. Our findings provide insight into the giving process and suggest that firms can maximize the benefit of corporate philanthropy if they strategically consider the donation frequency and donation amount simultaneously.     

Financial returns to collecting rare political economy books

Rare books of political economy are eminently collectable. Using historical prices, I employ hedonic regressions to estimate financial returns to collecting the works of ten eminent political economists and develop a price index for this corpus of collectables. For the observation period 1975–2019, I find that in those 45 years investing in rare political economy books yielded an average annual real rate of return of 2.8%, which is well in line with the returns to collecting rare books of classical literature. Compared with other collectibles such as fine art, investing in rare books turns out to be financially more profitable.     

理性人的人情味：快手“老铁经济”的内在机制和逻辑

以中国用户规模最大短视频平台之一快手头部主播直播带货推广项目的案例和数据分析为基础,构建解释快手直播电商经济底层逻辑的社会学机制模型.提出快手直播电商经济背后的3种社会学机制:关键影响者逻辑、身份认同逻辑和社会网络逻辑.通过LDA文档主题生成模型将快手主播的直播语义字段进行文档主题生成归类,发现情感因素和理性因素词交互影响受众的购买决策,它背后的社会学作用机制是关键影响者逻辑和身份认同逻辑.2020年快手直播电商半年交易额已达1044亿元,理解快手直播背后的影响机制,能够持续优化推广模型,在互联网流量广告领域具有重要的应用价值.     

Sentiment-scaled CAPM and market mispricing

This study explores the conditional version of the capital asset pricing model on sentiment to provide a behavioural intuition behind the value premium and market mispricing. We find betas (β) and the market risk premium to vary over time across different sentiment indices and portfolios. More importantly, the state β derived from this sentiment-scaled model provides a behavioural explanation of the value premium and a set of anomalies driven by mispricing. Different from the static β–return relation that gives a flat security market line, we document upward security market lines when plotting portfolio returns against their state βs and portfolios with higher state βs earn higher returns.     

“十四五”时期推进新旧动能转换的思路与策略

“十四五”时期是国际经济秩序重塑的关键期、新一轮科技革命和产业变革由孕育发展向形成高潮的关键过渡期、我国跨过高收入门槛的关键期和改革攻坚的关键时期,也是我国新旧动能接续转换的关键时期。加快新旧动能转换对于促进经济持续稳定健康增长、抢占新一轮科技革命机遇和实现高质量发展等意义重大,是我国转换发展方式、调整经济结构、建设现代化经济体系和实现体制机制转型的重要途径。必须深化对新旧动能转换内涵和特征的认识,厘清思路,明确新旧动能转换重点;深化体制机制改革,激发新旧动能转换活力;培育主体,做优做强一批新旧动能转换领军企业和优质中小企业;加快集群建设,形成一批新旧动能转换高地;创新优化要素支撑,夯实新旧动能转换基础;提升对外开放水平,拓展新旧动能转换空间。     

国内外众创经济研究述评——基于文献计量与扎根理论分析

立足众创时代特征,运用文献计量对1999—2018年间1701篇国内外众创文献挖掘分析,探寻众创经济特点主题,探析众创发展知识基础,探求众创研究演进脉络,并获取众创经济视域下核心语句和高频词语,运用扎根理论对抽取的126篇的众创文献样本进行三级编码,进而构建众创研究的整合性理论框架,探究众创研究的系统性发展图景。研究表明,众创理论假说大量问世,众创文献热点主题包括六类,众创经济研究存在两种演进趋势,众创经济治理系统理论具有三个维度;未来应关注众创主体思辨性、众创要素系统性和众创技术本土化等专题研究。     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.