Promotion and Prevention Contracts in Industry Level Firm to Firm Dyad

ABSTRACT

Purpose

This article aims to introduce and distinguish two features of contract design – prevention and promotion contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism within the distributor–supplier relationship. It also examines the moderating role of ex post contract enforcement strategies.     

高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行，并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明，高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为；提升公司选择非国际“四大”会计师事务所的概率，并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升，公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地，国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响，却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理；当高管机会主义水平较高时，国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看，高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别，并显著减损公司未来价值。     

机会主义还是稳健主义?——来自中国上市公司解聘审计师的经验证据

上市公司解聘审计师问题是学术界和监管部门关注的热点,本文选取2002至2004会计年度解聘审计师的公司为研究样本,考察了上市公司解聘审计师的动机及其经济后果。结果表明,公司解聘审计师并非由于前任审计师过于稳健,当公司具有避免亏损、ST、退市以及摘除ST的动机时,则更有可能解聘审计师,而且这些公司通过解聘审计师成功实现了审计意见的购买。     

Imperfect Information and Opportunism

Information is a scarce resource. It is inherently available only in a limited form to decision-makers. Limited or imperfect information is caused by uncertainty — both ontologic and epistemic, limitations in cognitive capabilities or bounded rationality, hidden information, and information asymmetries. This has fundamental implications for the manner in which the self-interested behavior of agents will manifest itself. The article argues that in the context of imperfect information, self-interest can function in a manner quite different from what standard approaches assume. This has been demonstrated by the recent financial crisis. However, there has been limited consideration in mainstream models, both of the neoclassical and institutional type, as to what the exact nature of self-interestedness is, and how this affects the market behavior of agents. The nature of self-interest, therefore, needs to be modeled explicitly to improve the explanatory power of economic theories.     

How to inhibit a partner's strong and weak forms of opportunism: Impacts of network embeddedness and bilateral TSIs

This study investigates the moderating effects of a firm's network embeddedness and a partner's transactional specific investments (TSIs) on relationships between the firm's TSIs and its partner's strong- and weak-form opportunism, and compares the efficiency among these moderator variables. The regression results suggest that (1) a firm's TSIs are positively related to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's TSIs are relatively low; but (2) a firm's TSIs are negatively related to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's TSIs are relatively high. Furthermore (3) network embeddedness is more effective in inhibiting partner's weak-form opportunism than in inhibiting strong-form opportunism resulting from the firm's TSIs. Finally (4) with regard to the relationship between TSIs and weak-form opportunism, the negative moderating effect of network embeddedness is greater than the negative moderating effect of partner's TSIs. This study explains reasons why conflicting views exist about the relationship between TSIs and partner's opportunism, reveals the differences in the moderating effects of network embeddedness and partner's TSIs, and makes new contributions to both transaction cost theory and embeddedness literature. It also provides, for firms involved in TSIs in a buyer–supplier relationship, insightful managerial suggestions about ways to reduce their partner's varying forms of opportunism.     

Relationship Commitment and Ethical Consumer Behavior in a Retail Setting: The Case of Receiving Too Much Change at the Checkout

In this study, we conducted two experiments to examine the effect of relationship commitment on the reaction of shoppers to receiving too much change, controlling for the amount of excess change. Hypotheses based on equity theory, opportunism and guilt were set up and tested. The first study showed that, when the less committed consumer is confronted with a large excess of change, he/she is less likely to report this mistake, compared with a small excess. Conversely, consumers with a high commitment towards the retailer are more likely to tell when they receive too much change, especially when the amount is large. The second experiment provided an explanation for these findings: the less committed consumer is driven by opportunism, whereas guilt-related feelings play an important role in a high commitment relationship. These results have several implications for both retail management and future research.     

Bilateral Opportunism in Buyer–supplier Partnerships

ABSTRACT

Purpose

Literature analyzes interorganizational relationships mostly from a relational perspective by emphasizing partnerships’ positive aspects. Yet business reality is often less romantic and more opportunistic. Especially within the automotive industry opportunistic behaviors often cause extreme reactions in both partners, resulting in poisoned relationships. This study examines the effects of bilateral opportunism between buyers and suppliers on both partners’ relationship induced financial performance, using an automotive industrial setting of new product development (NPD) partnerships. Furthermore, we evaluate the “opportunistic fit” between both partners to assess whether partnerships are characterized by opportunistic parity or unilateral domination.     

人大预算决策、机会主义行为与宪法性约束

与行政部门一样,立法机构在预算决策过程中同样存在着机会主义行为.本文从抑制公共支出总量膨胀与防止公共支出结构异化这两个角度,就如何施加宪法性约束以限制人大在预算决策过程中的机会主义行为做出了理论的探讨.问题的研究对于目前正在进行的<预算法>的修订和完善具有重要的参考价值.     

网络外部性、专用性投资与机会主义行为——双边锁定与关系持续

机会主义行为是营销研究核心问题之一。文章通过模型分析表明,渠道购买商网络外部性引起的正反馈循环会使销售商被"锁定",这种被"锁定"的专用性投资进而会导致购买商攫取"准租"的机会主义行为,不考虑关系持续和双边锁定,实证研究验证了模型结论。但渠道双方都发生专用性投资时,机会主义行为会受到限制;另外,渠道关系期限也有效地缓解专用性投资"锁定"导致的机会主义行为。     

Are joint venture partners more opportunistic in a more volatile environment?

This study examines how joint venture partners' opportunism is influenced by environmental volatility in a drastically changing emerging economy. Building on transaction cost and information‐processing theories, we develop the hypothesis that opportunism increases to cope with industry structural instability, information unverifiability, and law unenforceability, the three interrelated yet distinct characteristics that jointly describe environmental volatility in an emerging economy. Our analysis of 188 foreign joint ventures in an emerging market suggests that opportunism increases with information unverifiability and law unenforceability. These relationships are even stronger when joint ventures depend more on the host country environment, but weaker when joint ventures operate in faster‐growing industries. Finally, opportunism is found to play a mediating role in the relationship between environmental volatility and joint venture performance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.