The role of public space in constructing experience capital: A longitudinal analysis in the hotel context

Public space plays a primary role in shaping customers' hospitality experiences. Yet how public space conditions customers' experiential outcomes in accumulating capital for hospitality organizations remains underexplored. Inspired by the theory of psychological ownership, this research presents an in-depth analysis of the impacts of customers' public space experiences on their experiential outcomes using a longitudinal hotel industry dataset merging information from customer surveys, property performance, and surrounding accessibility insights. Findings revealed the positive effects of customers’ public space experiences on their overall service experiences, the perceived value of the experience, revisit intentions, and recommendation intentions. Moreover, hotel class, other customers, and surrounding accessibility were empirically verified as moderators conditioning the positive impact of public space. These findings offer valuable implications for theory and practice that are worthy of further exploration.     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms

We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. It is affected by the number of the firms and asymmetry among the sizes of the firms; the smaller the number of firms and the more asymmetry among firms, the higher the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggested that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms, and thus, decreases with the market competition index, assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation to discuss asymmetry among private firms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monotonically increasing, and thus never monotonically decreasing, in asymmetry among private firms.     

Institutional investors and international investments in emerging economy firms: A behavioral risk perspective

While the extant literature has examined the influence of controlling and non-controlling principals on the internationalization decisions of emerging market firms, heterogeneity among non-controlling principals is largely ignored. The risk characteristics of different groups of owners, shaped by their institutional environments, could contribute to the differences in their preferences for firm internationalization. In this paper, we draw insights from institutional theory and behavioral risk perspective to examine the risk propensities and risk perceptions of various non-controlling principals, such as pressure-resistant (FIIs and mutual funds) and pressure-sensitive (banks, insurance companies and lending institutions) institutional investors. Empirical results from a sample of 2364 unique Indian firms during the 2005–2014 time-period show that, after controlling for firm-level resources and capabilities identified in prior literature, the ownership share of different types of institutional investors is associated with firms’ international investments differently. While pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are not supportive of foreign investments by firms, pressure-resistant institutional investors, such as FIIs and mutual funds, are supportive of this strategic decision. Furthermore, our results show that the family ownership in a firm (measured in terms of family shareholding) further lowers the preference of pressure sensitive institutional investors for internationalization, whereas family ownership positively moderates the pressure resistant investors towards internationalization.     

女性高管对企业研发创新的影响：一个有调节的中介模型

企业创新是企业持续发展的内在动力,也是推动国家产业升级、建设创新型国家的重要举措.近年来女性高管比重不断提高,学术界开始关注女性高管对企业研发创新的影响.以沪深两市2010—2018年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验女性高管对企业研发创新投入的影响.结果表明:女性高管负向影响企业研发创新投入;其负向作用以风险承担为中介实现;企业所有制调节了中介过程的后半段路径.     

Disproportionate insider control and firm performance

The effect of disproportionate insider control on firm performance is ambiguous. Disproportionate control may enhance insiders’ ability to expropriate perquisites; on the other hand, it may provide stability of management and reduce short‐term market pressures. Using a hand‐collected sample of U.S. dual‐class firms, we find that disproportionate control is positively associated with accounting‐based performance, but negatively associated with Tobin's Q. These results are consistent with the incentives of entrenched insiders who are interested in profitability but less beholden to capital markets.     

How Owners Matter? An Examination of Ownership Type in Corporate Disaster Relief Giving

Little research has investigated the effect of ownership identity (or type) and corporate philanthropy experience on giving. In this research, relying on legitimacy theory, we first assess the effect of ownership identity on corporate philanthropy (CP) in the context of the 2008 earthquake in China. Then we explore moderation effects of firms' prior CP experience and size as proxies for perceived legitimacy on owners' efforts at increasing giving and legitimacy. We find that state and CEO ownership are deterrents, while non‐SOE and institutional ownership enhances giving probability and amount. In addition, there is evidence that firm size and prior CP weaken the effects of institutional ownership on CP. This study provides a complete assessment of owner behaviour. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"利剑斩污"行动下石家庄市挥发性有机物的污染特性变化研究

为研究石家庄市在"利剑斩污"行动管控期和非管控期挥发性有机物(VOCs)的污染特性变化,在2个时间段内对石家庄市3个国控点进行采样分析。通过苏玛罐(SUMMA罐)进行样品采集,利用气相色谱/质谱联用(GC/MS)仪对石家庄市区3个国控点的VOCs进行定性定量检测分析。结果表明,监测期间主要的特征污染物是二氯甲烷、二氯丙烷、苯和甲苯。与非管控期间相比,管控期间各污染物的质量浓度均有所降低,总VOCs平均质量浓度降低45.107μg/m~3,二氯甲烷质量浓度降低8.796μg/m~3,二氯丙烷质量浓度降低3.750μg/m~3,苯质量浓度降低18.285μg/m~3,甲苯质量浓度降低16.895μg/m~3。大气环境调控策略的实施,有效降低了VOCs浓度,减少了空气污染程度,空气质量改善效果显著。"利剑斩污"行动期间采取的相关举措,对于制定常态化下VOCs的防治对策具有一定的参考价值。     

基于引力模型的省域创新产出空间联系研究

基于引力模型，结合社会网络分析法的凝聚子群分析，对31个省（区、市）的创新产出空间联系进行探究，研究发现：我国省域创新产出空间联系主要集中于京津冀和长三角一带，呈现出严重的分布不均状况，具有较强的区域集中性和空间依赖性；北京、天津、上海、浙江、江苏作为区域创新产出引力较强的节点省（区、市），对周边区域的创新产出具有较强的辐射作用；总体来看，省域创新产出空间联系并没有形成贯穿东西南北的交叉网状结构，中心省（区、市）数量较少且分布不均，辐射范围有限。基于此，提出加大区域创新投入、减少区域创新产出联系的政策性障碍、营造区域创新产出联系的良好环境等政策建议。     

Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition

This research investigates the effect of the separation between firm ownership and control on the cost of debt, with attention to the moderating role of state ownership and bank competition. We make use of a sample of 1744 Chinese A-share firms for the years 2011–2017. We find that separation between ownership and control is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the view that separation of control from ownership allows controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling and other behaviors that increase the risk of default. State ownership weakens this positive link because government debt guarantees mitigate the risk of default. Greater competition in the banking industry generally reduces the cost of debt for non-state enterprises while having no effect for state enterprises. At the same time, greater bank competition amplifies the positive effect of ownership and control separation on debt cost for non-state enterprises as banks must still cover the higher default risk. Finally, the global financial crisis raised the cost of debt for non-state enterprises but had no effect for state enterprises.