The effect of mandatory CSR disclosure on firm profitability and social externalities: Evidence from China

We examine how mandatory disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) impacts firm performance and social externalities. Our analysis exploits China's 2008 mandate requiring firms to disclose CSR activities, using a difference-in-differences design. Although the mandate does not require firms to spend on CSR, we find that mandatory CSR reporting firms experience a decrease in profitability subsequent to the mandate. In addition, the cities most impacted by the disclosure mandate experience a decrease in their industrial wastewater and SO₂ emission levels. These findings suggest that mandatory CSR disclosure alters firm behavior and generates positive externalities at the expense of shareholders.     

The effects of corporate environmental disclosure on environmental innovation from stakeholder perspectives

Based on legitimacy theory and resource dependence theory, using 111 listed companies among China’s typically high pollution-emitting listed corporations, research into the effects of environmental disclosure on environmental innovation is undertaken. From the perspective of stakeholders, we analyse the moderating effects of different proportions of institutional investor holdings and types of enterprises on the relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental innovation. The results indicate that corporate environmental disclosure has a positive role in promoting environmental innovation; the proportion of institutional investor holdings has a positive moderating effect between environmental disclosure and environmental innovation. However, there is no significant difference between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in terms of the effect of the environmental disclosure on environmental innovation, which possibly arises because both types of enterprises make full use of their own advantages to instigate environmental innovation through environmental disclosure. The conclusions may help enterprise decision-makers implementing environmental innovation and government policy makers formulating scientific policies to promote the clean production in enterprises.     

Conflicted financial advice: disclosure revisited

We examine the impact of disclosing an advisor’s conflict of interest in providing financial advice to a client in an experiment. We find that an advisor’s conflict of interest harms the client and that disclosing the conflict harms the advisor. Unlike earlier literature, we do not find that disclosure of the advisor’s conflict of interest results in moral licensing or strategic exaggeration behaviour by the advisor nor, relatedly, that disclosure disadvantages the client.     

Information disclosure quality: correlation versus precision

We investigate how a multidimensional disclosure quality (i.e., correlation and precision) determines an optimal information disclosure strategy. We find that, for an infinitely lived, unlevered firm with market perfection, a truth‐telling disclosure is optimal at increasing the expected firm value. However, for a finitely lived, levered firm in the presence of market imperfections (e.g., bankruptcy cost), the optimal disclosure quality depends negatively on the level of imperfections. Once we consider the agency problem, such dependence can become positive, thereby highlighting the importance of a proper managerial‐incentive scheme to align the information disclosure interests of managers and shareholders.     

Novel approaches to the regulatory control of financial services providers: The importance of cultural context

This study investigates the effectiveness of a public sector financial management initiative. Specifically, the powers awarded to the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman (FSO) in 2013 to name and shame malfeasance by financial service providers (FSPs) in its annual reports. As the first country to award such powers to its public sector financial ombudsman, Ireland represents a novel setting in which to test the impact of regulatory disclosure as a way to promote accountability and transparency. Our results show that the number of complaints lodged against malfeasants dropped in the immediate aftermath of this and, following a one-year lag, so did the percentage of complaints lodged that proceeded to a full investigation and legally binding finding. Despite the failure of such strategies in some jurisdictions, the Irish experience indicates that regulatory disclosure can, in line with Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory and consistent with the accounting and accountability literature, have considerable impact where and when contextual preconditions are met. These findings have important implications for the operationalisation of regulatory disclosure as an accountability enhancing measure in other jurisdictions.     

Determinants of materiality disclosure quality in integrated reporting: Empirical evidence from an international setting

This study examines determinants of materiality disclosure quality (MDQ) in integrated reporting (IR) in an international setting. To this purpose, we constructed a novel, hand‐collected MDQ score in line with the <IR> guiding principles introduced by the International Integrated Reporting Council. On the basis of a cross‐national sample consisting of 359 firm‐year observations between 2013 and 2016, we find that MDQ is positively associated with learning effects, gender diversity, and the assurance of nonfinancial information in the integrated report. On the other hand, we find that IR readability, listing in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, and earnings management do not affect MDQ. Our results are robust to different statistical models. We expand on earlier empirical findings on IR disclosure quality and provide valuable insights for research, practice, and standard setting.     

Value relevance of multinational directorship and cross-listing on MNEs national governance disclosure practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Nigeria

We draw on institutional isomorphism literature to develop a conceptual framework which uncovers how emerging market MNEs manage institutional tensions and complexity in corporate governance (CG) regulations within and across economic environments. Using a sample of 400 firm-year observations (2011–2015) from Nigeria, we show foreign directorship and cross-listing as significant avenues for governance isomorphism. MNEs employ these mechanisms to manage and reconcile foreign and Nigerian CG regulations whilst overcoming institutional weaknesses at home. Specifically, governance isomorphism leads to improvement of home country CG disclosures practices because of associated linkages with international CG systems through cross-listing and employment of multinational directors.     

纳税信用评级结果披露与研发投入

以纳税信用评级披露作为一个天然外生冲击,并基于2013—2016年1214家A股上市公司的微观数据构造准自然实验,使用双重差分法系统评估纳税信用评级结果披露对上市公司研发投入的影响。结果发现:纳税信用评级结果披露显著增加了上市公司的研发投入。基于PSM-DID方法的估计结果与上述结论无明显差异。稳健性检验也表明上述结论的正确性。机制检验表明,纳税信用评级结果披露通过降低企业的融资约束,进而促进企业增加研发投入。此外,分样本回归发现纳税信用评级结果披露只能对中小型企业和民营企业的研发投入产生促进作用。     

Asymmetric impact of earnings news on investor uncertainty

We describe a model that predicts an asymmetric impact of disclosure on investor uncertainty. We show that good news tends to resolve more uncertainty than bad news, and that uncertainty can be revised upwards if the investors' prior belief is sufficiently strong and the signal is sufficiently bad. This result is in contrast to classical disclosure models, where new information always resolves uncertainty and the change in uncertainty depends only on the relative precision of the news. Using option-implied volatility as a proxy for uncertainty, we find strong support for our predictions. We also show that our results are robust to competing explanations, notably to the leverage effect and volatility feedback, as well as to the jump risk induced in anticipation of the earnings announcements.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.