Operational efficiency analysis of Beijing multi-airport terminal airspace

Multi-airport systems are growing in number and size globally, despite being afflicted by known inefficiencies due to the interferences between the flows of neighbouring airports. A macroscopic empirical approach is proposed in this paper to estimate the capacity penalties and demonstrated by a numerical case study for Beijing, which is projected to become one of the busiest metroplexes in Asia. The Pareto envelopes of the theoretical and observed peak hour capacities are statistically analysed to quantify the penalties in a comparable metroplex and are subsequently modulated by a sigmoid correlation function. The analysis predicts the practical capacity of Daxing, the penalty incurred by the pre-existing Capital airport and by the total multi-airport system. Various findings are drawn and discussed, highlighting the needs for further research.     

One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates

We consider optional time-of-use (TOU) pricing for residential consumers, offered by a publicly regulated electricity supplier, as an alternative to a single TOU or flat rate structure. An equilibrium model explores and quantifies the effects of such pricing on welfare, consumption, and production costs. The supplier offers to each household a menu of possible rate structures obtained by maximizing a collective welfare function subject to three restrictions: Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, sufficiency of supplier revenue to cover costs. Simulations based on realistic calibration of the model demonstrate that optional pricing can increase overall consumer welfare and reduce average cost.     

Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section

Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006 Akamatsu, T., Sato, S., &; Nguyen, X. L. (2006). Tradable time-of-day bottleneck permits for morning commuters (in Japanese). JSCE Journal of Infrastructure Planning 62(4), 605–620.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993 Arnott, R., de Palma, A., &; Lindsey, R. (1993). Properties of dynamic traffic equilibrium involving bottlenecks, including a paradox and metering. Transportation Science 27(2), 148–160.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.     

Real exchange rates: are they dominated by fundamental factors?

Using Bayesian model averaging, we determine which fundamental pair-wise differences suggested by the literature on optimum currency areas give the best explanation of medium-term variability of bilateral real exchange rates. The intercept in the best specification is statistically insignificant, implying that for a hypothetical pair of economies for which the differences were zero, the bilateral real exchange rate would not move. Thus, the ‘non-fundamental’ element of the medium-term real exchange rate variability is, in our sample at least, negligible on average. In other words, floating exchange rate does not in itself imply, on average, more real exchange rate variability in the medium term than an exchange rate peg.     

Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments

We analyze a monopolist's incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time- and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.     

Spatial externalities and agglomeration in a competitive industry

We introduce spatial spillovers as an externality in the production function of competitive firms operating within a finite spatial domain under adjustment costs. Spillovers may attenuate with distance and the overall externality could contain positive and negative components with the overall effect being positive. We show that when the spatial externality is not internalized by firms, spatial agglomerations may emerge endogenously in a competitive equilibrium. The result does not require increasing returns at the private or the social level, increasing marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, or location advantages. In fact agglomerations may emerge with decreasing returns to scale, declining marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, and no location advantage. The result depends on the interactions between the structures of production technology and spatial effects as shown in the paper. No agglomerations emerge at the social optimum when spillovers are internalized and diminishing returns both from the private and the social point of view prevail. Numerical experiments with Cobb–Douglas and CES technologies and an isoelastic demand confirm our theoretical predictions.     

Positive and normative judgments implicit in U.S. tax policy,and the costs of unequal growth and recessions

Calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion. One approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real-world policy choices, converting a normative decision into a positive inference, as in the recent surge of “inverse-optimum” research. We find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope. We perform the inverse-optimum inference on U.S. tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations.     

Arrow–Debreu equilibria for rank‐dependent utilities with heterogeneous probability weighting

We study Arrow–Debreu equilibria for a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents having heterogeneous probability weighting and outcome utility functions. In particular, we allow the economy to have a mix of expected utility agents and rank‐dependent utility ones, with nonconvex probability weighting functions. The standard approach for convex economy equilibria fails due to the incompatibility with second‐order stochastic dominance. The representative agent approach devised in Xia and Zhou (2016) does not work either due to the heterogeneity of the weighting functions. We overcome these difficulties by considering the comonotone allocations, on which the rank‐dependent utilities become concave. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of comonotone Pareto optima, and derive their characterizing conditions. With the aid of the auxiliary problem of price equilibria with transfers, we provide a sufficient condition in terms of the model primitives under which an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists, along with the explicit expression of the state‐price density in equilibrium. This new, general sufficient condition distinguishes the paper from previous related studies with homogeneous and/or convex probability weightings.     

苦荞风味糕生产工艺研究

以苦荞粉为主要原料、辅以面粉,采用"三熟"处理苦荞,生产新型苦荞风味糕,优化配方为:特一粉∶苦荞粉6∶4,蔗糖50%,复合疏松剂0.5%,调和油10%,谷氨酸钠0.02%,NaCl 0.8%,活性酵母0.5%;最佳生产工艺为:苦荞籽80℃干燥3~5 h后炒制25 min,磨粉并过80目筛,75~80℃热烫20 min,加辅料并和面后,30℃发酵3 h,制坯成型后蒸30 min,所得苦荞风味糕细腻柔和、风味俱佳。     

A practical solution to the problem of ultimate ruin probability

Abstract

It was the Swiss actuary Chr. Moser who, in lectures at Bern University at the turn of the century, gave the name “self-renewing aggregate” to what Vajda (1947) has called the “unstationary community” of lives, namely where deaths at any epoch are immediately replaced by an equivalent number of births. It was Moser too (1926) who coined the expression “steady state” for the stationary community in which the age distribution at any time follows the life table (King, 1887). With such a distinguished actuarial history, excellently summarized by Saxer (1958, Ch. IV), it behoves every actuary to know at least the definitions and modus operandi of today's so-called renewal (point), or recurrent event, processes.