Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

面源污染视角下江西省耕地利用效率研究

[目的]在面源污染视角下考察耕地利用效率,可以为推动耕地可持续利用提供理论和参考依据。[方法]文章基于2000—2014年我国13个粮食主产省(区)耕地投入产出的面板数据,运用SBM方向性距离函数将耕地面源污染因素纳入到传统的效率分析框架,从省际比较的维度对江西省耕地利用效率进行了测度与分析。[结果]考虑面源污染因素对耕地利用效率测算产生了一定的影响;江西省耕地利用效率值呈现阶段性特征,耕地利用效率排名比较稳定,近年来排名有上升趋势;江西省耕地利用绩效一般,且与最佳实践者存在较大的差距。[结论]忽视面源污染因素的耕地利用效率评估是失真和不符合实际的,宜将面源污染因素纳入到耕地利用效率的测度框架,以此来更科学地量化评估耕地利用绩效;设计和完善相关政策,以有效控制耕地面源污染;加强与先进省(区)的交流与合作,学习其农业可持续耕作技术与管理经验,进一步推动江西省耕地产出与资源、环境协调发展。     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Institutional quality,investment efficiency,and the choice of public–private partnerships

We examine a sample of 625 public–private partnership (PPP) firms from 1980 to 2015 that straddle nine countries with varying degrees of economic development and PPP markets. We find that the motivations of the firms that undertake PPP investments vary. While private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality choose to engage in PPPs to alleviate capital constraints attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality participate in PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment due to an abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through PPP investments are more pronounced in economies with high institutional quality.     

Disappearing investment-cash flow sensitivities: Earnings have not become a worse proxy for cash flow

According to a recent conjecture in the literature, earnings have become a poorer proxy for cash flow from operations over time. We find that since 1988, when cash flow statements started to be consistently reported in Compustat, the cash effectiveness of earnings has actually increased for a large sample of US manufacturing firms. This occurs despite the introduction of fair value accounting and increasing accounting accruals during the last three decades. Also contrary to the conjecture, using more comprehensive measures of cash flow does not restore the investment-cash flow sensitivity, which continues to be around 0.05 in more recent periods.     

The impact of investor structure on stock price crash sensitivity: Evidence from China's stock market

Stock price crash sensitivity refers to the conditional probability of a stock crash when the market collapses. It focuses on individual stocks' sensitivity to the market crash and can affect stock pricing significantly. Although the crash sensitivity of China's stock market is very high as a whole (Weigert, 2016), different individual stocks show varying degrees of crash sensitivity. This paper, adopting the perspective of institutional investors, explores the reasons for the difference in crash sensitivity in China's stock market, and finds that: First, institutional investors' shareholdings is positively related to firms' stock price crash sensitivity. However, after dividing institutional investors into professional (represented by financial institutions) and non-professional institutional investors (represented by general legal persons), we find that only professional institutional investors' shareholdings is negatively related to firms' stock price crash sensitivity. Second, the impact of professional institutional investors on the crash sensitivity is influenced by stock liquidity and media sentiment: when the stock liquidity of listed companies is good or the media sentiment is strong, the negative impact of professional institutional investors on the crash sensitivity is accordingly high. This paper, by highlighting the investor structure, attempts a pioneering exploration of the influencing factors of the difference in stock price crash sensitivity in China. Our empirical results enrich research on stock price crash sensitivity and the heterogeneity of institutional investors. They can also serve to guide regulatory authorities' development of institutional investors and efforts to maintain market stability.     

异质机构投资者对高管薪酬的影响研究——来自A股上市公司的经验数据

以2012—2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本，从静态和动态两个角度实证研究异质机构投资者对上市公司高管薪酬的影响，结果表明：在高管薪酬方面，压力抵抗型投资者持股对薪酬总额的影响并不显著，而压力敏感型机构投资者则能显著提高薪酬总额；在高管薪酬变动速度方面，压力抵抗型机构投资者能够显著提升上市公司的业绩—薪酬敏感性，压力敏感型机构投资者的这一提升效果不显著；在高管薪酬变动幅度方面，A股上市公司高管薪酬普遍存在向下的粘性，相较于压力敏感型机构投资者，压力抵抗型机构投资者能够显著抑制高管薪酬粘性。     

基于神经网络的建筑业碳排放强度预测——以京津冀为例

通过统计分析得出影响建筑业碳排放强度的13个影响因素,基于收集的京津冀相关数据,运用逐步回归分析找出其中6个关键因素.借鉴五折交叉验证解决数据稀缺问题,采用神经网络对京津冀建筑业碳排放强度进行预测.利用敏感性分析简化模型,筛选出4个核心因素.结果表明,此模型预测精度高达99％,同时根据挖掘出的核心因素和关键因素,提出建筑业节能减排的建议.     

Performance sensitivity of non-executive compensation in China: The role of economic policy uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on non-executive employees from the perspective of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Economy-wide uncertainty can trigger adverse impacts for businesses, and in response enterprises may adjust employee pay to maintain their level of activity. Using firm-level data on A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2003–2016, this paper finds that better-performing firms pay higher wages on average, which they adjust only during uncertain times. We also show that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on PPS is more pronounced in the context of labor-intensive, highly competitive industries and state-owned enterprises, because they tend to respond to uncertainty via wage adjustment. The evidence demonstrates that the pay-performance link is much weaker during uncertain times, when different subgroups react differently. However, our finding of a robust pay-performance relation holds, even with a range of firm-level controls and accounting for different levels of firm heterogeneity.     

Managerial Overconfidence,Self-Attribution Bias,and Downwardly Sticky Investment: Evidence from Korea

The extant literature on behavioral corporate finance has explored the effects of overconfidence on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICS) to explain overinvestment, yet it has overlooked the asymmetric behavior of investments in relation to changes in cash flow levels. This study examines whether investments behave asymmetrically responding to changes in cash flows and, if so, how managerial overconfidence affects asymmetric ICS. Using a sample of KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms in Korea, we find the incidence of downwardly sticky ICS in unconstrained firms. We then find that overconfident managers encourage ICS to be stickier than their rational peers do in unconstrained firms. Finally, we find that managerial overconfidence intensified by self-attribution bias induces ICS to get even stickier, suggesting more explicit evidence of corporate investment distortions. The results of alternative tests using the asymmetric models of Homburg and Nasev (2008) are qualitatively consistent with prior results. Overall, our findings imply a higher incidence of excessive investment commitments driven by overconfident managers.