FX Intervention in the New Keynesian Model

We develop an open-economy New Keynesian Model with foreign exchange (FX) intervention in the presence of a financial accelerator and shocks to risk appetite in international capital markets. We obtain closed-form solutions for optimal monetary and FX intervention policies assuming the central bank cannot commit to future policies, and we compare the solution to that under policy commitment. We show how FX intervention can help reduce the volatility of the exchange rate, of inflation, and of the output gap, thus mitigating welfare losses associated with shocks in the international capital markets. We also show that, when the financial accelerator is strong, there is a risk of indeterminacy (self-fulfilling currency and inflation movements) although FX intervention can reduce this risk and thus reinforce the credibility of the inflation targeting regime. Model simulations match well the impact of a VIX shock obtained by local projections on a panel of inflation targeting emerging markets.     

Comparative performance of polyester,polypropylene and chlorofibre thermal fabrics in simulated consumer use

Polyester, polypropylene, chlorofibre/acrylic and polypropylene/acrylic/wool thermal fabrics were compared for water absorption/wicking, pilling and relaxation following elongation. The polypropylene fabrics did not absorb water. Wicking was related to the mass of all but the polypropylene/acrylic/wool fabric, which had a structure unlike that of any of the other fabrics. The polypropylene/acrylic/wool blend had the optimal resistance to pilling, least dimensional change in laundering and negligible growth after elongation.     

Cross‐Listed Bonds,Information Asymmetry,and Conservatism in Credit Ratings

We propose information asymmetry as an additional explanation for rating conservatism. Because information asymmetry is likely higher for cross‐listed bonds than for U.S. bonds, we expect and find that cross‐listed bonds are rated more conservatively than U.S. domestic bonds at issuance. Further, cross‐listed bonds receive less frequent upgrades and take longer to be upgraded after issuance. Because lower ratings might also reflect higher default risk based on agencies’ private information, we conduct additional tests to discriminate between the rating conservatism and private information explanations. The results are consistent with ratings conservatism and inconsistent with the private information explanation.     

Privatization in a Small Open Economy with Imperfect Competition

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.     

POVERTY,ELITE HETEROGENEITY,AND THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC SPENDING: PANEL EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN STATES

In this paper, we explore how in India, the world's largest democracy, the presence of different elite groups—the dominant landed and capitalist elite, and the minority elite (who are the elected representatives of the marginalized women and low caste population)—could affect the nature and extent of public spending on various accounts, especially education. We argue that the productive cooperation between the capitalist elite and workers may induce capitalists to favor spending on education, while the landed elite tend to oppose investment in basic education because they are fearful of dilution of their political dominance by the educated poor. While the minority elite may tend to favor redistributive spending, including that on education, their effectiveness could be limited by their under‐representation in the government. Results from the Indian states for the period 1960–2002 provide support for these hypotheses.     

The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance

The dramatic rise and fall of world food prices in 2007–8 was largely a result of speculative activity in global commodity markets, enabled by financial deregulation measures in the United States and elsewhere. Despite the recent fall in agricultural prices in world trade, the food crisis has been exacerbated in many developing countries where food prices remain high and even continue to increase. The financial crisis also directly operates to increase food insecurity by imposing constraints on fiscal policies and food imports in balance‐of‐payments constrained developing countries, causing exchange rate devaluation through capital flight and adversely affecting employment, thereby reducing the ability of vulnerable groups to purchase food.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.