Unraveling determinants of inferred and stated attribute nonattendance: Effects on farmers’ willingness to accept to join agri-environmental schemes

Attribute nonattendance (ANA) has received very little attention in the context of willingness to accept (WTA), although an increasing number of studies analyze the preferences of ecosystem service providers toward incentive-based schemes. We add to the understanding of ANA behavior by analyzing stated and inferred ANA in a choice experiment investigating farmers’ WTA for participating in agri-environmental schemes (AES) in southern Spain. We use mixed logit models, following Hess and Hensher for the inferred ANA approach. Evidence is found of ANA behavior for both stated and inferred approaches, with models accounting for ANA clearly outperforming those that do not account for it; however, we produce no conclusive results as to which ANA approach is best. WTA estimates are only moderately affected, which to some extent is consistent with the low level of non-attendance found for the monetary attribute. Stated and inferred approaches show very similar WTA estimates. Additionally, we investigate sources of observed heterogeneity related to ANA behavior by using a sequence of bivariate probit models for each attribute. Overall, our results hint at a positive relationship between ease of scheme adoption and nonattendance to attributes. However, further research is still needed in this field.     

Protest Responses and Willingness to Accept: Ecosystem Services Providers’ Preferences towards Incentive‐Based Schemes

The identification and treatment of protest responses in stated preference surveys has long been subject to debate. We analyse protest responses while investigating ecosystem services providers’ preferences for incentive‐based schemes. We use a choice experiment for olive farmers’ preferences for agri‐environmental scheme participation in southern Spain. Our two main objectives are: first, to identify and discuss a range of possible motives for protest responses that emerge in a WTA context; second, we analyse the impact on WTA estimates of censoring serial non‐participation linked to protest or high compensation requirements (very high takers). Using a random parameter logit model in WTA space, we find that the inclusion or exclusion of serial non‐participants in the analysis can have a significant impact on marginal and total WTA estimates. Based on the findings, the paper makes recommendations on how to reduce the incidence of protest responses through survey design, regarding the identification of protesters as opposed to very high takers, and regarding the treatment of both groups of respondents for WTA estimation.     

Optimal Design of Agri‐environmental Schemes under Asymmetric Information for Improving Farmland Biodiversity

Information asymmetry is one of the main obstacles to the effective design and implementation of agri‐environmental schemes (AES). The literature has generally addressed this issue through the use of principal‐agent models (PAM). We develop a PAM to support optimal design of a new AES for improving farmland biodiversity. We use the results of choice experiments to assess both the costs incurred by the agent for the provision of biodiversity and the resulting social benefits. We also make a number of novel contributions such as the inclusion of a non‐linear non‐compliance detection curve, a sensitivity analysis to identify which parameter estimates have a critical impact on PAM results, and analysis of the efficiency of different sanction scenarios. The results suggest that: (i) the second‐best solutions differ significantly from the optimal solutions attainable with perfect information, with farmers being strongly over‐compensated for the extra costs associated with improved biodiversity; (ii) monitoring levels should be higher; (iii) the sanction system should be tougher. Sensitivity analysis shows the need for accurate estimates of the marginal cost of public funds and the costs and benefits associated with the public goods, which represent the key parameters determining PAM results.     

Combating employee benefit cost and control issues: the case for coalition purchasing

Growing in popularity, employee benefit coalitions can impact an employer's bottom line and are becoming a market factor to be dealt with in every industry and business setting. This article examines how modern-day coalitions are bringing classic aggregation theory into the 21st century and the reasons behind the growing popularity of employee benefit coalitions. It also suggests several strategic initiatives that human resource (HR) and benefit managers can take within their own organization to unlock the power of the coalition movement toward a better, more efficient buying model.