Incentive effects of benevolent intervention: The case of government loan guarantees

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.     

The Many Faces of Information Disclosure

In this article we ask: what kind of information and how muchof it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosuresare considered. One is information that complements the informationavailable only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementaryinformation). The second is information that is orthogonal tothat which any investor can acquire and thus complements theinformation available to all investors (preprocessed complementaryinformation). And the third is information that substitutesfor the information of the informed investors in that it revealsto all what was previously known only by the informed (substituteinformation). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium,all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information.Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementaryinformation disclosure by firms strengthens investors' privateincentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosureweakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, whilecomplementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effecton financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosureweakens those incentives.     

Toward a theory of bank loan commitments

The characteristics of fixed and variable rate bank loan commitments are analyzed in a contingent-claims framework, and valuation expressions are derived for these commitments. The valuation expressions are used to present estimates of the impact of interest rate uncertainty on the liability assumed by a bank issuing loan commitments. Finally, a simple, two-period, asymmetric information model is employed to explain the recent trend among bankers to substitute variable rate commitments for their fixed rate counterparts.     

Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: whydo banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarilywith core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance suchloans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationshiploans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also requirethe relationship between the bank and the borrower to endurein order for the bank to add value. However, the informationalopacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawalrisk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractivefunding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidityservices to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihoodof premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuityof relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wishto match the highest value-added liabilities with the highestvalue-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizesthe bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizesthe value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examinethe impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liabilitymatching and extract numerous testable predictions.     

Telematics: Decision Time for Detroit

With implications for navigation, safety, entertainment and vehicle maintenance as well as regulation and infrastructure investment in roads, telematics has the potential to transform driving more than any other innovation for decades. In the already well-established Asian telematics industry, revenue tends to come from extra charges at the time of vehicle-sale, with most subsequent services provided free. The US model has evolved differently, with much of the cost of telematics hardware and software subsidized in the initial vehicle sale price and revenue coming from services used. The decision to invest in telematics is therefore riskier in the US. This article first briefly summarizes the potential of telematics. It then analyzes the investment risks, particularly for automakers. It concludes with recommendations on how the US auto industry can minimize risk and make the most of the opportunities.     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.     

Financial development and top income shares in OECD countries

We examine the causal impact of financial development (FD) on top income shares for a panel of 14 OECD countries—five Anglo‐Saxon countries, eight continental European countries, and Japan—over a 110‐year period. In our main General Method of Moments estimates, we find that a 1‐percentage‐point change in FD increases the top 1% income share by 0.2%. In distribution terms, a 1‐SD incr=ease in FD increases the top 1% income share by around 0.4 of an SD. The effects are robust to various measures of top income shares and FD and alternative estimation techniques, including nonparametric estimation. FD is typically viewed in positive terms in that it makes it easier to access credit and facilitates economic growth. Our results are important because they contribute to understanding of the potential negative effects of FD.     

Corporate Control Through Board Dismissals and Takeovers

This paper examines some policy issues related to the interaction between internal and external corporate control mechanisms—board dismissals and takeovers—by focusing on the information aggregation and other effects related to this interaction. We model the functioning of corporate control mechanisms as an example of a multilayered principal-agent relationship in which shareholders delegate the task of monitoring management quality to the board and rely on the external takeover market to provide additional disciplining of the manager as well as of the board. This gives rise to two effects: (1) a substitution effect, whereby the takeover market partially substitutes for board dismissal of the manager, leading to greater lenience toward the manager by a board acting in the shareholders' best interest, and (2) a kick-in-the-pants effect, whereby the board is stricter with the manager because it may be dismissed by a successful acquirer who views it as lax. The interaction of these two effects leads to various implications about the behavior of boards and potential acquirers. In particular, a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not obviate the need for external control (takeovers). Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively, there may be a greater incidence of takeovers when the internal control mechanism is working well than when it is not.