Vergleich zweier Modelle zur Bewertung der Kapitalausstattung deutscher Lebensversicherungsunternehmen

The result of the comparison between the capital adequacy model published by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and the supervisory model of the German Insurance Association (GDV) points up the both models aim at measuring the German life insurers’ capital adequacy. The capital adequacy model is part of the Insurer Financial Strength Rating analyzing the financial security of insurance companies. The supervisory model is part of the recommandations by the GDV to reform the insurance control within the Solvency II project. Furthermore, the research includes the GDV’s proposal for the Solvency II standard model following the supervisory model as recommandation to the Solvency II project. The risk based capital computation’s analysis shows that the S&P model is more comprehensive on the assets and the supervisory model is more comprehensive on the liabilities. In addition, S&P differentiates in his model in a more quantitative way, the GDV in a more qualitative way. The standard model balances out the supervisory model’s lower number of quantitative differentiating factors.     

Shadow economy and unemployment rate in USA: is there a structural relationship? An empirical analysis

This article aims to estimate the size of the US shadow economy (SE) using a structural equation approach and to evaluate if a structural relationship exists between the SE and the unemployment rate (UR) in the United States. The size of the SE is estimated to be decreasing over the last two decades. We corroborate the existence of a structural relationship between the SE and the UR by using a simple theoretical model. Furthermore, we extend the Okun's law to estimate the structural relationship between growth rate of official GDP, SE and UR. Our results indicate a significant positive relationship between the SE and the UR.     

Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.     

Regulation of credit rating agencies

Financial regulators recognize certain credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes. However, it is often argued that credit rating agencies have an incentive to assign inflated ratings. This paper studies a repeated principal-agent problem in which a regulator approves credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies may collude to assign inflated ratings. Yet we show that there exists an approval scheme which induces credit rating agencies to assign correct ratings.     

Impact of social media on economic growth – evidence from social media

This article attempts to investigate the impact of social media (SM) on economic growth. Using information obtained from memberships to social networks, we find that SM has a negative and significant impact on economic growth. This provides evidence in favour of our hypothesis that SM increases the search costs for information and also increases the substitution effect from labour to leisure thereby producing a negative impact on growth.     

The changing nature of the OECD shadow economy

Traditionally, the presence of the shadow economy (SE) has been associated, mainly and positively, with taxation. Recently, some authors have suggested that the SE may be also linked to the institutional setting (efficiency of the bureaucracy, regulations, corruption, etc.) so that just two stable equilibria are possible. In the “good” one, there is a small hidden sector, large fiscal revenues and honest/appreciated institutions. The other, “bad”, equilibrium is the opposite. Unlike the traditional approach, therefore, the recent literature argues that the tax burden and SE can be negatively correlated. Examining the links between these variables in relatively uncorrupt systems, this paper reconciles the two views. Theoretically, it claims that many different good equilibria can emerge whereby SE and its determinants are linked in complex and different ways. For instance, taxation and SE can go hand-in-hand, even taking into account the institutional framework. Empirical evidence for OECD countries supports both the model and the changing nature of the SE.     

Comparative fiscal illusion: a fiscal illusion index for the European Union

This paper provides an empirical analysis of fiscal illusion by estimating an index of fiscal illusion for 28 European countries over the period 1995–2008 employing a structural equation approach. Using Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes models, the paper investigates the main indicators of fiscal illusion and develops an index of fiscal illusion. It concludes that the chief determinants for the deployment of fiscal illusion strategies are the share of self-employment on total employment, the educational level of citizens, and the size of tax burden. At the same time, policy makers attempt to ‘conceal’ the real tax burden by means of debt illusion, fiscal drag, wage withholding taxes, as well as taxes on labour.     

The shadow economy in three Mediterranean countries: France,Spain and Greece. A MIMIC approach

This paper offers estimations of the evolution of the shadow economy in three Mediterranean countries, namely France, Spain and Greece. A multiple indicators and multiple causes model based on the latent variable structural theory has been applied. As established by Giles (Working paper on monitoring the health of the tax system, 1995), filtered data to solve the non-stationary problems are used. The model includes the tax burden (both as a whole and disaggregated into direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions), a proxy of regulation burden, theu nemployment rate and self-employment as causes of the shadow economy and the GDP growth rate, the labour force participation ratio and the currency ratio as indicators of the underground economy. The results confirm that unemployment, the fiscal burden and self-employment are the main causes of the shadow economy in these countries, and confirm that an inverse relationship exists between the official GDP growth rate and that of the unofficial economy. This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of the anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies. The paper was partly written when third author was visiting Real Colegio Complutense at Harvard University. The hospitality of this Institution is gratefully acknowledged.     

Institutions and human development in the Latin American informal economy

The aim of this study is to assess the causes of the Informal Economy (IE) in Latin American countries. By including indicators of institutional framework such as human development, marginal tax rate, public social spending, and unemployment rate in panel regressions, we find empirical evidence that the institutional background is a key indicator of the size of the IE in these countries. We observe that the correlation between the size of the IE and the human development index follows an inverted U shaped curve. Suggestions are offered for policies that may be adopted.