Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions

Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty, a natural efficiency requirement can be imposed on a bargaining solution. Using the maximin ordering, thestrictly monotone pathsolutions (generalizations of theegalitariansolution) to the bargaining problem are characterized as the only continuous solutions that satisfy this efficiency axiom. If the maximin criterion is replaced by the maximax ranking or a strict convex combination of the maximin and the maximax criterion, imposing our efficiency axiom and continuity leads to thedictatorialsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.     

Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility

This paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing. We examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous. With two identically sized firms, there are symmetric, Cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty, and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria. With one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms, there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. We conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by Stackelberg equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers?: D21, L11.     

EQUILIBRIA IN NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES II: DEVIATIONS BASED REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

In any Nash equilibrium no player will unilaterally deviate. However, many games have multiple Nash equilibria. In this paper, we survey some refinements of Nash equilibria based on the hypothesis that any player may consider a deliberate deviation from a Nash equilibrium vector while expecting other players to respond optimally to this deviation. The concepts studied here differ in the expectations players have about other players' responses to a deviation. This sort of deviations philosophy is predicated on the thought process of players. Therefore, the validity of a particular equilibrium concept to an economic model may depend upon the relevance of the thought process implied by the concept.     

Labor Regulations,Employment and Wages: Evidence from India's Apparel Sector

While India is among the world's largest producers and exporters of apparel products, the sector has not performed to its potential. This study analyzes why this might be so from the perspective of the structure of production in the sector, the most striking aspect of which is a firm size distribution heavily dominated by small firms. Using nationally representative firm‐level and labor force survey data, we argue that the dominance of firms operating at scales too small to apply modern production and management technologies is one proximate reason for India's relative underperformance. Further, we note that India's labor regulations and the associated enforcement regime are important policy drivers of Indian firms' tendency to avoid placing “too many workers under one roof”.     

Testing the effectiveness of online assignments in theory of finance

The authors investigated the effectiveness of online versus paper assignments using final examination scores in three cohorts of theory of finance. In particular, two cohorts were exposed to online assignments while another cohort was exposed to traditional assignments. The central result is that exposure to online assignments robustly leads to higher final exam scores, all else being equal. The authors also found a lower level of engagement as shown by low assignment completion rates for students exposed to online assignments.     

Managing diversity: Impact of religion in the Indian workplace

Religious diversity in India stems from centuries of foreign traders and invaders ranging from the Mongols to the Mughals, French and British who came with their faiths. Religious diversity has created much political conflict and bloodshed in society at large (e.g. the recent blasts in Mumbai), but many differences have been reconciled in the workplace over time. MNCs seeking to engage in the Indian economy are attracted by the intellectual capital of this diverse nation. I examine the presence of religion in the Indian workplace through cultural values, beliefs and management practices and their impact on IHRM practices in managing diversity.     

Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information

This paperendogenously determines the order of offers and the duration of delay in reaching agreement between buyers and sellers in a continuous-time bargaining game in which a seller wishes to vend an object of known cost to a buyer, to whom the value of the good is private information, and in which each player can choose to strategically delay a response to a previous offer or to interrupt the delay of his rival. Both buyers and sellers are shown to prefer to move first in a model of bargaining in which: (1) either player can make the first offer; (2) after the minimum time has elapsed from the previous offer, either player can make an offer; and (3) players can choose to strategically delay and refrain from making an offer after the previous offer. When the buyer moves first, the equilibrium response for the seller is to accept the offer immediately. When the seller moves first the equilibrium is characterized by the seller making all but the last offer, with minimal feasible delay between successive offers. Observable endogenous delay in reaching an agreement in such equilibria approaches zero as the minimal feasible delay between offers approaches zero. This indicates that in noncooperative bargaining models with private information, where players can strategically delay their offers, endogenizing the order in which players make offers removes the ability of informational asymmetries to generate equilibria exhibiting endogenous delay in reaching an agreement.     

The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Micro Enterprises: Do Banks Matter? Evidence from Indian Manufacturing

This paper looks at the impact of trade liberalization on micro enterprises with differential access to banks. I use Indian data on rural micro enterprises employing less than ten workers in the manufacturing sector to find that trade liberalization, measured by a fall in the tariff, is associated with a larger increase or a smaller decrease in output, capital–labour ratio and labour productivity in districts with a larger number of bank branches per capita. Evidence is consistent with strong complementarities between trade liberalization effects, and the economic dynamism and access to financial intermediation associated with greater bank presence in the enterprise's location. The study underscores that trade liberalization can be beneficial to micro entrepreneurs under certain conditions and emphasizes reallocation resulting from trade liberalization. The study hence highlights the role for development policy in exploiting gains from trade.     

Guaranteed renewable life insurance under demand uncertainty

Guaranteed renewability (GR) is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. We develop a model that includes unpredictable (and unobservable) fluctuations in demand for life insurance as well as changes in risk type (observable) over individuals' lifetimes. The presence of demand type heterogeneity leads to the possibility that optimal GR contracts may have a renewal price that is either above or below the actuarially fair price of the lowest risk type in the population. Individuals whose type turns out to be high risk but low demand renew more of their GR insurance than is efficient due to the attractive renewal price. This results in imperfect insurance against reclassification risk. Although a first‐best efficient contract is not possible in the presence of demand type heterogeneity, the presence of GR contracts nonetheless improves welfare relative to an environment with only spot markets.     

EQUILIBRIA IN NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES I: PERTURBATIONS BASED REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

The concept of Nash equilibrium is widely used to analyse non-cooperative games. However, one of the problems with that concept is that many games have multiple equilibria. Recent work has concentrated on reducing or refining the set of Nash equilibria in some games. In this paper, we survey some equilibrium concepts based on perturbations of strategies that refine the set of Nash equilibria. We discuss the pros and cons of each concept and its relationship to the others by the use of numerous examples and intuition. It is hoped that this survey will enable the economist to consider the relevance of a particular equilibrium concept to a given economic model of interest. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.