Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The lender is risk-averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower. The borrower, however, might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state. We provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a nonindexed contract instead.     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

Why Do Large Firms' Prices Anticipate Earnings Earlier than Small Firms' Prices?*

This paper presents evidence that the positive association between firm size and price leads of earnings is not solely a function of private search incentives for firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that small‐firm prices also lag large‐firm prices with respect to industry‐wide information. Our empirical analysis extends Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn 1987 and Freeman 1987, who document that security‐price leads of earnings are positively associated with market capitalization. In particular, we examine the association between firm size and the timing of security returns for two components of annual earnings changes: the average change for a firm's industry and the firm's idiosyncratic change. We find that large firms' prices have a longer lead than small firms' prices with respect to both components. Large firms' early lead on industry‐wide earnings suggests that returns of large firms predict returns of same‐industry small firms. To test this implication, we construct a portfolio of long (short) positions in small firms when the prior month's returns of large firms in their industry are above (below) average for large firms in other industries. This zero investment portfolio earns 4.5 percent over 12 months.     

BEYOND EMU: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY

A common currency, as envisioned in the Maastricht treaty, is thought to be the surest way to "lock in" commitments to monetary cooperation among sovereign states. But historical evidence suggests otherwise. Comparative analysis of six currency unions demonstrates that while economic and organizational factors are influential in determining the sustainability of monetary cooperation, interstate politics matters most. Compliance with commitments is greatest in the presence of either a locally dominant state, willing and able to use its influence to sustain monetary cooperation, or a broad network of institutional linkages sufficient to make the loss of monetary autonomy tolerable to each partner.