A Model of the Confidence Channel of Fiscal Policy

This article presents a simple macroeconomic model where government spending affects aggregate demand directly and indirectly, through an expectational channel. Prices are fully flexible and the model is static, so intertemporal issues play no role. There are three important elements in the model: (i) fixed adjustment costs for investment, which create an inaction zone; (ii) noisy idiosyncratic information about the aggregate economy; and (iii) imperfect substitution among private goods and goods provided by the government. An increase in government spending raises demand for private goods and may prevent a coordination failure. The optimal level of government expenditure is high when the desired level of investment is low, which we interpret as a time of low economic activity.     

乡村旅游创业动机的性别差异研究——以台湾为例

以往有关乡村旅游经营者创业动机的研究主要局限于拉力创业动机和不同性别创业者拉力创业动机研究。旅游研究学者提出应该对乡村旅游经营者动机进行更为理论化和系统的研究,并对乡村旅游经营动机的性别差异做进一步的探讨。该研究以台湾地区为例,比较性别差异下中小型乡村旅游经营者的创业动机模式。探索性因子分析结果显示,乡村旅游经营者拉力创业动机包括善用农业资源、社交、更换工作与政府政策鼓励等4个因子;推力创业动机则包括工作压力、自我压力与生活压力等3个因子。后续的多元方差分析(MANOVA)结果表明,女性的拉力创业动机明显高于男性,而男性的推力创业动机则明显高于女性。研究表明,女性从事乡村旅游产业经营主要是为了追求理想的生活方式与获得利益,而男性从事乡村旅游产业经营主要是因为对过去生活不满意。     

Investment Policy and Exit-Exchange Offers Within Financially Distressed Firms

This article examines the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders in a setting in which firms can renegotiate the terms of existing debt with public debtholders. In particular, we consider one of the most common types of debt restructuring: the exit-exchange offer. Our analysis explores the relation between exit-exchange offers and investment choice by the manager, and it concludes that managers, acting strategically on behalf of shareholders, may select inefficient investment projects in order to enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis creditors. Holding the upside potential of an investment project fixed, managers/shareholders prefer projects with lower payoffs in states of bankruptcy because it induces individual bondholders to accept poorer terms in a debt-for-debt exit-exchange offer, thus generating a greater residual for shareholders in states of solvency. Additionally, we show how the investment inefficiencies in our analysis depend on (i) the inability of bondholders to coordinate their actions; (ii) the ability of managers to commit to suboptimal investment projects; and (iii) the coupling of an individual bondholder's decision to tender and her decision to consent to allow the firm to strip fiduciary covenants. We suggest conditions under which a ban on coupled exit-exchange offers—or alternatively, constraints on “debt-for-debt” exchanges—would be efficiency-enhancing.     

U.S. Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies

This paper empirically investigates the impact of changes in U.S. real interest rates on sovereign default risk in emerging economies using the method of identification through heteroskedasticity. Policy‐induced increases in U.S. interest rates starkly raise default risk in emerging market economies. However, the overall correlation between U.S. real interest rates and the risk of default is negative, demonstrating that the effects of other variables dominate the anterior relationship.     

The Valuation of Complex Derivatives by Major Investment Firms: Empirical Evidence

This article examines the auction of a portfolio of collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) to major broker dealers and institutional investors. The unique data set allows us to analyze a number of important empirical questions related to the valuation of CMOs by the bidders and the elasticity of demand for the securities. The results reveal that the valuations differ substantially implying a significant elasticity of demand.     

The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply,Reach‐for‐Yield,and Real Effects

We identify the international credit channel by exploiting Mexican supervisory data sets and foreign monetary policy shocks in a country with a large presence of European and U.S. banks. A softening of foreign monetary policy expands credit supply of foreign banks (e.g., U.K. policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), inducing strong firm‐level real effects. Results support an international risk‐taking channel and spillovers of core countries’ monetary policies to emerging markets, both in the foreign monetary softening part (with higher credit and liquidity risk‐taking by foreign banks) and in the tightening part (with negative local firm‐level real effects).