Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

The marketing of love: how attachment styles affect romantic consumption journeys

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science - The experience of romantic love is closely interlocked with consumption journeys—yet how and why consumers engage in romantic consumption is not...     

Market timing,investment, and risk management

The 2008 financial crisis exemplifies significant uncertainties in corporate financing conditions. We develop a unified dynamic q-theoretic framework where firms have both a precautionary-savings motive and a market-timing motive for external financing and payout decisions, induced by stochastic financing conditions. The model predicts (1) cuts in investment and payouts in bad times and equity issues in good times even without immediate financing needs; (2) a positive correlation between equity issuance and stock repurchase waves. We show quantitatively that real effects of financing shocks may be substantially smoothed out as a result of firms' adjustments in anticipation of future financial crises.     

Agribusiness and FAO: A critical view

The author seeks to redress the balance of views expressed about the role of industry in the UN system. He does this through a redefinition of the links in the Industry Cooperative Programme of FAO and its perceived role and a critique of the article by Kimberley Albright et al in the February 1977 issue of Food Policy.     

Audit committee performance: ownership vs.independence – Did SOX get it wrong?

This study documents a positive relationship between audit committee stock ownership and firm performance in large US firms from 1998 to 2008. This study also finds a positive relationship between changes in ownership and performance. These results persist throughout the sample period, do not weaken after Sarbanes–Oxley and are robust to controlling for endogeneity between ownership and performance. After testing shows that there is no relationship between audit committee independence and firm performance, these findings suggest that audit committee stock ownership is an important corporate governance mechanism and potentially a more relevant variable than audit committee independence from a policy perspective.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

Graduate Engineers and British Trans-National Business: Elite Human Resource Or Technical Labourers?

Bryn Jones, Peter Scott, Brian Bolton and Alan Bramley discuss the results of their cross-sectoral study of manufacturing firms in the UK. They find that policy of treating graduate engineers as an elite human resource is mostly confined to consortia having international cooperative links and to companies with ‘central interventionist’ HRD policies. the high degree of decentralisation characteristic of UK-owned companies, however, combined with the disproportionate recruitment of non-engineer managers, restricted the career development of engineers. All four authors are from the University of Bath. Bryn Jones and Peter Scott are from the School of Social Sciences. Brian Bolton and Alan Bramley are from the School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering and the School of Mechanical Engineering.     

The effect of customers' emotional responses to service failures on their recovery effort evaluations and satisfaction judgments

This study examines the role of customer emotions in the context of service failure and recovery encounters. It investigates how customers' emotional responses to service failures influence their satisfaction judgments after accounting for cognitive antecedents of satisfaction. The study also considers how customers' emotional responses to service failures influence how they evaluate an organization's recovery efforts. The research is conducted by surveying customers about their satisfaction judgments in two service settings, restaurants and hotels. The results suggest that customers' emotional responses to service failures will influence their recovery effort evaluations and satisfaction judgments in some circumstances and that the effects of emotion vary across industry settings. This study identifies the types of efforts that are most effective in helping customers “recover” from the negative emotions caused by service failures. Amy K. Smith (Ph.D., University of Maryland) is currently an assistant professor of marketing at George Washington University. Her research focuses on customer assessments of services, customer satisfaction and retention, customer service, serice failure and recovery, and customer-service provider relationships in both business-to-consumer and business-to-business markets. Her research has been published in the Journal of Marketing Research and the Journal of Service Research. Ruth N. Bolton is currently a Ruby K. Powell Professor of Marketing in the Michael F. Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. Her research focuses on how organizations can growth the value of their customer base through customer service and support. Her research has been published in the Journal of Retailing, the Journal of Marketing, Marketing Science, Marketing Letters, the Journal of Marketing Research, and the Journal of Service Research.     

Career Analysis: the Missing Link In Managerial Assessment and Development

Robin Jacobs and Robert Bolton argue that, although competency-based assessment methods have improved the haphazard management development practices of the past, they nonetheless provide an incomplete picture for improving performance and developing potential. They suggest that self-development through a career planning framework might provide the missing link and present a case study in this area based on their work in the Nationwide Building Society. Robin Jacobs is a Lecturer in Management at the Open University Business School as well as one of the directors of Transitions Limited, and Robert Bolton is Human Resources Manager at the Nationwide Building Society.     

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.