PRICE AND VOLUME EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CREATION OF STANDARD & POOR'S MIDCAP INDEX

In this paper we explore price and volume effects associated with the 1991 creation of Standard & Poor's MidCap 400 index. Prior work on changes in the composition of existing indices finds a significant price response to the announcement. Various authors link the effect to price pressure, information, an outwardly shifting demand curve for securities, and the increased attention that comes with inclusion in an index. Using event study methodology, we find significant price and volume effects during the two weeks leading up to the Standard & Poor's announcement, but no significant effect in the two-day interval around the event. Apparently, information leakage and/or anticipation preceded the creation of the index. The price run-up is permanent since the positive abnormal returns leading up through the announcement are not associated with significantly negative abnormal returns after the announcement. In addition, MidCap stocks significantly outperform the market during the fifty-two weeks following the announcement. Using cross-sectional regressions, we show that these prior-period abnormal returns are positively related to abnormal volume and institutional holdings. We also find that firms trading over-the-counter had larger price run-ups than NYSE or AMEX firms.     

Do CRA‐Related Events Affect Shareholder Wealth? The Case of Bank Mergers

This study explores how Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) protests and their resolution affect the market value of merging banks. We find, in contrast to earlier research, that CRA‐related events are not associated with significant negative market reactions for either bidder or target institutions. Rather, the market does not seem to respond strongly to CRA‐related events at all. The results appear to stem from the choice of an estimation period for establishing an institution's baseline stock‐market price dynamics that does not include abnormal security price movements induced by the merger announcement.     

The impact of CRA agreements on community banks

We develop three empirical models to identify the impact of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) agreements on the mortgage lending behavior of small banking institutions during the period 1990–1997. CRA agreements are pledges banking institutions make to extend levels of credit to targeted populations and are often used by institutions to reaffirm their commitment to the goals of the CRA. We hypothesize that CRA agreements increase the level of competition for mortgage loans in the targeted area, which in turn causes a reduction in the quantity of mortgage credit to be supplied by community banks. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, the results show that CRA agreements are associated with less mortgage lending, including lending in lower-income communities (CRA lending) and in minority communities (minority lending), by small community lenders. Evidence does not support a second hypothesis – that community banks respond to the increased competition by providing credit to riskier individuals.     

Assessing the effectiveness of the Paulson “teaser freezer” Plan: Evidence from the ABX index

How did investors holding assets backed by subprime residential mortgages react when Treasury Secretary Paulson announced the so-called “teaser freezer” plan to modify mortgages in December 2007? We apply event-study methodology to the ABX index, the only source of daily securities prices in subprime mortgage markets. Our results show that investors initially perceived that the Paulson Plan would improve conditions in subprime housing markets. Specifically, those investors who held the riskiest securities backed by subprime residential housing benefited the most from the Paulson Plan. These findings do not extend to the longer term, suggesting that any positive effects from Paulson Plan were overwhelmed by the continued deterioration in housing markets.     

Do CRA Agreements Influence Lending Patterns?

This article considers the broader impact of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) agreements—bank pledges to extend a certain volume of lending to targeted groups and communities—by examining whether they are associated with changes in lending to lower–income and minority communities in the markets where they are initiated. We find the number of newly initiated CRA agreements in a county to be associated with significant increases in CRA, minority and overall conventional mortgage lending in a county over a three–year period. The results are consistent with the view that the increases in lending represent new lending, with some evidence suggesting that the increases in lending are relatively short–lived. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that lenders view CRA agreements as a form of insurance against the potentially large and unknown costs associated with fair lending violations, poor CRA performance ratings and adverse publicity from CRA–related protests of mergers or other applications. The results are also consistent with the view that the effectiveness of CRA agreements in increasing lending activity is ultimately determined by the persistence and sophistication of community groups in monitoring compliance with CRA agreements.     

CHANGES IN MARKET PERCEPTION OF RISKINESS: THE CASE OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL

In 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency stated that the eleven largest banking firms were “too big to fail,” implying they would receive de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. The question is whether this announcement altered the market's perception of the riskiness of all banking organizations, not just those included in the Comptroller's statement. We address this question with two tests. First, through the examination of changes in institutional equity ownership from 1980 through 1988, we find that the announcement is associated with increases in institutional ownership at a time when a comparable set of nonfinancial firms saw reductions in institutional holdings. Second, through the examination of stock returns behavior of bank holding companies around announcements of dividend cuts and omissions from 1974 through 1991, we find that the Comptroller's 1984 announcement altered the market's reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by bank holding companies not specifically included in the Comptroller's statement.     

Is Race an Important Factor in Bank–Customer Preferences? The Case of Mortgage Lending

This paper tests whether there is a preference by borrowers and lenders of a particular ethnic or racial group that may predispose them to borrow and lend from each other. Using a narrow geographic area called zip code clusters, this paper groups minority-owned and non-minority-owned banks to allow for a homogenous applicant pool from which both borrower and lender preferences can be determined. This study compares Asian-owned, black-owned and Hispanic-owned banks versus white-owned banks that are located in the same zip code and adjacent zip codes. The results show that borrowing preferences exist between all applicant groups and banks from the same racial classification. In addition, some cross-racial borrowing preferences exist. The results show that across sample lending preferences exist for both black and white applicants with black-owned banks and white applicants with white-owned banks that are located in the same area as Asian-owned banks. Also, the results of the within sample lending preference model shows that white-owned banks have a preference for white applicants, at the expense of Hispanic applicants and both white-owned and Asian-owned banks exhibit a preference for Asian applicants.     

Disparities in Mortgage Lending,Bank Performance,Economic Influence,and Regulatory Oversight

This study investigates factors affecting changes in the disparity of home mortgage denial rates between white and minority loan applicants in the U.S. during the period 1991–1997. We develop a two-stage least-squares regression model that incorporates applicant-level characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, regional economic data, and bank-specific data as explanatory variables. Some have argued that mortgage lenders were under increasing pressure from industry regulators to extend additional credit to minorities and low-income groups during the period under study. The model includes each institution's periodic CRA rating as a proxy for regulatory influence. An alternative explanation is that market forces, such as improvements in economic conditions and in bank financial condition and performance, affected default loss estimates and credit standards in a way that disproportionally benefited minority and low-income applicants. The empirical findings are consistent with the latter hypothesis. We conclude that policy makers should consider the impact of market factors when assessing the allocation of mortgage credit in a particular demographic market. The findings also underscore the importance of controlling for lender assessments of credit risk when evaluating compliance with CRA and fair lending statutes.