The seasoned executive's decision-making style

Leaders make decisions every day of their lives, but how they do it changes dramatically over the course of their careers. At lower levels, the job is to get widgets out the door; action is at a premium. At higher levels, the job involves decisions about which widgets to offer and how to develop them. To climb the corporate ladder and be effective in new roles, managers need to change the way they use information and evaluate options. Based on a study of the decision-making profiles of more than 120,000 executives, the authors found that people make decisions very differently in public than they do in private and that the decision styles of successful managers evolve in highly predictable patterns. The most successful managers and executives become increasingly open and interactive in their leadership (or public) styles, and more analytic in their thinking (or private) styles, as they progress in their careers. The research shows that decision-making profiles do a complete flip over the course of a career; that is, the decision profile of a successful CEO is the opposite of a successful first-line supervisor's. When does the major change in focus occur? Somewhere between the manager level and the director level, executives find that formerly effective decision styles no longer work so well. At this point, decision styles fall into a "convergence zone", where managers use all styles more or less equally. From then on, the executives continue to evolve their styles. The most successful managers come to the convergence zone quickly and continue to adjust their styles as their careers progress. Low performers seem to stagnate once they hit the convergence zone; their styles do not evolve in new directions. Clearly, relying on past successes and habits is no guarantee of success-indeed, it may be the road to failure.     

The self-organisation of strategic alliances

This paper is based upon an analysis of various experiences of electronic commerce. It analyzes the role of private institutions in the organization of systems of transactions. Private institutions take place between public institutions (that are insufficiently specialized) and inter-individual governance structures (that do not benefit from scale and cognitive economies). These private institutions are very diverse and the paper points out the various types of services provided by diverse institutions depending on their constitutional mode.

While various possible institutional frameworks have very different features in terms of coordination, there is no most efficient institutional environment. Moreover, the emergence process of these institutional framework strongly influences their ability to survive. Very different institutional frameworks can therefore organize electronic trade quite differently in the various industries     

The Governance of Transactions by Commercial Intermediaries: An Analysis of the Re-engineering of Intermediation by Electronic Commerce

Efficiency arguments explain why commercial intermediaries exist and will continue to be involved in the exchanges despite the spread of digital networks. Commercial intermediaries provide producers and consumers with a set of information, logistic, securization and insurance (and liquidity) services. By bundling these services and by dedicating assets and learning capabilities to their production, commercial intermediaries allow transaction costs to be reduced. Digital networks per se cannot allow transacting parties to benefit from such efficient providers of intermediation services. Rather than establishing direct relationships among producers and consumers, the Internet will support a re-organization of existing intermediation chains, because traditional intermediaries will reinforce their ability to provide these service by using ITs. The analysis of the role of commercial intermediaries thus leads to a better understanding of the future of e-commerce. In turn, e-commerce provides New-Institutional Economics with a stimulating case study.     

Mercantilism and bureaucratic modernization in early eighteenth‐century France

French mercantilism is generally associated with absolutist policy‐making subject to capture by rent‐seeking interests. This article investigates how the Bureau du Commerce, a small state agency in charge of commerce and the supply side, handed out rents and privileges to private entrepreneurs. We coded how the Bureau investigated and decided all 267 voluntary submissions received between 1724 and 1744. It is shown that the Bureau’s formal, rule‐based decision‐making process could actually differentiate between alternate policy aims and target them consistently over time, with more or less powerful sets of rents. From this, a hierarchy of revealed policy preferences is derived. First comes technical innovation and diffusion, then local economic development; import substitution is only in the third position, followed by consumers’ welfare. Lastly, and in contrast to a long line of authors, it is shown that the production of luxury goods was not a significant or valued objective.     

Does fair value accounting contribute to market price volatility? An experimental approach

This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of accounting measurement rules for financial assets. We examine the association between fair value accounting for financial assets and market price volatility for nonfinancial firms in an experimental setting. One group of participants was provided with financial statements where held‐for‐trading securities were reported at fair market value (FVA). Another group received financial statements with investments reported at historical cost (HCA). Controlling for accounting data, we find no systematic difference between FVA and HCA for three different measures of market price volatility, despite higher earnings volatility and marginally heavier trading under FVA.     

The WACC Fallacy: The Real Effects of Using a Unique Discount Rate

In this paper, we test whether firms properly adjust for risk in their capital budgeting decisions. If managers use a single discount rate within firms, we expect that conglomerates underinvest (overinvest) in relatively safe (risky) divisions. We measure division relative risk as the difference between the division's asset beta and a firm‐wide beta. We establish a robust and significant positive relationship between division‐level investment and division relative risk. Next, we measure the value loss due to this behavior in the context of acquisitions. When the bidder's beta is lower than that of the target, announcement returns are significantly lower.     

Biased Auctioneers

We construct a neural network algorithm that generates price predictions for art at auction, relying on both visual and nonvisual object characteristics. We find that higher automated valuations relative to auction house presale estimates are associated with substantially higher price-to-estimate ratios and lower buy-in rates, pointing to estimates' informational inefficiency. The relative contribution of machine learning is higher for artists with less dispersed and lower average prices. Furthermore, we show that auctioneers' prediction errors are persistent both at the artist and at the auction house level, and hence directly predictable themselves using information on past errors.