Recognition versus Disclosure of Stock Option Compensation: An Analysis of Judgements and Decisions of Nonprofessional Investors*/CONSTATER OU PRÉSENTER PAR VOIE DE NOTE LA RÉMUNÉRATION SOUS FORME D'OPTIONS D'ACHAT D'ACTIONS: UNE ANALYSE DES JUGEMENTS ET DES DÉCISIONS DES INVESTISSEURS NON PROFESSIONNELS

Given the importance of stock options in the aggregate compensation of chief executive officers and other firm employees in the 1990s and early 2000s, the International Accounting Standards Board issued an International Financial Reporting Standard on stock‐based payments on February 19, 2004, requiring that all share‐based payment transactions be recognized at fair value in entities' financial statements. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Accounting Standards Board had already agreed to this principle and amended section 3870 of the CICA Handbook (stock‐based compensation) for financial periods beginning on or after January 1, 2004, making Canada the first major jurisdiction to require all public companies to expense employee stock‐based compensation awards. The revised section eliminated the possibility of disclosing pro forma net income and earnings per share only by way of a note. This research, conducted as a between‐subjects experiment with executive MBA students as nonprofessional investors, examines whether changes in the way stock option compensation is reported (recognition as an expense in the income statement or note disclosure of pro forma net income and earnings per share) affect financial statement users' judgements and investment decisions. Our results indicate that, consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, the reporting method does indeed significantly influence subjects' judgement of the expected stock price direction, but has no material influence on their investment decisions.     

An Experimental Investigation of Alternative Going‐Concern Reporting Formats: A Canadian Experience*

This study questions whether the current or proposed Canadian standard of disclosing a going‐concern contingency is viewed as equivalent to the standard adopted in the United States by financial statement users. We examined loan officers' perceptions across three different formats ‐ namely, an integrated note with a clean auditor's report (the current Canadian standard), a stand‐alone note with referencing on the face of the balance sheet and income statement (the proposed and now rescinded standard), and a modified auditor's report with an explanatory paragraph in addition to a stand‐alone going concern note (the standard adopted in the United States and other countries). Bank loan officers were selected as the appropriate financial statement users for this study. The results of the test of the hypothesis suggest that once the going‐concern note is fully disclosed in the notes, the style of presentation within the notes (a stand‐alone note versus an integrated note) does not significantly influence the reactions and perceptions of risk if the auditor's report is unmodified (i.e., if no reference is made to a going‐concern contingency). However, when the auditor's report is modified with an explanatory paragraph detailing the uncertainty and referencing the going‐concern note in the footnotes, the format appeared to convey a stronger signal of financial distress to loan officers. These results appear to differ from prior research, which holds that once the information is released in the financial statements, the format has no additional effect. The finding of this study is that the proposed and withdrawn Canadian standard was not perceived differently by the bankers from the present Canadian standard, but the standard adopted in the United States and most other countries was. This makes a strong argument for moving all the way to that standard as opposed to the “halfway” approach of the now rescinded CICA exposure draft. Thus, the public interest in Canada may not be served by adopting a halfway approach.     

Simulation of the Impact of the Recognition of Stock Options on the Earnings: The case of Canadian Companies*

One of the most controversial accounting issues pertains to stock compensation. In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) approved section 3870, Stock‐based Compensation and Other Stock‐Based Payments, on November 13, 2001, to take effect in January 2002. Section 3870 forces companies to “take a look at the real economic cost of most of the stock‐based compensation mechanisms” (AcSB Bulletin, October 2001, 1). The adoption of section 3870 was aimed at harmonizing Canadian accounting practice with U.S. standards. The new standard, which was initially based on two American accounting standards ‐ APB Opinion No. 25 and SFAS No. 123 ‐ gave companies the choice of using either the fair value method or the pro forma disclosure of net income and adjusted earnings per share to account for stock‐based compensation. The Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) nevertheless recommended that Canadian companies use the fair value method, which consists in estimating and recognizing the value of the stock options at the grant date.