The Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board after the Implementation of CLERP 9

This paper traces the establishment of the reconstituted Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) as a result of the CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, and its progress in developing auditing standards that are "in the public interest". The paper canvasses the composition of the AUASB, its transparency and due process, its relationship with the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board and the Financial Reporting Council, and its resourcing and attitude to researching issues of importance in auditing. The paper discusses methods that might be used to provide evidence of the efficacy of the reforms to auditing standard-setting.     

The Function of the Auditor-General: Independence, Competence and Outsourcing – the Policy Implications

Privatisation, outsourcing or restructuring the public-sector audit office in Victoria will have implications - economic, political and even moral. The authors believe that a more competitive system will, if operational independence can be put in place, bring significant benefits to the people of Victoria and will be a model for other jurisdictions. While the implications are enormous, the challenges that will need to be dealt with are just as great.     

Does the Cost Paradox Preclude Technological Progress under Imperfect Competition?

We consider a two‐stage model of R&D/Cournot competition with isoelastic demand satisfying the cost paradox (i.e., that equilibrium profits increase with unit cost). The R&D process has a binary structure, with spillover effects. We provide a negative answer to the question in the title: Under noncooperative R&D, firms will conduct R&D for a broad parameter range, despite the presence of the cost paradox, as a result of being caught in a prisoner's dilemma. A second‐best social planner is shown to have a higher propensity for R&D than the noncooperative scenario. However, if firms engaged in any of the known R&D cooperation scenarios, the answer to the question in the title would become affirmative. It follows that R&D cooperation leads to lower producer and consumer surpluses. This constitutes a major departure from the conclusions of the standard R&D model. Therefore, R&D cooperation in such environments should not receive favorable antitrust treatment.     

Evidence from Archival Data on the Relation Between Security Analysts' Forecast Errors and Prior Forecast Revisions*

Abstract. This paper examines the association between analysts' forecast errors at the earnings announcement date and the revisions to those forecasts during the preceding year. The study is an initial effort to use archival data from expert decision makers to test behavioral theories that have support in laboratory environments. Consistent with findings of conservatism in laboratory experiments, we find that analysts systematically underweight new information. This finding is most pronounced when the analysts are consistently revising their estimates downward throughout the year. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent le lien entre les erreurs prévisionnelles des analystes à la date de déclaration des bénéfices et les révisions dont ces prévisions ont fait l'objet au cours de l'exercice précédent. Il s'agit là d'une première tentative d'utilisation des données d'archives des experts en matière décisionnelle dans le but de tester les théories comportementales qui ont été démontrées en laboratoire. Conformément aux observations faites en laboratoire en ce qui a trait à la prudence, les auteurs constatent que les analystes accordent systématiquement trop peu de poids à l'information nouvelle/Cette constatation est très marquée lorsque les analystes révisent continuellement leurs estimations à la baisse au cours de l'année.     

Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit Order Market

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game with rational traders. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov‐perfect equilibrium. We then generate artificial time series and perform comparative dynamics. Conditional on a transaction, the midpoint of the quoted prices is not a good proxy for the true value. Further, transaction costs paid by market order submitters are negative on average, and negatively correlated with the effective spread. Reducing the tick size is not Pareto improving but increases total investor surplus.