Inflation And Efficiency In A Search Economy*

We present a model in which purely monetary inflation systematically affects efficiency, welfare, and relative prices. The model focuses on the microeconomics of trade in search markets under inflation. Inflation, by increasing the cost of holding money, undermines the market's ability to sustain long‐term customer relationships. Because those relationships generate the most efficient transactions patterns, overall welfare unambiguously declines.     

PAGES AS STAGES: A Performance Approach to Visitor Books

This article offers a contribution to the fields of tourist performance and language. By exploring a visitor book located at a heritage site in Jerusalem, Israel, it argues that texts produced by tourists can assume the semiotic status of performances. Consequently, tourists’ texts should not be viewed merely as instances of “discourse” or “language”, but also as organic parts of the aesthetic and semiotic aspects of tourism. The article describes four dimensions that establish the visitor book as a particular “stage”, and the texts therein as the tourists’ situated performances. Taken together, these dimensions constitute a model for the analysis of linguistic performance and for the semiotic interrelationship between stage and performance in tourism.     

Out of control or right on the money? Funder self-efficacy and crowd bias in equity crowdfunding

Our findings extend the entrepreneurship literature by highlighting the mechanism through which self-efficacy can hinder rather than enhance performance in entrepreneurial settings. Using two complementary experimental studies and a third quasi-experimental field study on equity crowdfunding decisions, we demonstrate that self-efficacy is negatively related to decision-making performance. This relationship is mediated by reduced searching effort. Our research also indicates that high self-efficacy funders tend to exhibit a “crowd bias” whereby they over-weight the opinions of the crowd, increasing the likelihood that they will fund poor quality ventures when such ventures are favored by the crowd. We introduce the term crowd bias and explore its effects, establishing that social indicators in the form of crowd cues can exasperate the negative effects of self-efficacy.     

Public policy for reducing tax evasion: implications of the Yule–Simpson paradox

The current study exhibits a new implication of the Yule–Simpson paradox with public policy repercussions. We construct Laffer curves of local property tax collection based on aggregated data and group division to residential land uses in Jerusalem. Results indicate that based on aggregated (dis-aggregated) data, the location of owner-occupiers and renters who pay a relatively high rate tariff will be on the upward-sloping (downward-sloping) part of the Laffer curve. Consequently, statistical test outcomes support Laffer’s controversial claim that for the few upper-brackets taxpayers, an efficient collection is associated with tax reduction rather than tax increase.     

A woman's place is in the… startup! Crowdfunder judgments,implicit bias,and the stereotype content model

We examine investor stereotypes and implicit bias in crowdfunding decisions. Prior research in formal venture capital settings demonstrates that investors tend to have a funding bias against women. However, in crowdfunding – wherein a ‘crowd’ of amateur investors make relatively small investments in new companies – our empirical observations reveal a funding advantage for women. We explain the causal mechanism underlying this counterintuitive finding by drawing upon stereotype content theory and testing a dual path moderated-mediation model. Based on archival data and a follow-up experiment, our findings suggest common gender biases held by amateur investors function to increase female stereotype perceptions in the form of trustworthiness judgments, which subsequently increases investors' willingness to invest in early-stage women-led ventures. We discuss our results with specific attention to how our findings extend the entrepreneurship funding literature as well as the gender dynamics literature in entrepreneurship and organization research more broadly.     

A computational framework for analyzing dynamic auctions: The market impact of information sharing

This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically important data, need not be welfare reducing. Our methodological contribution is to show how to adapt the experience-based equilibrium concept to a dynamic auction environment and to provide an implementable boundary-consistency condition that mitigates the extent of multiple equilibria.     

The effects of insider trading on insiders effort in good and bad times

We analyze the effects of insider trading on insiders' effort decisions and on the value of firms. We consider a situation in which the final output of a firm and the productivity of managerial effort will depend on whether the firm is in a good or a bad state. When the state is not verifiable, the managerial contract cannot be made explicitly contingent on it: consequently, a contract that does not allow for insider trading would lead to the insiders' facing the same incentive scheme in good and bad times. Under a contract that allows for insider trading, however, insiders will buy shares on receiving (ahead of the market) good news and will sell shares on receiving bad news; consequently, they will end up facing different incentive scheme in good and bad times. Whether this effect is desirable depends on how the marginal productivity of managerial effort in good times compares with that in bad times. In particular, we show that allowing insider trading may improve managers' effort decisions and consequently may increase corporate value and benefit shareholders.     

Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment

Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C78, J52.     

Direct and indirect knowledge spillovers: the “social network” of open‐source projects

Knowledge spillovers are a central part of knowledge accumulation. The article focuses on spillovers that occur through the interaction between different researchers or developers who collaborate on different research projects. The article distinguishes between project spillovers and contributors’ spillovers and between direct and indirect spillovers. The article constructs a unique data set of open source software projects. The data identify the contributors who work on each project and thus enable us to construct a two‐mode network: a project network and a contributor network. The article demonstrates that the structure of these networks is associated with project success and that there is a positive association between project closeness centrality and project success. This suggests the existence of both direct and indirect project knowledge spillovers. We find no evidence for any association between contributor closeness centrality and project success, suggesting that contributor spillovers play a lesser role in project success.     

Capital accumulation games of infinite duration

Consider a market in which firms accumulate capital according to the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation equation. Each player chooses a path of investment and thus an induced path of capital to maximize his total discounted profits which depend on his own capital and the capital stocks of his rivals. Existence is proved for such a nonzero sum, infinite horizon differential game and conditions under which the game converges to a particular stationary point, regardless of the initial conditions are shown. Thus, the game possesses the property of conditional global asymptotic stability.