Monetary policy with an overrestricted demand for money equation: Chile in the 60's

The purpose of this paper is to show that in designing monetary policy special care should be taken in the specification of the demand for money equation. An evaluation of the a priori restrictions imposed by Chilean monetary authorities on the demand for money equation during 1965–1969 demonstrates that monetary policy, rather than passively accomodating the supply of money to the demand for money as was the intention of the Central Bank, instead actively restricted the supply of money below the quantity demanded.     

The Effect of Real Exchange Rate Uncertainty on Exports: Empirical Evidence

Unless very specific assumptions are made, theory alone cannotdetermine the sign of the relation between real exchange rateuncertainty and exports. On the one hand, convexity of the profitfunction with respect to prices implies that an increase inprice uncertainty raises the expected returns in the exportsector. On the other, potential asymmetries in the cost of adjustingfactors of production (for example, investment irreversibility)and risk aversion tend to make the uncertainty-exports relationnegative. This article examines these issues using a simplerisk-aversion model. Export equations allowing for uncertaintyare then estimated for six developing countries. Contrary tothe ambiguity of the theory, the empirical relation is stronglynegative. Our estimates indicate that a 5 percent increase inthe annual standard deviation of the real exchange rate canreduce exports by 2 to 30 percent in the short run. These effectsare substantially magnified in the long run.     

LESSONS FROM THE SOUTHERN CONE POLICY REFORMS

This article assesses the design of stabilization and liberalizationprograms in the Abstract Southern Cone countries of Argentina,Chile, and Uruguay. With the exception of Chile, the reformswere not as widespread as some believed. Little trade liberalizationtook place in Argentina and Uruguay, although some of the antiexportbias was reduced by eliminating taxes on traditional exports.In all three countries, labor markets remained fairly highlyregulated, though it was easier to dismiss labor. In general,liberalization was gradual: even Chile's trade liberalizationspanned five years. The article also shows that the collapse of the three economiesin the early 1980s cannot be ascribed mainly to terms of tradeand interest rate shocks. The main causes of failure were poorlydesigned programs and poor implementation. These errors includedrestrictive wage legislation (Chile) or political instabilitycombined with a preoccupation with keeping unemployment as lowas possible (Argentina). Monetary policy to deal with growingfiscal deficits was inconsistent with the accompanying exchangerate policy (Argentina throughout its reform period and Uruguaytoward the end of its reforms). Financial deregulation was notmatched by appropriate supervision of the financial institutions. The article suggests several policy lessons for countries attemptingto resume growth and restore external balance through a combinationof liberalization and stabilization policies. First, it findsevidence that reductions in distortions produced efficiencygains in Chile and Uruguay even though Uruguay's reforms wereshort-lived. Second, the article shows that policy inconsistenciesundermined the credibility of the later stages of reform inall three countries, eventually producing a crisis. Third, itpresents data that call into question the use of exchange rate-basedstabilization, because of the slow convergence of domestic pricesand interest rates to international levels, which in turn canproduce unsustainably large capital movements. Fourth, the articlestresses the need for caution in financial deregulation.      

The translog production function: Some evidence from establishment data

This paper uses cross-section data from individual establishments to estimate directly, i.e., without using side conditions, translog functions for 44 four-digit ISIC Chilean manufacturing industries. Main results are: (1) The null hypothesis that the production function is Cobb-Douglas cannot be rejected for 39 out of 44 four-digit ISIC industries. (2) The null hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected for 35 out of 44 industries; the remaining 9 sectors show evidence of increasing returns to scale.     

MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO CAPITAL INFLOWS: LESSONS FROM RECENT LATIN AMERICAN AND EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Capital inflows to some developing countries have increasedsharply in recent years. Impelled by better economic prospectsin those countries, lower international interest rates, anda slowdown of economic activity in the capital-exporting countries,the inflows have furnished financing much needed to increasethe use of existing capacity and to stimulate investment. Butcapital inflows can bring with them their own problems. Typicalmacroeconomic repercussions have been appreciation of the realexchange rate, expansion of nontradables at the expense of tradables,larger trade deficits, and, in regimes with a fixed exchangerate, higher inflation and an accumulation of foreign reserves. Should government intervene to limit some of these side effects—andif so, how? The question is especially pressing in the wakeof the Mexican crisis of December 1994. This article looks foranswers in the experience of four Latin American and five EastAsian countries between 1986 and 1993, examining the effectsof the capital inflows on the economy and comparing the differentways in which these countries responded to the problem of "toomuch" capital.      

Reforms and macroeconomic adjustments in Chile during 1974–1984

This paper provides a background on the main macroeconomic developments of the reform period. After a review of the macroeconomic disequilibrium before the reforms, the paper interprets the macroadjustments. The interpretation covers two distinct periods: 1973–1976, when policy was based on a closed-economy view, and 1977–1982, when macropolicy was increasingly guided by an open-economy model. The paper argues that the setback that Chile suffered during 1982–1983 and the large external debt that was accumulated were the result of two major errors. The first was the use of the exchange rate to stabilize prices without due regard for the incentives for large capital inflows that arose from this policy at a time when international capital markets were very liquid. The second major error was in the second half of 1981. After a large drop in capital inflows, the authorities relied on an automatic adjustment mechanism, by which the monetary squeeze from the reduction in capital inflows would improve the real exchange rate. Because wages were indexed to prior inflation, the adjustment mechanism was bound to create substantial unemployment, as indeed was the case. The paper concludes with the assessment that most of the micro reforms were in the right direction and had the expected result — and the errors were mostly in the design of macroeconomic policies.