Money and economic activity,inventories and business cycles

Incomplete information is a necessary condition for any real effects produced by monetary impulses. An alternative to the local-global inference problem is explored in this paper. Agents are confronted with permanent and transitory shocks. Even with full knowledge about the stochastic structure their best perception at any particular time will usually be erroneous. Prices for each period are set at the beginning of the period on the basis of market conditions. The realization of the shock process thus creates a short-run ‘disequilibrium’ absorbed by inventory adjustments. This adjustment translates perceived transitory monetary shocks into serially correlated output movements. The analysis proceeds within the context of rational expectations It offers a generalization of equilibrium analysis in two respects. Prices are always in equilibrium relative to perceived conditions, but they do not reflect all ongoing shocks. Quantity adjustments reflect the perceived transitory shocks. The framework used involves moreover a stock-flow interaction operated by inventory adjustments. The stock-flow interaction imposes at any time a future expected adjustment path (for price-level and quantities) to the system's unique stock equilibrium. A major implication of the analysis resolves a puzzle experienced in a recent paper by Robert Hall. It reconciles intertemporal substitution with lagged effects of monetary impulses. It also reconciles small and inconclusive cyclic movements in real wages with the occurrence of production function and large variations in unemployment. Lastly, the nature of the inference problem determined by the pattern of incomplete information produces serially correlated movements conditioned on large permanent shocks.     

Heterogeneous inflationary expectations,Fisher's theory of interest and the allocative efficiency of the bond market

This letter considers the consequences of heterogeneous inflationary expectations for Fisher's theory of interest. It is further shown that divergent and erroneous expectations cause welfare losses which increase when either the variance of expectations or of actualinflation increase.     

Forex Intervention and Reserve Management in Switzerland and Israel since the Financial Crisis: Comparison and Policy Lessons

Open Economies Review - This paper compares the appreciation pressures on the currencies of Switzerland and Israel, documents the similarities and differences between their methods of interventions...     

The Limits of Transparency

This paper probes the limits of transparency in monetary policymaking along two dimensions: feasibility and desirability. It argues that, due to limited knowledge about the economy, even central banks (CBs) that are considered champions of openness are not very clear about their measurement of the output gap and about their beliefs regarding the effect of policy on inflationary expectations. Consequently, feasibility constraints on transparency are more serious than stylized models of the transmission mechanism would imply. In addition, no CB has made clear statements about its objective function, including in particular the relative weight on output versus inflation stabilization, the policy discount factor and the shape of losses from the inflation and the output gaps over the possible ranges of realizations of those variables.
The paper also argues that there is a trade-off between full transparency and full utilization of information in setting policy and that excessive transparency may facilitate the exertion of political pressures on the CB.
The last section of the paper abstracts from feasibility constraints and discusses the desirable levels of openness in various areas of the policymaking process. It is argued that the strongest case against immediate transparency arises when the CB has private information about problems within segments of the financial system. Premature release of information may, in such a case, destroy efficient risk-sharing arrangements and long-term investments by triggering a run on the financial system. This is illustrated within the context of the classic Diamond–Dybvig model of bank runs. The paper also probes the desirable levels of transparency in other areas of the policymaking process like the bank's objective function, the bank's output target, forecasts of economic shocks, disagreements within the CB board and the publication of CB interest-rate forecasts.     

The effects of indexation of wage contracts on macro-economic stability

The paper develops a simple analytical framework in which the shortrun affects of wage indexation on the dynamic stability of inflation can be analyzed. It consists of a unlonized labor market faced by a competitive demand. Without indexation, the wage contract is based upon the union's prediction of the price level during the period of the contract. With indexation, the same objective is achieved by contracting only once at some initial period, subject to the stipulation that the nominal wage is linked to the price level. The main result is that when the demand for money is sensitive to changes in the expected rate of inflation, nominal variables like prices and wages are more likely to yield an unstable dynamic response with wage indexation, thus endangering the monetary system.     

The redistributive effects of inflation and of the introduction of a real tax system in the U.S. bond market

This paper investigates which types of borrowers and lenders in the U.S. bond market gain (or lose) as result of the interaction of inflation with a nominal and discriminating tax structure. It is shown that an increase in the rate of inflation favors tax exempt institutions, and probably other lenders too. Corporate borrowers probably gain while mortage borrowers probably lose. The paper also investigates the one shot redistributive effects of indexing the tax structure. It is shown that the reform hurts tax exempt institutional investors and, probably, other lenders too. It hurts corporate borrowers and probably favors state and local governments and mortgage borrowers.     

Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets

This paper develops a simple intertemporal model of inflation targets within a framework in which the public is uncertain about the dependability of policymakers, and in which policymakers do not perfectly control inflation. The framework is used to evaluate the effects of various parameters like the rate of time preference, initial reputation, and transparency (or precision of inflation control) on planned inflation, announced targets and the evolution of reputation and of inflationary expectations. The paper also shows that, when allowed to choose the precision of inflation control, more dependable policymakers will often choose relatively more precise control procedures. Implications for the type of inflation stabilization (cold turkey or gradual) chosen by dependable policymakers are also derived. Received: February 15, 1999 / Accepted: March 26, 1999     

The effects of wage indexation on macroeconomic fluctuations: A generalization

This paper investigates the effects of wage indexation on fluctuations in employment, output, investment and the price level within a more general framework than that used in recent literature. The generalization involves: (a) a more general labor contract which allows labor supply as well as labor demand to affect actual employment in disequilibrium, and (b) a regular IS-LM framework which includes the previously used monetarist framework as a particular case. It is found that the effects of wage indexation on fluctuations in various economic variables depend in many cases on whether demand or supply dominates the labor market in disequilibrium. The exact dependence is characterized and used to reappraise recent results and develop new results.     

Monetary Institutions,Monopolistic Competition,Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance*

Recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy, but not both. This leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness. We evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework. We find that: (i) the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions’ relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation, and (ii) for plausible values of this relative aversion (and more than one union), social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank. We also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation.