A Long-Run Non-Linear Approach to the Fisher Effect

We argue that the empirical failure of the Fisher effect found in the literature may be due to the existence of non-linearities in the long-run relationship between interest rates and inflation. We present evidence that, for the U.S. during the 1960–2004 period, the Fisher relation presents important non-linearities. We model the long-run non-linear relationship and find that an ESTR model for the pre-Volcker era and an LSTR model for the post-Volcker era are able to control for non-linearities and constitute long-run co-integration vectors. Monte Carlo evidence produces support for the hypothesis that non-linearities may also be responsible for the less than proportional coefficients of inflation usually found in the linear specifications.     

The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource

Using archival data from the U.S. passenger airline industry, this study examines whether management control mechanisms aimed at mitigating moral hazard explain outsourcing decisions over and above transaction cost economics (TCE) determinants documented in prior research. Consistent with TCE theory, we find that in‐house production efficiencies and our proxy for transaction risk (i.e., deriving from transaction infrequency, transaction complexity, and relationship‐specific investments) significantly explain the extent of outsourcing of aircraft maintenance. We extend TCE insights to show that incentive delta (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO portfolio holdings to stock price changes) strengthens the negative association between production efficiencies and outsourcing while incentive vega (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO holdings to stock return volatility) weakens the negative association between transaction risk and outsourcing. Monitoring strengthens the negative association between in‐house production efficiencies and outsourcing, but has no effect on the transaction risk–outsourcing relation. The results suggest that the use of outsourcing to achieve cost savings is promoted through both incentive contracts and monitoring, but outsourcing to achieve the desired risk level is promoted only through incentive contracts.     

Organization Capital and the Cross‐Section of Expected Returns

Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. Hence, both shareholders and key talent have a claim to its cash flows. We develop a model in which the outside option of the key talent determines the share of firm cash flows that accrue to shareholders. This outside option varies systematically and renders firms with high organization capital riskier from shareholders' perspective. We find that firms with more organization capital have average returns that are 4.6% higher than firms with less organization capital.     

Growth Opportunities,Technology Shocks,and Asset Prices

We explore the impact of investment‐specific technology (IST) shocks on the cross section of stock returns. Using a structural model, we show that IST shocks have a differential effect on the value of assets in place and the value of growth opportunities. This differential sensitivity to IST shocks has two main implications. First, firm risk premia depend on the contribution of growth opportunities to firm value. Second, firms with similar levels of growth opportunities comove with each other, giving rise to the value factor in stock returns and the failure of the conditional CAPM. Our empirical tests confirm the model's predictions.     

WEALTH CREATION AND BID RESISTANCE IN U.K. TAKEOVER BIDS

In this paper we investigate the determinants of, and relationship between, wealth creation and bid resistance for a sample of 178 successful takeover bids in the U.K. Within the context of an event study approach we test a range of hypotheses against a background that recognizes the existence of agency conflict and the role of corporate governance mechanisms designed to mitigate its effect. The results obtained are interpreted within the context of the U.K. corporate environment. We find that wealth creation and bid resistance are mutually dependent on each other. We find evidence suggesting the presence of managerial and financial synergy but the absence of operational synergy. Our results also suggest that there is some conflict between managers and shareholders but that significant monitoring is exercised by the particular governance mechanisms we investigate. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Portfolio Inertia and Stock Market Fluctuations

This paper uses population‐wide data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Survey of Consumer Finances to resolve the conflict between overtrading and inactivity shown in administrative data on brokerage and retirement accounts, respectively. Considerable inertia is found and linked to characteristics (e.g., limited education or resources), but less to index movements: the downswing has encouraged staying out, rather than getting out, of the market. The small minority with brokerage accounts exhibits important differences in trading patterns relative to the population and invests small fractions of wealth in brokerage accounts. Results strengthen the case for default options in retirement accounts and built‐in trading provisions in mutual funds.     

When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As

We provide new evidence on the role of financial advisors in M&As. Contrary to prior studies, top‐tier advisors deliver higher bidder returns than their non‐top‐tier counterparts but in public acquisitions only, where the advisor reputational exposure and required skills set are relatively larger. This translates into a $65.83 million shareholder gain for an average bidder. The improvement comes from top‐tier advisors' ability to identify more synergistic combinations and to get a larger share of synergies to accrue to bidders. Consistent with the premium price–premium quality equilibrium, top‐tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions.     

The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios

We offer evidence that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEOs’ incentive contracts influences the effect of risk‐taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that, when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because RPE filters out the systematic component of firm performance. We also document that the use of RPE reinforces the incentive portfolio vega's effect on the total risk.     

On the Persistence of Cross‐Country Inequality Measures

We examine inequality persistence in a multicountry unbalanced panel using a battery of stationarity and long‐run memory tests. Inequality is measured by the Gini indices of income inequality. Results suggest that we cannot reject a unit root in inequality measures. This applies to both gross and net indices: thus while redistributive measures have reduced the level of inequality, they have not sufficiently modified its apparent unit root. A more likely conclusion is that inequality measures are exceptionally persistent if not strictly a unit root. We also introduce a new panel stationarity test useful for series subject to unknown structural breaks.     

Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership

High‐powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort, but they also expose managers to idiosyncratic risk. If managers are risk averse, they might underinvest when firm‐specific uncertainty increases, leading to suboptimal investment decisions from the perspective of well‐diversified shareholders. We empirically document that, when idiosyncratic risk rises, firm investment falls, and more so when managers own a larger fraction of the firm. This negative effect of managerial risk aversion on investment is mitigated if executives are compensated with options rather than with shares or if institutional investors form a large part of the shareholder base.