The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation

In this study I investigate the relation between firm‐level insider‐trading restrictions and executive compensation. Using a trading‐window proxy for the existence of such restrictions, I test predictions that insiders will demand compensation for these restrictions and that firms will need to increase incentives to restricted insiders. I find that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. Furthermore, these firms use more incentive‐based compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. These results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to restrict insiders and are consistent with the notion that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating executives.     

Management earnings forecasts and other forward-looking statements

We identify forward-looking statements (FLS) in firms’ disclosures to distinguish between “forecast-like” (quantitative statements about earnings) and “other”, or non-forecast-like, FLS.  We show that, like earnings forecasts, other FLS generate significant investor and analyst responses. Unlike earnings forecasts, other FLS are issued more frequently when uncertainty is higher. We then show that earnings-related FLS are more sensitive to uncertainty than quantitative statements, suggesting that managers are more likely to alter the content than the form of FLS when uncertainty is higher.  Our study indicates that incorporating other FLS into empirical measures provides a more comprehensive proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosures.     

Making out and making do: how employees resist and make organisational change work through consent in a UK bank

This article draws on fieldwork conducted in the back‐office of a major retail UK bank and explores how, when introducing change, management drew on contradictory normative and rational discourses. Its primary concern is to explore how, in this context, employees engaged in contradictory acts that combined elements of both resistance (‘making out’) and consent (‘making do’) that are difficult to disentangle. It is argued that although both are moves within the game, they can be distinguished from each other because the former works against the grain of corporate intentions, whereas the latter works with them.     

The kill programme: an ethnographic study of ‘dirty work’ in a slaughterhouse

It has been argued that ‘dirty work’ is characterised by strong occupational and workgroup cultures. This literature has mainly focused on direct workers, but this article largely attends to indirect ‘dirty’ workers, specifically meat inspectors, through ethnographic research conducted in a UK slaughterhouse. Four arguments are developed; the first is that ‘dirty workers’ may not all display group cohesiveness; indeed, individualisation may be more evident depending upon the technology used, internationalisation and employment conditions. Second, there is complexity and diversity within ‘dirty work’ and even single occupations can contain considerable variety, rendering generalisations problematic. Third, we argue that much greater attention needs to be given to the wider contextual issues affecting ‘dirty work’, specifically changing labour markets, itinerant labour, economic conditions and technologies. Finally, we argue that stigmatised work may become more so if it is equated with the low wage economy and/or undercutting conditions of employment through exploiting migrant labour.     

Entry and capital structure mimicking in concentrated markets: The role of incumbents’ financial disclosures

We examine whether the public availability of product market incumbents' financial disclosures leads to greater capital structure mimicking of incumbents by entrants. Exploiting a change in disclosure enforcement for German private firms in the mid-2000s, we find entrant-incumbent mimicking rises substantially in concentrated markets once incumbents' financial statements are publicly available. Additional tests exploring potential mechanisms are more consistent with interfirm learning underlying the effect than alternative channels. Our findings shed light on the effects of competitor financial statement disclosure on private firms’ initial financing decisions and highlight how capital structure dependencies among peer firms arise.     

Examining the Information Content of Residuals from Hedonic and Spatial Models Using Trees and Forests

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Machine learning algorithms such as neural nets, support vector machines, and tree-based techniques (classification and regression trees) have...     

Mobilizing consent: paternalism and cellular manufacturing

In this paper we explore the dynamics of the introduction of New Systems and Structures of Work Organization (NSSWO) in the context of the forces impacting upon organizational change in the unionized sector of manufacturing industry throughout the Thatcher period. This we do by way of a detailed case study of a major UK auto-components manufacturer. We explore a number of changes in work organization, including the introduction of a cellular-based system of manufacturing, from its initial strategic conception through to its implementation; the delegation of responsibility for quality to shop-floor operators and the use of more flexible working practices. In doing so, we reconsider the context of change, the detailed processes of change and the pattern of accommodation between labour and management. Drawing upon our previous work on the nature of paternalism (Ackers,and Black, 1991), we explore its significance in terms of management’s constant drive for more economic work practices and patterns of organization. Specifically we explore the significance of paternalism as a relevant concept in interpreting the case, and hence, also, as a relevant concept in understanding HRM. The case challenges the prevailing ideology that the ‘successful’

economic organization requires (a) a de-regulated labour market and (b)

a trade union free environment, or, failing this, that management needs to

develop an individualistic approach towards the work-force, moving from the

more pluralist‘industrial relations’approach towards an essentially ‘unitarist framework, as found in certain interpretations of ‘uman resource management’(Guest, 1987)

The paper is thus a contribution to the continuing analysis of those ‘tensions and struggles through which the open ended potential of labour power have been managed, through shifting patterns of coercion, accommodation and compliance into profitable forms of production’(Elger and Smith, 1994: 12; Thompson, 1990). By means of this case we attempt to explore this issue with respect to three interconnected

themes:

The place of paternalism as a relevant concept in the age of HRM.

The extent to which organizations may be better advised to look towards ways

to build upon their existing organization culture, rather than seeking solutions

from overseas models.

Linking with previous work on the ‘Joint Process’in the US (Black and Ackers, 1994), the paper raises issues concerning the ‘strategic issue . . . which managers have to face . . . the balance between joint regulation and joint consultation’(Storey and Sissons, 1993: 221), and hence the role of trades unions in organizational change programmes.     

Australian Socially Responsible Funds: Performance,Risk and Screening Intensity

We investigate the performance and risk of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) equity funds in the Australian market and find no significant difference between the returns of SRI and conventional funds. In an extension to prior literature, we examine the impact of the number of positive, negative and total screens funds impose on performance and risk. We find little evidence of positive or negative screening impacting total return, but find weak evidence that funds with more screens overall provide better risk-adjusted performance. Positive screening significantly reduces funds’ risk. However, negative screening significantly increases risk and reduces funds’ abilities to form diversified portfolios.     

Grades as incentives

This paper examines how grade incentives affect student learning across a variety of courses at two universities, using for identification the discrete rewards offered by the standard A–F letter-grade system. We develop and test five predictions about the provision of study effort and the distribution of numerical course averages in the presence of the thresholds that separate these discrete rewards. Surprisingly, all are rejected in our data. There is no evidence that exam performance is improved for those students that stand to gain the most from additional study.     

‘The times they are a changin’? transformative organizational innovations in financial services in the UK

Much of the management guru-based literature emphasizes the transformational capacity of organizational innovations (OIs). The excellence, quality and reengineering literature purports to abandon hierarchy, bureaucracy and management control; to eradicate conflict and instil an new team and quality-based ethos. Yet much remains unknown about how these OIs are operationalized. Here we question both theoretically and empirically the validity of such transformational claims by reference to our research within financial services. We argue that despite considerable changes, OIs remain both a condition of, and location for, the exercise of organizational power relations. Bureaucratic and hierarchical structures continue to pervade organizations. Work-related pressures and tensions abound concerning issues such as control over the quality versus the quantity of work output, work intensification and job insecurity. All of which impinge upon the performance of OIs, and belie notions of a ‘transformation’ of organizational cultures, structures or strategies.