The determinants of wagering behavior

The total volume of wagering at a racetrack is important since it affects both racetrack and state revenues. This paper studies the factors that determine the volume of wagering. One of these factors is the sire stakes, a major form of government subsidy. We conclude that this subsidy has little or no economic impact on the volume of wagers. Unless the state recoups nearly all of the subsidy in other ways, such as sales taxes on racehorses, the sire stakes amount to a direct transfer from taxpayers to the breeding industry. We also develop information useful to racetrack managers.     

Smooth Transition ARCH Models: Estimation and Testing

In this paper, we suggest an extension of the ARCH model, the smooth-transition autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (STARCH) model. STARCH models endogenously allow for time-varying shifts in the parameters of the conditional variance equation. The most general form of the model that we consider is a double smooth-transition model, the STAR-STARCH model, which permits not only the conditional variance, but also the mean, to be a function of a smooth-transition term. The threshold ARCH model, the Markov-ARCH model and the standard ARCH model are special cases of our STARCH model. We also develop Lagrange multiplier tests of the hypothesis that the smooth-transition term in the conditional variance is zero. We apply our STARCH model to excess Treasury bill returns. We find some evidence of a smooth transition in excess returns, but in contrast to previous studies, we find almost no evidence of volatility persistence once we allow for smooth transitions in the conditional variance. Thus, the apparent persistence in the conditional variance reported by many researchers could be a mere statistical artifact. We conduct in-sample tests comparing STARCH models to nested competitors; these suggest that STARCH models hold promise for improved predictions. Finally, we describe further extensions of the STARCH model and suggest issues in finance to which they might profitably be applied.     

Failed delivery and daily Treasury bill returns

If the seller of a Treasury bill does not provide timely and correct delivery instructions to the clearing bank, the bank does not deliver the security. Furthermore, the seller is not paid until this failed delivery is rectified. Since the purchase price is not changed, these fails generate interest-free loans from the seller to the buyer. This article studies the effect of failed delivery on Treasury bill prices. We find that investors bid prices to a premium to reflect the possibility of obtaining the interest-free loans that fails represent. This premium is a function of the opportunity cost of the fail. We also find that the bid-ask spread varies directly with the length of the fail. We rule out that our results are due to liquidity premiums, or to a general weekly pattern in short-term interest rates or the bid-ask spread.     

Capital forbearance and thrifts: Examining the costs of regulatory gambling

This article estimates losses embedded in the capital positions of the 996 FSLIC-insured savings and loan institutions that did not meet capital standards on December 31, 1979. We compare the estimated cost of resolving the insolvencies of these institutions in 1980 with the actual failure-resolution costs for those that were closed by August 31, 1994. Our most conservative estimates, considering only the direct costs associated with delayed closure of only the 372 thrifts that were subsequently closed as independent institutions, show that these costs exceed estimates of the cost of prompt resolution by over 16 billion 1979-dollars.R. P. DeGennaro is an Associate Professor and the 1996–1997 Tennessee Banker's Association Scholar, and J. B. Thomson is Vice President and Director of Financial Services Research.University of TennesseeFederal Reserve Bank of Cleveland