Financial liberalization and banking efficiency: evidence from Turkey

This paper examines the banking efficiency in a pre- and post-liberalization environment by drawing on the Turkish experience by using DEA. The paper also investigates the scale effect on efficiency. Our findings suggest that liberalization programs were followed by an observable decline in efficiency. Another finding of the study is that the Turkish banking system had a serious scale problem during the study period. The second part of our analysis relied on econometric methods and found that one major reason for such system-wide efficiency decline has been the growing macroeconomic instability of the Turkish economy in general and financial sector in particular.

Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act

The literature on distressed firms has focused on these firms’ investment, capital structure, and labor decisions. This paper investigates a novel aspect of firm behavior in distress: how financial health affects a firm?s lobbying and, consequently, its relationship with the government. We exploit the shock to nonfinancial firms during the 2008 financial crisis and the availability of the stimulus package in the first quarter of 2009. We find that firms with weaker financial health, as measured by credit default swap spreads, lobbied more. We also show that the amount spent on lobbying was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving stimulus funds.     

Bank reputation, bank commitment, and the effects of competition in credit markets

This article discusses the effects of credit market competitionon a bank's incentive to keep its commitment to lend to a borrowerwhen the borrower's credit quality deteriorates. It is shownthat, unlike in the borrower's commitment problem to keep borrowingfrom the same bank in 'good' times, the increased competitionmay strengthen a bank's incentive to keep its commitment. Banksoffer loans with commitment to the highest quality borrowersbut, when faced with competition from bond markets, they alsogive these loans to lower quality borrowers. An increase inthe number of banks has a non-monotonic effect; new banks reinforcea bank's incentive only if there are a small number of banks.