Trading for the future: Signaling in permit markets

Permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and (ii) the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way. These two concerns, however, may conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating the regulator's future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them, firms purchase permits to signal their need. This raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient. If the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market, the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non-tradable permits are better. The analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed.     

Policy instruments for pollution control in developing countries.

Economic development in developing countries must be accomplished in a manner that does not harm the environment with pollution. Pollution harms human health and productivity. Thus appropriate strategies must be developed that promote growth, reduce poverty, and protect the environment. A review of the current literature is performed with attention paid to cost-effective interventions i.e., comparisons of regulatory and fiscal instruments that can reduce pollution. Both direct instruments (like effluent charges, tradable permits, deposit refund systems, emission regulations and regulatory agency funding for purification, cleanup, waste disposal, and enforcement) and indirect instruments (like input/output taxes and subsidies, substitution subsidies, abatement inputs, regulation of equipment and processes, and development of clean technologies) are examined. Examples are used to show how indirect instruments can be successful when monitoring and enforcement is too costly. A careful examination of distributive concerns illustrate how the effect on the poor may need particular consideration and how groups with vested interests can help evaluate the probable success of such interventions.     

A Presumptive Pigovian Tax: Complementing Regulation to Mimic an Emissions Fee

If regulations are used to make cars and fuels cleaner, shouldgasoline taxes be used to manage demand for trips that pollute?Analysis of a well-composed program for Mexico City indicatesthat the emission reductions would cost 24 percent more if atax on gasoline was not introduced. A simple analytical framework is developed to analyze the useof abatement requirements to make cars cleaner, and a gasolinetax to economize on the use of cars. The two instruments shouldbe combined to mimic the incentives that would have been providedby an emissions fee. Thus, cleaner cars and fewer trips areanalogous to competing suppliers of emission reductions; theplanner should buy from both so that marginal costs are equal.Applying that rule, the marginal cost of emission reductionsis, simply, the gasoline tax rate divided by emissions per liter.     

Rationing Can Backfire: The "Day without a Car" in Mexico City

A ban restricting each car from driving on a specified weekdayis found to have increased total driving in Mexico City. Becauseof the ban, cars effectively represent "driving permits," andsome households have bought an additional car and increasedtheir driving. Greater use of old cars, congestion effects,and increased weekend driving may also have contributed to thedisappointing results. The ban has high welfare costs and doesnot deliver the intended benefits of reduced driving—quitethe contrary. The experience provides an interesting lesson in applied welfareeconomics. Theory indicates that this is a costly way of reducingtraffic and pollution. But the finding that the strategy iscounterproductive could be made only with applied quantitativeanalysis.