Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation

Summary This paper analyzes how learning behaviors can substantially modify the outcome of competition in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. We consider the case of a symmetric duopoly game where firms have imperfect information about market demand and learn through observing the volume of their sales. The main body of the paper consists in showing how market experimentation can explain the existence ofprice-dispersion in an oligopolistic industry. We study this phenomenon and its dynamic evolution in the context of an Hotelling duopoly model; we then extend the analysis to general demand functions and toN-firm oligopolies. We discuss some implications of the public good aspect of information about market demand. We then conclude with a few comments on what happens when the value of information in the oligopolistic industry is negative.We are very grateful to Patrick Bolton for his helpful advice. We also wish to thank Richard Caves, Anthony Creane, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Andreu Mas-Colell, Eric Maskin, Jean-Charles Rochet, Margaret Slade, John Sutton, Jean Tirole, Mike Whinston and an anonymous referee.     

Salvador Allende's development policy: Lessons after 50 years

Last year, 2020, was the 50th anniversary of the opening of the ‘Chilean road to socialism’ by Salvador Allende. Although the Allende government is the political reference for the 'socialism of the 21st century’ in Latin America, international supporters tend to disregard the primary cause of its downfall, focusing instead on the circumstances of Allende's death. This article explains the link between the Allende government's development policies and its macroeconomic outcomes between 1970 and 1973. It finds that Chile's economic collapse had an endogenous cause related to government policies. This supports the views of Mises and Hayek on the feasibility of socialist economic policies. Policymakers and commentators should recognise essential lessons from the Chilean experience to learn from past errors and effectively promote Latin America's economic development.     

The evaluation of a surveillance system for violent and non-intentional injury mortality in Colombian cities

Since 2002, the Institute for Peace Promotion and Injury/Violence Prevention (CISALVA) at the Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia and the Colombia Program at Georgetown University have developed and implemented 21 epidemiologically based municipal crime observatories in intermediate-sized municipalities in Colombia. These crime observatories serve as monitoring centres that provide low cost, geo-referenced methods of data collection and analysis, which allow cities to develop more responsive policies and prevention programmes and enhance governance. This article focuses on the methodology employed and lessons learned that may be applicable to similar settings. Worth noting within the results was a significant decrease in homicides after the first year of the programme. Whether or not such results could be attributed to the method or to the nature of the interventions and policy initiatives stemming from it remains open to conjecture.     

Entry and Managerial Incentives: A Note

This note reinforces the results in a paper by Sen (International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 11, 1993, pp. 123–37). It is shown that his assumption that the incentive schemes in a two‐period model are the same for the two periods is not necessary for the results: only the long‐term nature of contracts with managers matters.     

Corporate entrepreneurship through joint venture

One of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm is the active search for opportunities without taking into account the resources available to the firm at a given moment. In such cases, certain types of operation, such as a joint venture, may provide a quick solution to the resource needs of the entrepreneurial firm. Moreover, this form of cooperation offers a suitable context for partners to be able to learn specific knowledge pertaining, for example, to the country of origin of the market they are aiming to enter, or to learning particular activities etc. Bearing these two dimensions in mind, the objective of this paper is to analyze the role of the joint venture as a tool for undertaking different activities associated with Corporate Entrepreneurship, that is to say, strategic renewal, Corporate Venturing and innovation. An empirical study using a sample of 74 joint ventures suggests that this particular mode of cooperation is employed by the entrepreneurial firm to carry out some, though not all, of the activities associated with Corporate Entrepreneurship.     

OPTIMAL INVESTMENT UNDER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CONCERNS

We consider the problem of optimal investment when agents take into account their relative performance by comparison to their peers. Given N interacting agents, we consider the following optimization problem for agent i, : where is the utility function of agent i, his portfolio, his wealth, the average wealth of his peers, and is the parameter of relative interest for agent i. Together with some mild technical conditions, we assume that the portfolio of each agent i is restricted in some subset . We show existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the following situations:

• ‐ unconstrained agents,
• ‐ constrained agents with exponential utilities and Black–Scholes financial market.

We also investigate the limit when the number of agents N goes to infinity. Finally, when the constraints sets are vector spaces, we study the impact of the s on the risk of the market.     

OPTIMAL SELLING RULES FOR MONETARY INVARIANT CRITERIA: TRACKING THE MAXIMUM OF A PORTFOLIO WITH NEGATIVE DRIFT

Considering a positive portfolio diffusion X with negative drift, we investigate optimal stopping problems of the form where f is a nonincreasing function, τ is the next random time where the portfolio X crosses zero and θ is any stopping time smaller than τ. Hereby, our motivation is the obtention of an optimal selling strategy minimizing the relative distance between the liquidation value of the portfolio and its highest possible value before it reaches zero. This paper unifies optimal selling rules observed for the quadratic absolute distance criteria in this stationary framework with bang–bang type ones observed for monetary invariant criteria but in finite horizon. More precisely, we provide a verification result for the general stopping problem of interest and derive the exact solution for two classical criteria f of the literature. For the power utility criterion with , instantaneous selling is always optimal, which is consistent with previous observations for the Black‐Scholes model in finite observation. On the contrary, for a relative quadratic error criterion, , selling is optimal as soon as the process X crosses a specified function φ of its running maximum . These results reinforce the idea that optimal stopping problems of similar type lead easily to selling rules of very different nature. Nevertheless, our numerical experiments suggest that the practical optimal selling rule for the relative quadratic error criterion is in fact very close to immediate selling.     

What Do Farmers Want From Agri‐Environmental Scheme Design? A Choice Experiment Approach

Agri‐environmental schemes (AES) have had a limited effect on European agriculture due to farmers’ reluctance to participate. Information on how farmers react when AES characteristics are modified can be an important input to the design of such policies. This article investigates farmers’ preferences for different design options in a specific AES aimed at encouraging nitrogen fixing crops in marginal dry‐land areas in Spain. We use a choice experiment survey conducted in two regions (Aragón and Andalusia). The analysis employs an error component random parameter logit model allowing for preference heterogeneity and correlation amongst the non‐status quo alternatives. Farmers show a strong preference for maintaining their current management strategies; however, significant savings in cost or increased participation can be obtained by modifying some AES attributes.     

Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts

This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.