Contract enforcement,institutions, and social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised1

Social scientists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, it has been argued, lacked effective legal mechanisms for contract enforcement and instead relied on informal sanctions based on collective ostracism within an exclusive coalition. We show that this claim is untenable. Not a single empirical example adduced as evidence of the putative coalition shows that a coalition actually existed. The Maghribi traders made use of the formal legal system in order to enforce agency agreements in long‐distance trade. A subset of the traders did form a web of trusted business associates that contributed to informal contract enforcement, but this was very different from the hypothesized coalition, in neither being exclusive nor having a clearly defined membership. The Maghribi traders combined reputation‐based sanctions with legal mechanisms, in ways that resemble the practices of medieval European merchants. We find no evidence that the Maghribi traders had more ‘collectivist’ cultural beliefs than their European counterparts.     

Dissecting the Long-Term Performance of the Chinese Stock Market

Domestically listed Chinese (A-share) firms have lower stock returns than externally listed Chinese, developed, and emerging country firms during 2000 to 2018. They also have lower net cash flows than matched unlisted Chinese firms. The underperformance of both stock and accounting returns is more pronounced for large A-share firms, while small firms show no underperformance along either dimension. Investor sentiment explains low stock returns in the cross-country and within-A-share samples. Institutional deficiencies in listing and delisting processes and weak corporate governance in terms of shareholder value creation are consistent with the underperformance in stock returns and net cash flows.     

The Federal Reserve,the Emerging Markets,and Capital Controls: A High‐Frequency Empirical Investigation

In this paper, I use weekly data from seven emerging nations—four in Latin America and three in Asia—to investigate the extent to which changes in Fed policy interest rates have been transmitted into domestic short‐term interest rates during the 2000s. The results suggest that there is indeed an interest rates “pass‐through” from the Fed to emerging markets. However, the extent of transmission of interest rate shocks is different—in terms of impact, steady state effect, and dynamics—in Latin America and Asia. The results also indicate that capital controls are not an effective tool for isolating emerging countries from global interest rate disturbances. Changes in the slope of the U.S. yield curve, including changes generated by a “twist” policy, affect domestic interest rates in emerging countries. I also provide a detailed case study for Chile.