Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING IN NORWAY: A DISCUSSION WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Accrual accounting is now being introduced in governmental organizations internationally. Some scholars have, however, questioned this development, implying that other accounting theories, like cameral accounting, should also be considered for use in these organizations. Since Norway is a country, which has not introduced accrual accounting in the governmental sector, the purpose of this paper is to study the evolution of governmental accounting in this country. Based on the Norwegian experiences, the paper aims to present some conclusions for the further international development of governmental accounting.     

How does PLM technology support knowledge transfer and translation in new product development? Transparency and boundary spanners in an international context

Information Technology is often viewed as imposing too much standardization and limiting flexibility in New Product Development (NPD). This paper aims at understanding how the use of Product Lifecycle Management Technology (PLM) contributes to knowledge sharing in an international NPD environment. The research is based on a longitudinal case study of a consumer goods industry group and involved development teams in Europe and local suppliers in China. Knowledge transfer and translation were observed through the reduction of communication glitches among members and increased NPD work with Chinese suppliers. The results of the case study indicate that (1), with an important codification effort, the use of PLM technology resulted in higher data and network transparency and enhanced knowledge transfer; (2) PLM served as a particularly useful tool for knowledge translation especially for boundary spanners in their work relationships. While PLM can be considered the main mechanism for knowledge transfer in this context, the case suggests that knowledge translation requires a boundary spanner intervention and that, with the use of PLM, they reinforce each other. Particularly noteworthy was a positive shift in the boundary spanners' roles from the project leader to the outsourcing engineer. In turn, this unintended consequence reinforced their credibility and the legitimacy of the use of the system with the Chinese suppliers.     

Securities fraud

Recent frauds in investment banks and securities houses have revealed how vulnerable modern financial institutions are to criminal activity by their employees. In this paper, we examine how regulators may limit the incidence of securities fraud by encouraging firms to provide managers and dealers with appropriate incentives and by imposing ex post penalties once a fraud has been discovered     

Discretionary write-downs,write-offs,and other restructuring provisions: a signaling approach

This paper introduces a model seeking to explain the discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions reported by managers. The model comprises a firm, a manager, and a financial market. The firm is about to be restructured. The manager has some private information about the likelihood of success of his restructuring action. The manager may recognise all or part of the expenditure associated with his future restructuring action by reporting a discretionary restructuring provision. The manager chooses whether or not to report a provision, recognising the impact of the provision on his compensation. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his provision policy. Testable implications are consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), and Zucca and Campbell (1992).     

Regulatory competition and rules/principles‐based regulation

This paper analyses how regulatory competition affects principles‐based and rules‐based systems of regulation. Competition between regulators creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage that generates a race to the bottom by regulators that is socially harmful. We derive the welfare effects of such competition and the regulatory response to these effects, in particular, regulatory harmonisation. We find, however, that regulators can adopt harmful regulatory harmonisation. These effects can make coordination efforts in developing global regulation socially desirable. We demonstrate, moreover, that corporate lobbying is not always harmful: it can both encourage and discourage socially desirable regulation.     

Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders

The literature suggests that security design can be used to manipulate the information content of securities prices [what is referred to as the “informational leverage effect” in Boot and Thakor (J Finance 48, 1349–1378, 1993)]. The informational leverage effect arises in this literature in a market microstructure environment in which noise trade is exogenous, which is a fairly standard assumption dating back to the framework developed in Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70, 393–408, 1980). This assumption is relaxed in our paper, and we show that the informational effects described in the related literature become less clear cut when noise trading activity is endogenous. We find that the intensity and direction of these effects depends crucially on the parameters describing the modeling environment. The elegant point of the informational leverage literature is that these effects arise largely independently of such parameters, but with endogenous noise trading that is no longer true. This literature may, therefore, lead to too strong conclusions being drawn about the relationship between information revelation and security design. We are very grateful for the helpful comments made by an anonymous referee.     

Revisions of labeling for personal watercraft: Part 1 – label development

This two-part paper presents a comprehensive case study related to the development and evaluation of warning labels. In particular, this two-part paper describes the development and evaluation of revised warning labels applicable to a class of products known as personal watercraft (PWCs), and serves as an example application of a general warnings design process described by Frantz et al. Part 1, presented in this paper, includes the process of project planning, identifying and analyzing hazards, and developing two preliminary warning labels to address PWC operational hazards. Included are discussions regarding the methods used to address problems frequently encountered in the development of warning labels. Topics of these discussions include the prioritization and selection of hazards to be addressed, message development strategies, avoiding information overload, and organizing the presentation of information using human factors models and concepts. The work conducted in Part 1 resulted in two preliminary labels: one label dealing with issues related to Collision Avoidance and a second label dealing with General Operational Hazards. Part 2, the companion article, describes the process of evaluating and revising the preliminary labeling to produce the final labels. Discussions regarding the methods used to address challenges related to the evaluation and revision of warning labels are provided. As a result of the entire process, revised labels for PWCs with increased uniformity will be used by PWC manufacturers, although flexibility for specific model features or future changes in design will be retained.     

Discretionary Accounting Choices: A Debt covenants Based Signalling Approach

This paper seeks to explain the discretionary accounting choices made by managers in a world characterised by asymmetric information between managers and investors. It considers a firm whose capital structure consists of both debt and equity, a manager who protects the interests of the firm's existing shareholders, and a financial market. The manager is committed to engage in an investment opportunity and needs to raise some equity to finance it. He is furthermore endowed with some private information about his firm's future earnings. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his accounting choices. In this equilibrium, the selection of balance sheet strengthening and income increasing accounting choices signals unfavourable information while the use of balance-sheet weakening and income- decreasing accounting choices signals favourable private information. The latter firms should thus experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of their accounting choices.     

The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm

The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity. The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important role in reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporate restructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which counters existing models of agency driven takeover activity. The model can therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictions which discriminate between the agency paradigm and the corporate restructuring paradigm of takeover activity. Negative post-merger performance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent with corporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and that takeover targets' investment levels are below or at the average (Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flow theory is also consistent with this model.