A Theory of Endogenous Commitment

Commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action. The weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed, as it is assumed. This paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model. We construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish, but pay a switching cost if they do so. We show that for games with two players and two actions there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium with a simple structure. This equilibrium is independent of the order and timing of moves and is robust to other protocol specifications. Moreover, despite the perfect information nature of the model and the costly switches, strategic delays may arise in equilibrium. The flexibility of the model allows us to apply it to various environments. In particular, we study an entry deterrence situation. Its equilibrium is intuitive and illustrative of how commitment power is endogenously determined.     

Competition,Loan Rates,and Information Dispersion in Nonprofit and For‐Profit Microcredit Markets

We describe the competitive environment of microcredit markets globally and we study the effects of competition on loan rates of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We use a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs in 67 countries over 2002–2008. Controlling for interest rate ceilings and other country‐specific factors, we first find that nonprofits are relatively insensitive to industry‐wide concentration changes, while for‐profits charge significantly lower rates in less concentrated markets. Second, we find spillover effects between the for‐profit and nonprofit segments. Third, we show that the effects of concentration are consistent with an information dispersion mechanism.     

INFLATION STABILIZATION AND NOMINAL ANCHORS

This paper analyzes the choice of a nominal anchor in disinflation programs in chronic inflation countries. Both theory and evidence suggest several conclusions. (i) The recessionary effects associated with disinflation appear in the early stages of money-based programs but only in the late stages of exchange rate-based programs. (ii) Lack of credibility is more disruptive under fixed exchange rates than under floating exchange rates. (iii) Attempting to pursue a disinflationary policy while maintaining a given level of the real exchange rate is likely to be self-defeating. (iv) A high degree of currency substitution favors the exchange rate as the nominal anchor.     

THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

Since 1990, capital has flowed from industrial countries to developing regions like Latin America and parts of Asia. Most countries welcome reentry into international capital markets. However, capital inflows often are associated with inflationary pressures, a real exchange rate appreciation, a deterioration in the current account, and a boom in bank lending. This paper briefly examines how these inflows have altered the macroeconomic environment in a number of Asian and Latin American countries, and discusses the pros and cons of the policy options .     

Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation

This paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor: (i) the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and (ii) whether his/her replacement is an ally of the government. We identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government. We find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS

In Leachman et al. (2005) we use the multicointegration approach to test for sustainable fiscal budgeting processes in a stochastic setting in 15 industrialized countries. In this paper, we extend the analysis in order to rank these same countries as well as an additional three, according to the degree to which their budget processes are sustainable. Rankings are related to theories regarding the political economy of budget deficits. Evidence clearly indicates that fiscal performance is better where fiscal budgeting institutions are strong. Additionally, we find that in conjunction with fiscal strength, greater degrees of federalism positively affect intertemporal budget management.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE BASED ON A NEW DATASET

Do alternative exchange rate regimes affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently? The existing empirical evidence is quite mixed with slightly more papers supporting that they do. We show that such lack of consensus is mainly due to current literature limitations regarding the measurement of real exchange rates (RERs), the identification of exchange rate regimes (ERRs), and the control for the incidence of real and nominal shocks. To address these limitations, we construct a novel monthly dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007, which includes market‐determined multilateral RER and a proxy for terms of trade. We find that ERRs indeed affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently. While the evidence is generally consistent with Mussa's sticky prices argument, we find that for nonadvanced countries in post‐Bretton Woods there exists a “U‐shape nominal flexibility puzzle of RER.” We also find evidence of a “short‐run RER volatility puzzle.” Having controlled for the incidence of real and nominal shocks, nonadvanced countries' RER volatility remains between 25% and 150% greater than that of the advanced economies. Moreover, the key literature finding that short‐term RER volatility is higher in Bretton Woods (BW) than in post‐Bretton Woods (PBW) for industrialized countries vanishes when using market‐determined multilateral RER instead of official bilateral RER. (JEL F31, F33, F41)