Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies’ investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors’ independence and companies’ opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms’ incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.     

Sequential Solutions to Capacity‐Planning and Pricing Decisions*

Ideally, firms should jointly solve capacity‐planning and product‐pricing problems. In practice, informational limitations and cognitive bounds may force firms to sequentially solve the two problems. For example, a firm may plan capacity using limited demand information, and update prices subsequently once additional demand information becomes available. In a simple setting, we characterize the economic loss due to such sequential planning. We use simulation experiments to assess the extent of this loss in more complex settings. We find a relatively low loss if the firm plans for capacity using limited demand information and subsequently adjusts product prices to reflect realized market conditions. However, even “reasonable” restrictions on the subsequent price adjustment (e.g., constraining adjusted prices to always exceed full cost) lead to significant economic loss.     

Effectiveness of alternative channels of monetary policy transmission: some evidence for India

In this article, we have employed ‘shutdown’ methodology, not used before in the Indian context, to study the relative importance of alternative channels of monetary policy transmission. We have, for the first time, studied the impact of monetary policy on consumer price index (CPI) inflation. In response to a shock to the operating target, the maximum decline in gross domestic product growth occurs with a lag of two to three quarters, while the impact on inflation (both CPI and wholesale price index) is felt with a lag of three to four quarters. The interest rate channel is found to be the most dominant channel of monetary policy transmission in India.     

Expensing Versus Capitalization

We develop a theoretical framework to study the effects of expensing versus capitalization of investment expenditures on capital market asset prices, corporate investment, and investment efficiency. We use a two‐period model in which the financial reports at the end of the first period influence the price of the firm. In the first period, the current owner makes an investment decision that yields returns during the first and the second periods. We highlight the benefits and costs of the matching principle in GAAP and identify conditions under which less disclosure improves investment efficiency. We find that, in terms of investment efficiency, expensing beats capitalization if and only if the expected growth rate is high, the growth volatility is large, or the earnings persistence is small. We also offer testable empirical implications for accounting choice and for real earnings management.     

The Effects of Biasing Performance Measurement Systems on Incentives and Retention Decisions

We examine a principal–agent setting in which the principal uses a performance measurement system for multiple purposes—to provide incentives and for retention decisions. The principal chooses the nature and extent of bias in the system, which determines whether the performance report is stringent, neutral, or lenient relative to the unobservable actual outcome. We show that when the report is used only for incentive purposes (an incentive role), stringency alleviates moral hazard. On the other hand, when the principal's objective is to minimize the cost from incorrect retention and firing decisions (a fit evaluation role), there is a demand for leniency. Surprisingly, however, we show that adding a fit evaluation role to a system serving an incentive role can accentuate the demand for stringency because stronger incentives can also indirectly improve retention decisions.     

Earnings co-movements and earnings manipulation

This study develops a theory that predicts the lower the degree to which firms’ earnings are correlated with the industry the greater the probability a firm will issue a biased signal of firm performance. The theory provides for causal predictions in our empirical tests in which we examine the probability a firm will be subject to an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The empirical findings provide support for the theory, even after controlling for various predictive variables from the literature, indicating the degree of earnings co-movements with the industry is in fact a causal factor in managers decisions to bias earnings reports. We further illustrate that low co-movement firms are less conservative than high co-movement firms, which provides an application of our theory to a broader setting. Overall, we provide both a theory and an empirical validation of the theory helping to discipline the thinking about earnings management and allowing for causal relations to be uncovered.     

The certification role of insider participation in PIPEs

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - In this paper we provide new insights into the motives underlying insider participation in private investments in public equity (PIPEs) by...     

Voluntary disclosures and information production by analysts

We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures. Moreover, a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures.     

Responding to QE taper from the receiving end

This paper analyses the spillovers of quantitative easing (QE) and their taper in India, as there could be country-specific nuances that qualify the inferences thrown up by cross-country studies, and therefore, can enrich and empower the on-going debate. Using a combination of event study analyses, generalized method of moments and VAR estimates, it finds that QEs have significantly altered monetary conditions in India. Among the QEs, QE1 had the largest impact and taper announcement had a strong negative impact, with the spillovers working mainly through the portfolio rebalancing channel, followed by the liquidity channel. Going forward, emerging economies are likely to take into account these spillovers in the conduct of monetary policy, with implications for both policy autonomy and global welfare.