Free cash flow, debt-monitoring and managers' LIFO/FIFO policy choice

This paper explores the explanatory power of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis in managers' choice of LIFO versus FIFO. The association between FCF, and choice of inventory methods is based on the assumption that there is a potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when LIFO is the tax minimization method and that non-value-maximizing managers of firms with the FCF problem have incentives to choose FIFO, an income increasing method, in order to increase their compensation. However, since debt can act as a monitoring device and mitigate the agency problems of FCF, managers of firms with high FCF and high debt are less likely to choose FIFO than managers of firms with high FCF and low debt. The evidence is consistent with this expectation.     

Towards an integrated model for the transference of environmental responsibility

This research explores how environmental responsibility transfers to others. Although environmental responsibility is one of the most debated topics in environmental management literature, a framework describing how a teacher's environmental responsibility shapes the student's environmental responsibility is still lacking. Adopting emotional contagion theory as a lens, the paper addresses this issue via the mediation of emotional contagion and the moderation of a teacher's environmental concern. Based on a survey of teachers and students (N = 283) conducted in Pakistan, our findings provide evidence that a teacher's environmental responsibility can better transfer to students via emotional contagion. Additionally, our data establish that the transference of environmental responsibility from teachers to students via emotional contagion is more effective when the teacher has a high level of environmental concern than when he or she has a low level of environmental concern. Finally, the authors discuss the implications for policy in detail.     

Perks and the informativeness of stock prices in the Chinese market

While the literature shows that perks can affect firm values positively or negatively, we argue that firms with higher perks are more likely to be associated with a lower quality of financial reporting, which, in turn, can affect the informativeness of stock prices. Based on hand-collected data on perks from Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with lower perks are associated with higher informativeness of stock prices (or lower R-square). Moreover, the positive association between perks and R-square is shown to be weaker for firms with higher financial reporting quality through audit and earnings quality measures.     

Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise

Prior studies suggest that auditors with short tenure are associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or low balling. In this study, we examine whether industry specialization of auditors and low balling affect the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality. We find that the association between shorter auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists compared to non-specialists. In addition, we do not find results consistent with the low balling explanation.     

The Effects of Management Accounting Systems and Environmental Uncertainty on Small Business Managers' Performance

This study examines the interacting effects of management accounting systems (MAS) and perceived environmental uncertainty on small business managers' perceptions of their performance. Results obtained from using a multiple regression and partial derivative analyses of responses to questionnaires distributed to a sample of 42 managers/owners of light engineering manufacturing firms in Australia, confirmed the hypothesis that the effects of MAS on performance were dependent on environmental uncertainty. Under high levels of uncertainty, sophisticated MAS had a positive effect on performance but under low levels it had a negative effect.     

Chaebol,Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Debt and Dividend Policies of Korean Companies

This paper examines explanations for the association between Korean Chaebol, which are giant conglomerates supported by various government initiatives, and corporate debt and dividend policies. Unlike in the US, the Korean corporate sector is dominated by the Chaebol which are characterized by concentrated family ownership, political affiliation and bank ownership. These institutional arrangements are likely to encourage more debt financing. In addition, the study also investigates whether firms with more growth options measured in terms of the investment opportunity set (IOS) have lower leverage and dividends. Results using observations from 411 Korean firms showed that for a fixed level of growth opportunities, Chaebol carry higher levels of debt. Results also show that growth options were negatively associated with leverage and dividends. No association, however, was found between Chaebol and dividends.     

Decentralisation as a Moderating Factor in the Budgetary Participation-Performance Relationship: Some Hong Kong Evidence

This study tests the contingency or ‘fit’ hypothesis that the effects of budgetary participation on managerial performance will be positive in decentralised organisations and negative in centralised organisations. The responses of 37 managers from a cross-section of Hong Kong manufacturing companies to a questionnaire survey designed to measure the variables were analysed by examining the interaction term in a multiple regression equation. The results supported the interaction hypothesis and found that at high levels of decentralisation there is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance but at low levels of decentralisation this relationship is negative. These findings have implications for the design of effective control subsystems.     

Investor legal protection and earnings management: A study of Chinese H-shares and Hong Kong shares

Under the unique “one country, two systems” arrangement, the more stringent investor protection rules in Hong Kong are not enforceable in firms that are incorporated in China but listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange (H-shares). As such, H-shares and other local Hong Kong firms are subject to different investor protection regimes in the same stock market. We find that H-shares are associated with higher earnings management than local Hong Kong firms after controlling for disparity in economic development, types of controlling shareholders and other factors. More importantly, this relationship is weaker after China implemented the Securities Law in 1999. The results are robust after considering the dual-listing status of H-shares and board characteristics. These results provide direct evidence showing the effect of investor legal protection on financial reporting quality.     

The association between cost of debt and Hong Kong politically connected firms

This paper investigates the association between Hong Kong politically connected (PCON) firms and their cost of debt and find these firms are associated with significantly lower interest rates being charged by lenders compared to other (non-PCON) firms. We compare our results with earlier investigations of Malaysian and U.S. PCON firms and find that our results are consistent with the results of the U.S. but inconsistent with that of Malaysia. Our results suggest that the economic wealth, the extent of political power, and the pervasiveness of firms having political connections could account for the cross-country differences between the cost of debt and PCON firms.     

Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing

This study examines whether political connection to firms affects the association between audit committee independence and demand for higher quality audits. In line with Carcello et al. (2002), our findings show that there is a positive association between audit committee independence and audit fees thus supporting the hypothesis that more independent audit committees demand higher audit quality. However, we find that this relationship is weaker for politically connected (PCON) firms suggesting that the independence of audit committees in Malaysian PCON firms may be compromised. Additionally, we provide evidence that PCON firms that have CEO duality are perceived by audit firms as being of higher risk than CEO duality firms without political connection.