International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems

This article uses managerial control rights data for over 5000firms from 31 countries to examine the net costs and benefitsof cash holdings. We find that when external country-level shareholderprotection is weak, firm values are lower when controlling managershold more cash. Further, when external shareholder protectionis weak we find that firm values are higher when controllingmanagers pay dividends. Only when external shareholder protectionis strong do we find that cash held by controlling managersis unrelated to firm value, consistent with generally prevailingU.S. and international evidence.     

Liquidity biases in asset pricing tests

Microstructure noise in security prices biases the results of empirical asset pricing specifications, particularly when security-level explanatory variables are cross-sectionally correlated with the amount of noise. We focus on tests of whether measures of illiquidity, which are likely to be correlated with the noise, are priced in the cross-section of stock returns, and show a significant upward bias in estimated return premiums for an array of illiquidity measures in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly return data. The upward bias is larger when illiquid securities are included in the sample, but persists even for NYSE/Amex stocks after decimalization. We introduce a methodological correction to eliminate the biases that simply involves weighted least squares (WLS) rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, and find evidence of smaller, but still significant, return premiums for illiquidity after implementing the correction.