VAR,ERROR CORRECTION AND PRETEST FORECASTS AT LONG HORIZONS

This paper focuses on the construction of forecasts over long horizons where a typical long-horizon forecast might span four years using 20 to 40 years’ data. It is argued that the presence of persistence in the form of unit or near-unit autoregressive roots poses substantial difficulties for long-horizon interval and point forecasting. These difficulties may not be overcome even by efficient pre-testing or model-selection procedures and might, in general, lead to point forecasts with large asymptotic root mean squared errors and undesirably wide prediction intervals.     

CROSS‐DOCKING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN LOCATION‐DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

Cross‐docking replaces traditional warehousing, enabling continuous flow of items without storage. Here we model location‐distribution networks, that include cross‐docking facilities, to obtain the latter's impact on the supply chain. We formulate optimization models to minimize total cost in three multi‐echelon networks, each model generalizing the preceding one. The first includes a single manufacturer, one product type, and multiple customers. Cross‐docks are to be located between origin and destinations. Besides solving optimally, a tool for quantitative analysis of direct‐shipment decisions is developed. The second model considers more than one product: We determine a cost‐effective sequence of items for indirect shipment (via cross‐docks). Finally, in a network with multiple origins, optimal solutions are obtained for 40 medium‐sized and larger examples.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.