Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies

The inability of political actors to make credible promisesto broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinantof civil war—causes both elected and unelected governmentsto pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off andmore prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are alsoless able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfactionwith rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowingregimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgencycapacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulersfrom writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximizecounterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamplesusing various measures of political credibility support theconclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least ashigh as social fractionalization and natural resource rentsas a cause of conflict.     

Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting—but not in new—democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights.     

Limited attention in residential energy markets: a regression discontinuity approach

It is well known that limited attention affects consumption decisions, in particular, when the decision environment is complex. The objective of this study is to determine whether or not, and to what extent, limited attention is prevalent in residential energy markets. We use data on more than 10,000 randomly selected customers of a California-based utility company and examine consumption responses as measured by changes in kilowatt-hours after a bill has crossed a salient threshold. The results of a sharp regression discontinuity design indicate that consumers use significantly less electricity in a month following the receipt of a bill that crossed a given threshold, such as $50 for lower-income households, who then show a 2–4% reduction in the consumption. We find that even at the threshold, the degree of inattention is roughly 0.75, consumers still tend to ignore the actual (i.e., full) cost of energy use. As previous studies have found inattention to be related to income, we focus primarily on lower-income households. However, there is some evidence that higher-income households have a similar response at higher thresholds. Considering the urgent need to reduce greenhouse emissions and increase energy savings, our results may contribute to the design of more effective billing and feedback mechanisms for energy-end-users.     

Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES

The impact of property rights on economic growth is examined using indicators provided by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. Indicators include evaluations of contract enforceability and risk of expropriation. Using these variables, property rights are found to have a greater impact on investment and growth than has previously been found for proxies such as the Gastil indices of liberties, and frequencies of revolutions, coups and political assassinations. Rates of convergence to U.S.-level incomes increase notably when these property rights variables are included in growth regressions. These results are robust to the inclusion of measures of factor accumulation and of economic policy.     

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goodsand reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies,politicians often have incentives to divert resources to politicalrents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at theexpense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfectionsin political markets that are greater in some countries thanin others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on theimpact on political incentives of incomplete information forvoters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and socialpolarization. The analysis has implications for policy and forreforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.      

New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions

This article introduces a large new cross-country database,the Database of Political Institutions. It covers 177 countriesover 21 years, 1975–95. The article presents the intuition,construction, and definitions of the different variables. Amongthe novel variables introduced are several measures of checksand balances, tenure and stability, identification of partyaffiliation with government or opposition, and fragmentationof opposition and government parties in the legislature.     

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.     

Comment on "Evaluating Recipes for Development Success": The Policy Usefulness of Institutional and Political Analyses of Development

In "Evaluating Recipes for Development Success" Avinash Dixitcriticizes recent efforts to identify the "fundamental" causesof development and to distill policy recommendations from theseefforts. This comment focuses on the strand of that literaturerelated to institutions and development. Two arguments are important:that the rule of law and the security of property rights areimportant for growth and that they are the product of politicalinstitutions. Professor Dixit argues that identification andother concerns undermine the second argument and inhibit theformulation of policy recommendations. While these concernsare valid, research has begun to disaggregate broad politicalinstitutions (democracy and autocracy) and to look at the detailsof political competition, such as voter information and politiciancredibility, which are both more robust determinants of politicaldecision-making and more susceptible to policy interventions. JEL codes: O43, O17, O20, P30, P48