Bitcoin price and its marginal cost of production: support for a fundamental value

This study back-tests a marginal cost of production model proposed to value the digital currency Bitcoin. Results from both conventional regression and vector autoregression (VAR) models show that the marginal cost of production plays an important role in explaining Bitcoin prices, challenging recent allegations that Bitcoins are essentially worthless. Even with markets pricing Bitcoin in the thousands of dollars each, the valuation model seems robust. The data show that a price bubble that began in the Fall of 2017 resolved itself in early 2018, converging with the marginal cost model. This suggests that while bubbles may appear in the Bitcoin market, prices will tend to this bound and not collapse to zero.     

Practitioners' Corner

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. The year 1982 was not a particularly good period for the worldeconomy. At year's end, the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD) revised its growth figures for membernations from slightly over 1% to –0.5%, with some 32 millionunemployed in its 24 member states. In the United States thejobless rate was 11% and 30% of plant capacity stood idle. OttoEckstein found the economy in its worst shape in nearly halfa century. Truly the year belonged to Scrooge. Yet 1982 was a very good year indeed for financial econometrics,the debut of an explosion of activity in the area that continuesvigorously 20 years later, as the emergence of the Journal ofFinancial Econometrics attests. In fact, it can convincinglybe argued that 1982 heralded the beginning of our subject, andperhaps with the recent awarding of the Nobel Prize in Economicsto Robert Engle . . . [Full Text of this Article]     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.     

The Evolution of the Social Contract

Two transitions in the evolution of the social contract are considered, the first from the dominance hierarchies of the great apes (used as a proxy for our prehuman ancestors) to the egalitarian political structure of non-sedentary hunter-gatherer bands, and the second, to the reintroduction of hierarchical institutions of governance, primarily a result of living in fixed settlements after the inception of agriculture. The first transition was a product of biological and cultural evolution, which brought about big brains, language, higher consciousness, and a lower rate of time preference that enabled early man to sustain an egalitarian social contract and thereby escape the domination that confronted his prehuman ancestors. The second transition was a product of cultural evolution alone. The high costs of enforcing the hunter-gatherer social contract caused it to break down and be replaced by hierarchy when the domestication of plants and animals gave rise to a sedentary existence and increased populations. However, it is shown that the very biological and cultural adaptations that made hunter-gatherer egalitarianism possible were a necessary foundation for the spontaneous creation of complex culture and the evolution of institutions that would once again eventually make freedom possible and economic prosperity possible.     

Capital Investment under Alternative Marketing Scenarios in the Hog Industry: A Real Option Approach

This paper uses a real option approach to analyze the impact of alternative marketing contracts on the decision to invest in a cooperatively owned hog facility. For the numerical analysis of the impact, this paper uses a simulation method that incorporates early exercise, multiple‐state variables, multi‐choice decisions and temporal optimality. The results show that the option values that stem from the value of waiting to invest and choosing between alternative marketing methods amounts to 20–36% of the initial investment. Further, having an option to choose an alternative marketing method with different risk structure does add to the value of waiting to invest. Having an option to enter a 15‐year marketing contract increases the value of waiting by as much as $117,097 for the pork production example in this paper. Finally, the value of the option to wait is unilaterally lower under a risk‐reducing contract scenario than under a spot market alternative. This could explain the explosion in hog production facility investment during the 1990s when prevalence of contract production increased. Les auteurs ont recouru à l'approche du choix véritable pour analyser l'impact d'autres solutions de mise en marché sur la capacité d'investir ou pas dans un élevage de porcs exploitéà la manière d'une coopérative. Aux fins de l'analyse, on s'est servi d'une méthode de simulation intégrant une brève campagne, de multiples variables d'État, des décisions à choix multiple et des conditions optimales dans le temps. Les résultats indiquent que l'existence d'un choix réel permettant à l'exploitant d'attendre avant d'investir et de sélectionner entre plusieurs méthodes de mise en marché représente 20 à 36 pour cent de l'investissement initial. Par ailleurs, le fait d'avoir accès à une autre méthode de mise en marché, à structure de risque différente, ne donne pas plus de valeur à la capacité d'attendre avant de procéder aux investissements. La possibilité de signer une entente de commercialisation de quinze ans accroît la valeur de l'attente de jusqu'à 117,097 $ pour le type d'élevage porcin retenu comme exemple. Enfin, l'existence d'une entente de commercialisation atténuant les risques réduit unilatéralement la valeur de l'option « attente », comparativement à ce qui se produit quand l'éleveur n'a d'autre choix qu'écouler ses bêtes sur le marché au comptant. Ces résultats pourraient expliquer l'explosion des investissements observée dans le secteur du porc au cours des années 90, où la production sous contrat avait sensiblement augmenté.     

How Leviathan Taxes

The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights.     

Extending working hours: why not work 42 h rather than 38?—a CGE analysis for Germany

Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported.