The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats’ investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.     

General equilibrium with differentiated commodities: the linear activity model without joint production

Summary In this paper the existence of a general equilibrium with differentiated commodities is proved for the classical case of a production set with constant returns, spanned by elementary activities without joint production, and with a finite set of primary factors. This framework allows to proceed without strong assumptions concerning substitution possibilities, which are typical in general equilibrium theory with differentiated commodities, but which at least with respect to production are not adequate to the problem. Moreover, in our model general consumption sets are allowed. Thus true intermediate products are not excluded. Furthermore the possibility of survival without trade is not assumed.I am indebted to E. Dierker, M. Hellwig, K.J. Koch, A. Mas-Colell, M. Nermuth, W. Neudeck, and to an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. Of course, I am responsible for any shortcomings. Finally, support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB 303 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology

Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction.     

Two-moment decision models and rank-dependent utility

This paper extends results on the consistency of two-moment decision models with expected utility to rank-dependent utility preferences. The representations of expected utility and rank-dependent utility by --preferences have very similar comparative statics properties for linear distribution classes, except for the behavior with respect to small independent risks.I thank Soo Hong Chew for helpful discussion and three anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

Business managers and moral sanctuaries

Moral Sanctuary is used in this paper as a metaphor for any theory which makes actions immune from moral criticism. Three arguments favoring moral sanctuaries for business activities are countered. Two of the arguments rest on faulty analogies. One compares business activities to games, another to the behavior of machines. The third rests on the claim that business is a unique activity. This position is rejected by a reductio ad absurdum argument; it entails the immunity of all professional activities from moral judgment. I argue that business managers are accountable to the combined requirements of professionalism and democratic citizenship, notions which are briefly described at the conclusion of the paper.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Vis-à-vis vs. mixed dock door assignment: A comparison of different cross dock layouts

An important decision problem during the layout phase of a cross dock is related to the arrangement of inbound and outbound operations within a terminal. Either one side of the terminal is exclusively dedicated to inbound and the other to outbound destinations (vis-à-vis policy) or inbound and outbound destinations can facultatively be assigned all around the terminal (mix policy). The latter policy promises more flexibility, when finally assigning dock doors to truck destinations during operational planning, but comes for the price of ambiguous material flows and potential congestions inside the terminal. Both policies are compared with regard to their impact on operational planning, where deterministic, stochastic and unknown inbound loads are differentiated. Our results show the mix policy being superior in most cases except for unknown inbound loads.     

Strategic responses to fuel cell hype and disappointment

This article investigates the interplay of expectation dynamics and innovation processes at the level of organizations and at the innovation system level. We examine how different kinds of organizations contributed and responded to a recent hype and disappointment cycle in the field of stationary fuel cells. Among others, we trace how innovation and discourse activities changed and we explain the observed differences in strategic responses. We show that the sensitivity of organizations to expectation dynamics depends on at least three factors: the strategic embedding of the new technology, the organization's dependence on external legitimacy and its role in the innovation system. Moreover, we show that – in their aggregation – strategic responses affected the level of the technological innovation system as well. Not only did the pace and direction of innovation activities change, but structures such as actor constellations and institutions were also modified. Our study thus provides insights into the interplay of expectation and innovation dynamics, which is important for our understanding of larger transformation processes, e.g. toward more sustainable modes of energy supply.