Pricing in Segmented Markets, Arbitrage Barriers, and the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market

The paper uses micro‐level price data from the European car market to examine why there are deviations from the law of one price. The absolute law of one price is strongly rejected, but there is convergence to its relative version. Two sets of explanations are considered: (i) price‐setting in segmented markets, and (ii) arbitrage barriers. Overall, the determinants of arbitrage costs have more explanatory power. The single most important factor is the distance between markets. Evidence for Belgium and Luxembourg suggests that a single currency lowers price differences significantly.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

Introduction: What Role Can Experiments Play in Research on Regulation?

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

The minimum variance hedge and the bankruptcy risk of the firm

In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a “natural” hedge.     

THE ROLE OF INVENTORIES AND SPECULATIVE TRADING IN THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR CRUDE OIL

We develop a structural model of the global market for crude oil that for the first time explicitly allows for shocks to the speculative demand for oil as well as shocks to flow demand and flow supply. The speculative component of the real price of oil is identified with the help of data on oil inventories. Our estimates rule out explanations of the 2003–2008 oil price surge based on unexpectedly diminishing oil supplies and based on speculative trading. Instead, this surge was caused by unexpected increases in world oil consumption driven by the global business cycle. There is evidence, however, that speculative demand shifts played an important role during earlier oil price shock episodes including 1979, 1986 and 1990. Our analysis implies that additional regulation of oil markets would not have prevented the 2003–2008 oil price surge. We also show that, even after accounting for the role of inventories in smoothing oil consumption, our estimate of the short‐run price elasticity of oil demand is much higher than traditional estimates from dynamic models that do not account for for the endogeneity of the price of oil. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inside the Crystal Ball: New Approaches to Predicting the Gasoline Price at the Pump

Appropriate real‐time forecasting models for the US retail price of gasoline yield substantial reductions in the mean‐squared prediction error (MSPE) at horizons up to 2 years as well as substantial increases in directional accuracy. Even greater MSPE reductions are possible by constructing a pooled forecast that assigns equal weight to five of the most successful forecasting models. Pooled forecasts have lower MSPE than the US Energy Information Administration gasoline price forecasts and the gasoline price expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumers. We also show that as much as 39% of the decline in gas prices between June and December 2014 was predictable. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.